FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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
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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 46 APRIL 1968 No. 3

MUST WE INVADE THE NORTH?

By Roger Hilsman

IT seems more and more likely that the logic of the situation in Viet Nam will, within the next several months, push the United States into an invasion of North Viet Nam. The vast increase in both American manpower and firepower since 1965 has resulted in heavy casualties for the communist side, but neither the Viet Cong nor the North Vietnamese are about to collapse. On the contrary, as their recent offensive against the cities so dramatically demonstrated, they have the capacity to strike back almost anywhere, provided they have time for the necessary preparations. There is no convincing evidence that the recent offensive was a "desperate last gasp" or that the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam could not continue to take the present rate of casualties for years.

The bombing of North Viet Nam and the infiltration routes has not prevented the enemy from increasing both the tempo of the war and the level of violence. The pressures on Washington to do more about this, by authorizing "hot pursuit" raids into Laos, Cambodia and across the DMZ, are already almost overwhelming. Such raids, however, will in all probability also fail to prevent still further increases. If so, the United States will discover that communism cannot be destroyed as a political force in South Viet Nam, which is the present American objective, without also destroying communism in North Viet Nam. The United States must then either modify its objectives or invade the North, and of the two an invasion seems more likely.

But it is doubtful that an invasion will work. There are 400,000 troops in reserve in North Viet Nam, and Hanoi, certainly, will fight to the end. The terrain is no more favorable, and the wider

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theater will magnify the logistical problems. In addition, the probability of a Chinese intervention will be high, and, if the circumstances develop in certain ways, the Soviets might also intervene. If the *Pueblo* incident demonstrates nothing else, it indicates that the North Koreans might be willing to take advantage of a situation that leaves the Korean flank overexposed.

On the other hand, there is, I believe, an honorable alternative to invasion and its risks—an alternative that will neither abandon our true commitments nor damage American prestige.

II

The fundamental reason for pessimism about the possibility of winning inside South Viet Nam with the present level of forces is not about the American effort, but the Vietnamese. The logistics problem has been solved, for which General Westmoreland should be given the greatest credit, and the American and allied soldiers have fought superbly. But as one high American official in Viet Nam said last fall, "The improvement here is real, but it is 100 percent due to the American effort, and not one-tenth of 1 percent due to the Vietnamese effort."

The overall effectiveness of the South Vietnamese army, the ARVN, is very poor. American journalists who are permanently stationed in Viet Nam are in a better position to give an assessment of ARVN performance than anyone else except General Westmoreland's headquarters itself, which is naturally reluctant to make its judgment public. And the testimony of this group of experienced reporters is gloomy:

"—although the total of South Vietnamese forces is greater, American losses have been running higher, exposing the lack of ARVN aggressiveness."

"—nearly all of the American losses are taken on offensive operations, but only one-third of ARVN losses."

"—although the ARVN has doubled in size since 1962, its casualties remain the same. Many ARVN operations take place where the enemy is known *not* to be."

"—nowhere in the country can the ARVN be said to have made real gains against the enemy; what progress there has been is due solely to the allied and American forces."

Why? The Vietnamese are a brave and able people; the Viet Cong, after all, are Vietnamese. Probably no one knows all the answers, but two are obvious. One is the present Government's

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practice of appointing officers for their political loyalty rather than military ability. The second is the overwhelming presence of the Americans. As one of the old-time correspondents puts it: "Since the Americans seem to want to take over the war, the Vietnamese tendency is to let them—to sit back and let the Americans do the job."

Another reason for pessimism is the "pacification" program. Despite real progress in the organization of the American effort and the energy put into it, the results in the field even before the recent communist offensive were not encouraging. In many South Vietnamese villages counted as secure, where Vietnamese and American troops were present and things had been done for the people, the villagers were still hanging back from committing themselves to the Government side. There was really no convincing evidence that the "pacification" program had begun to win the positive allegiance of the people. And the recent offensive has obviously set the program back many months. No matter what the communists intended to accomplish with their offensive, it demonstrated that no place in Viet Nam is really secure—including the first floor of the American Embassy—and creating a feeling of security is the first and foremost principle of a successful "pacification" program.

Improvements in the "pacification" program are still possible. One is to eliminate corruption, which riddles the whole nation. Another is to reform the police, which is still the same kind of political police that plagued Viet Nam in the days of President Diem; it is designed more to protect the régime from its political rivals than to protect the people from the Viet Cong. The people in the villages know that the Viet Cong agents, the communist infrastructure, are still present even though the main-force units have been driven off, and even those who are sympathetic to the Government side feel that their lives would be in danger if they openly supported it.

Many observers believe that these reforms would bring important improvements. But others have doubts—of two kinds. The first is whether the Vietnamese can ever be either persuaded or forced to adopt measures of this sort. What we call corruption is in part a set of arrangements that underpin the whole structure of traditional Vietnamese life. Changing these traditional arrangements would involve a social revolution as fundamental and violent as that being conducted by the communists. The

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same may be said of the failure over so many years to bring about a change in the nature of the police.

The second doubt is whether these measures would really result in any decisive improvement after all. Some observers feel that it is really too late. In their view, the emphasis on military measures may have so alienated segments of the peasantry that the positive appeals of the "revolutionary development" program—land reform, schools, agricultural aid and so on—are not enough to overcome the accumulated bitterness.

"Interdiction" bombing and shelling of suspected Viet Cong huts and hamlets and of the movement of people suspected to be Viet Cong have certainly caused many civilian deaths. The latest estimates are that the civilian casualties for 1967 were about 24,000 killed and 76,000 wounded, while the combined total of American and South Vietnamese *military* deaths was about 19,000. Not all the relatives of civilians killed or wounded by American and South Vietnamese bombing and shelling turn against the Government. Some stoically decide only that war is hell. Some may even blame the Viet Cong for bringing on the attack. But there can be no doubt that many are embittered.

Then there is the problem of the refugees. Very large areas in South Viet Nam have been declared "free-fire" zones, where anything that moves is shot. In these zones, the population that could be reached has been forced to evacuate to refugee camps in secure areas and the villages have then been razed. The combined result of establishing these zones, of the voluntary flight of people to escape combat areas, and of Viet Cong terrorism has been to fill the refugee camps with two million people and to swell the city slums with an estimated two million more. Just how much bitterness there is and how deeply it runs no one knows, but as the hearings before Senator Edward M. Kennedy's Subcommittee on Refugees have shown, life in the camps is miserable. Sanitary conditions are deplorable, medical care is grossly deficient and the lack of opportunity for work has been demoralizing.

The main pessimism about the "pacification" effort, however, has the same source as pessimism about the ARVN—the lack of Vietnamese effort. Too many Vietnamese remain devoted not to the nation, but to the selfish interests of class, sect and region. Corruption continues, and so does apathy. There are many able and dedicated South Vietnamese who are convinced of the need for the kind of peaceful revolution of Viet-

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namese society envisioned by the theory behind the "pacification" program, but there seem to be too few of them too far from the positions of power. I visited one province of 160 hamlets, for example, that had been cleared of main-force Viet Cong units by American troops at considerable cost. But instead of 160 revolutionary development teams, there were only four. And these four could rarely be persuaded to spend the night in the villages assigned to them. Americans can help in giving the villagers physical protection, but they cannot win the villagers' allegiance to the South Vietnamese Government. That task can be done only by Vietnamese, and there is little evidence that enough Vietnamese are sufficiently dedicated and willing to make the necessary sacrifices.

All these pessimistic views are reinforced by a look at the political situation. Viet Nam is in the throes of two revolutions, not one. The first is the communist-led guerrilla war. The second is a social and nationalistic revolution in which the French-educated mandarin class, the new nationalists, the Buddhists, the youth and the "young Turks" in the army all struggle over both power and purpose. The Johnson Administration saw much hope in the recent elections in Viet Nam, while critics of the Administration have charged that the elections were nothing but a fraud. Both sides are probably wrong. For an underdeveloped country in the midst of a guerrilla insurgency, the elections were fairer than anyone had a right to expect. But the hope that the elections would provide a legitimate government that could enlist the forces of nationalism was misplaced. For this purpose, the elections may have been an important first step for the long run, but for the short run the best that can probably be said is that they were largely irrelevant.

A conversation I had with a group of student leaders illustrates the political malaise. "Most Vietnamese students," one said, summing up, "no longer think of what North Viet Nam offers as an appealing alternative, and neither do the peasants. But they don't think the Saigon Government is either. So both the students and the peasants will sit on one side—if they can."

What all this adds up to is that, in spite of the increases since 1965 in both the military and "pacification" efforts, the progress is not enough to produce real confidence that the war can be brought to a successful conclusion in the reasonable future.

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III

This judgment is reinforced by a study of the effects of the bombing of North Viet Nam and the evidence we have of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong intentions.

When the bombing was begun in 1965, there was some hope that it would break Hanoi's will and force it to come to the negotiating table. The evidence today is that over 36 months of bombing has made the war effort more costly for the North Vietnamese in lives, in treasure and in effort, but that it has only stiffened their determination to resist.

The fact that the bombing has not broken Hanoi's will is not surprising. North Viet Nam is an underdeveloped country. Most of the people live in a village culture, subsisting on what they grow themselves. The industrial portion of the economy is very small, and its total destruction would not radically alter the lives of most of the people. The worker whose factory is bombed moves back to his home village. The people do without, or repair and make do with what they have. Much of the industry of North Viet Nam does not contribute to the war effort at all; most of the war matériel is imported from China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. What war matériel is produced in North Viet Nam comes from small, rather primitive workshops that have long ago been dispersed and put underground.

If the United States removed the present limitations on its bombing program, it would not make much difference. Of the target systems that have not yet been bombed, the one that contributes most to the North Vietnamese war effort is the dike and irrigation system. An attack on that system would seriously affect the food supply of the North; it would also, it is said, bring large-scale flooding and loss of life. For humanitarian reasons alone, the United States is reluctant to embark on such an attack. If it did, the revulsion and political outcry around the world would be severe. In any case, it is doubtful that bombing the dikes would have a decisive long-term effect. The communist world would provide the necessary rice to make up the loss. Most knowledgeable observers also reach the same conclusion about the proposals to end the war by attacking the North Vietnamese civilian population. The cities have already been evacuated of all but essential personnel. The whole population is dug in, with individual foxholes and an efficient civil defense.

Secretary of Defense McNamara, testifying before the Senate

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Committee on Armed Services in August 1967, summed up the case against further escalation of the bombing: "As to breaking their will, I have seen no evidence in any of the many intelligence reports that would lead me to believe that a less selective bombing campaign would change the resolve of the North Vietnamese leaders or deprive them of the support of the North Vietnamese people."

There seems to be no reason to believe, in sum, that a continuation of the war at its present level or even an increase in the bombing would accomplish the United States objective of destroying communism as a political force in South Viet Nam. Hanoi and the Front seem to have no interest at all in ending the war on terms acceptable to the Administration and very little interest in deëscalating it. Washington is undoubtedly correct in its judgment that the communist side is unwilling to negotiate an end to the war at the present time. But it has failed to draw the equally obvious conclusion—that neither the North Vietnamese nor the Viet Cong are likely to collapse or lose their resolve no matter how long the war continues at its present level of violence.

This is admittedly a judgment, and there are reasonable and intelligent men outside the Administration as well as in it who believe otherwise—who believe that only one or two more rungs up the ladder of escalation will see the end. But the evidence for this optimism is thin and unpersuasive. And the optimism itself is one of the more dangerous pressures toward further escalation. If the hope of early success proves unfounded, the frustrations will mount even higher and so will the demand for measures large enough to be considered unquestionably decisive.

If it is true that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong will not give in to the present level of violence, the United States will have to make a fateful choice. One possibility is to take over command of the entire effort in Viet Nam and to increase that effort substantially—increase it enough to carry on both the "seek-and-destroy" strategy and the "clear-and-hold" strategy simultaneously and to do so with both efficiency and dispatch. An outside observer does not have the detailed information to offer a precise estimate of the number of American troops needed to do both jobs simultaneously, but it seems unlikely that fewer than one million Americans would be required.

If we took this course of increasing the American forces and progressively taking over more and more of the struggle from

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the Vietnamese, the real trouble is that even a "military victory" would leave the United States with equally unpleasant alternatives. The first would be to continue the occupation of Viet Nam for one or two generations—not providing a mere presence of American forces for deterrence as in Korea, but occupying Viet Nam for the purpose of sustaining a government that is not truly representative of the Vietnamese people. The second alternative would be to withdraw after a military victory, as President Johnson has promised. But this would clearly lead very quickly to a communist take-over—and all the casualties would have been in vain.

Doubling the number of Americans and taking over command of the entire effort would have other disadvantages that are more immediate and politically telling. It would mean mobilization, calling up the reserves and stepping up the draft. The frustrations so many in Congress and the military already feel would mount, and so would the pressures on the Administration for measures that seemed more decisive. For even a massive effort in the South would seem to be missing the real target. Only an invasion of the North, it would be argued, will strike at the source of the aggression, and only an invasion will offer any hope of a quick and decisive end.

IV

The arguments against an invasion are obvious. In the first place, there is no reason to believe that fighting in North Viet Nam would be any better than fighting in the South. Expanding the war to North Viet Nam and Laos does not get us out of a quagmire; it only gets us into a bigger quagmire. Second, there is no reason to believe that the Chinese would accept the destruction of North Viet Nam. If the coming invasion of North Viet Nam were limited—confined, say, to Vinh and the third of North Viet Nam lying to the south of Vinh—it is not entirely certain that the Chinese would engage the American forces directly. They might confine their response to mobilizing their forces and concentrating them along the Laotian and North Vietnamese borders. But it is very doubtful that such a precarious situation could long continue. In the third place, we cannot reasonably expect that the Soviets would remain aloof if the United States and China were locked in a struggle brought about as a result of *American* escalation.

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"If China goes mad and starts a war with the United States," one high Soviet official said in Moscow, "we would have no trouble staying out. But if a war comes about as a result of American escalation in Viet Nam, the Soviet Union would have the terrible choice between supporting China—which would eventually mean with nuclear weapons—and giving up the whole idea of a communist world." And another Soviet official put it this way: "We can accept a defeat of the communist side within South Viet Nam, brought about, for example, by a political shift within South Viet Nam. What we cannot accept is a defeat brought about by the military destruction of North Viet Nam."

But all these arguments against invasion will be set aside by the Administration—however reluctantly—if it continues to hold to the present objective of destroying communism as a political force in South Viet Nam. For it is increasingly clear that that objective cannot be achieved without either increasing our effort and our losses to levels that are unacceptable or by running risks of a larger war that are equally unacceptable—or both. One of the most acute of U.S. government analysts, recently returned from Viet Nam, sums it up as follows: "There are three things worse than a bad settlement of Viet Nam right now. The first is an invasion of the North and a confrontation with China. The second is the same bad settlement two or three years from now with all the additional casualties—which is about the best we can expect. And the third alternative worse than a bad settlement now is a *good* settlement, achieving all the Administration's demands, four or five years from now. For four or five years of that level of risk, even if we avoid a war with the Chinese, will wreck all our other objectives around the world and tear our own society here at home into shreds."

We cannot, however, get even a "bad settlement" at the present time. Hanoi is not ready for even that level of compromise. What the United States needs is an interim strategy that is realistic politically—one that will reduce risks and that can be sustained. It should be one that will moderate pressures toward escalation and stimulate pressures on the other side to settle. The present debate over Viet Nam between those who want a grand escalation and those who seek a total withdrawal, for example, is not realistic in this sense—for either course would have repercussions that would be both dangerous and difficult

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to control. What we need is a strategy that will open up new options rather than close them down, that will loosen the coupling now binding U.S. prestige so tightly to events in Viet Nam and create a climate that will permit a wider range of choice. And the strategy must be independent of Hanoi—it must not depend on a favorable response from the North.

Such a strategy has three aspects: first, damping down and deëscalating the military side of the struggle and emphasizing the political; second, progressively "de-Americanizing" the war; and, third, broadening the South Vietnamese Government.

V

Damping down and deëscalating the war means, first, a shift from the "seek-and-destroy" strategy to a "clear-and-hold" strategy. Among the American military leaders in Viet Nam there are a number who advocate this shift. They point out that since the main-force Viet Cong units and the North Vietnamese regular divisions have largely now been driven into mountain and jungle areas, attempts to go in after them will result in high casualties for relatively small gains. The terrain is highly favorable to the enemy, and since most of the population in these areas has fled, there would be no meaning in gaining control of the territory even if we could—which seems doubtful. On the other hand, since the rice and the majority of the recruits for the Viet Cong come from the villages in the populated areas, they argue, protecting these people and winning their allegiance would accomplish more than seeing how many of the enemy we can kill. If the main-force units choose to come down out of their base areas and launch more offensives against the most populated areas, we would at least be better prepared for them. Under a clear-and-hold strategy, such an offensive would not get as far as the one in February, and the communist casualties would be even greater. In the meantime, the main-force units can be harassed in their base area by both shelling and bombing.

The second step is to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam—unilaterally, and without any expectation of negotiations or an immediate military quid pro quo.

The question of how an end to the bombing would affect the military situation, and whether it would result in an increase of American casualties is, of course, foremost in any such decision. The evidence is that, although the bombing hurts the North Viet-

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Namese and makes the war more costly for them, it does not prevent them from carrying on the war at the present level nor would it prevent them from increasing their effort when and if they chose.

The evidence can be found in both Washington and Saigon. Secretary McNamara has testified that North Viet Nam's total imports, of all kinds, are only 5,800 tons per day, while the total capacity of ports, rail and roads is more than 14,000 tons per day. Even if the limitations on bombing the docks and piers at Haiphong and Hongay were lifted and the ports and ships in them were totally destroyed, North Viet Nam would still be able to import 8,400 tons per day over the road and rail network from China. And what makes these figures even more telling is the estimate by intelligence sources that, of the total of 5,800 tons per day imported into North Viet Nam, only 550 tons are military supplies. The conclusion seems inescapable that no bombing program, no matter how effective, could prevent enough military supplies from reaching the North Vietnamese to permit them to continue the war at the present or even higher levels.

In talking to officials in Saigon and examining McNamara's testimony, one reaches the same conclusion about the flow of men and supplies from North Viet Nam down the infiltration routes to the Viet Cong in the South. Even the figures most favorable to the case for bombing show that the flow of men over the infiltration routes increased from a maximum of 12,400 in the years before the bombing to 26,000 in 1965, the year the bombing began, and to 54,800 in 1966. No one knows the total of supplies that is infiltrated over these routes, but Secretary McNamara has testified that the total of arms and ammunition required in the South to sustain the communist war effort at its present level is only 15 tons per day. The total of all supplies required from the North is only 85 tons a day.

Translating that tonnage into the number of vehicles required to move the supplies, one finds that any of the following could do the job each day:

1 small steel-hulled coastal trawler (several have been sunk or captured)
4 or 5 junks
14 army-type 6 x 6 trucks
85 jeeps

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225 elephants
340 reinforced bicycles
1,135 men with packs

The impossibility of interdicting 14 trucks or 340 bicycles, scattered and traveling mainly at night over a random choice of small roads and hidden trails in an area the size of Connecticut, is painfully obvious.

Asked what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing, Secretary McNamara said, "Undoubtedly they would take advantage of the reduction to move matériel with a lesser cost to them in terms of numbers of people engaged, and this would be an advantage to them. Whether it would result in the movement of more men and matériel to the South I think is questionable. I don't know the answer." Some observers in South Viet Nam are willing to go farther. They believe that the number of men and supplies going over the trails is determined not by North Viet Nam's overall capability, which is far from being reached with or without the bombing, but by the strategic considerations: by the capacity of the people in the South to receive, store and utilize the supplies effectively and, perhaps more importantly, by the communist view that it would be wasteful and inefficient to supply more units than the strategy calls for. Even today, most of the communist units in the South are in combat only one day in every thirty.

True, some 500,000 North Vietnamese are tied down by the bombing—manning anti-aircraft guns and repairing roads and bridges. But neutral diplomats who have visited North Viet Nam doubt if they have even begun to reach the bottom of their manpower barrel. And if you ask the professional China watchers in Hong Kong about this, they seem impatient that you even bothered. "China already has 50,000 technicians in North Viet Nam," one pointed out, "and if Hanoi ever begins to feel the pressure of a manpower shortage, the Chinese will supply all they need to relieve Vietnamese for combat duty."

From all this evidence, it seems probable that if we stopped the bombing, it would neither harm our position in the South nor increase the number of American and South Vietnamese casualties. It might, in fact, decrease them. With Soviet aid, the North Vietnamese have set up the most formidable anti-aircraft screen the world has ever known. The fact that there are so few targets in this underdeveloped country and that most

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targets of military significance can be easily repaired means that our planes must attack the same few targets over and over. Thus, the North Vietnamese can concentrate their anti-aircraft fire and make the flak through which our men must fly a murderous corridor. As one of our discouraged pilots said bitterly, "The hell of it is that we fly through all that flak for what? To attack a two-bit bridge that we've already knocked down five or six times. The damned center spans are now made of wood, and they put them up again in hours."

Bombing the North has already cost the United States almost 1,000 men killed and captured and the loss of over 800 aircraft. In monetary terms, the cost of the bombing program as of several months ago was reported as being $6 billion, while the dollar value of the facilities destroyed in the North is estimated to be $340 million. On this basis some experts argue that an end to the bombing might actually result in a military gain rather than a loss.

In political terms, stopping the bombing certainly would be pure gain. There is a growing uneasiness among our European allies about the course we are following in Viet Nam. Only in Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand is there anything resembling wholehearted support. Among the neutrals there is mainly dismay.

Paradoxically, in the present circumstances the North Vietnamese themselves may feel that, on balance, they now gain a little more from the bombing than they lose. The damage to their industry has by and large already been done. At the same time, they reap immense political advantages. The bombing brings them public sympathy throughout the world—including, as we all know, from within the United States itself.

On both military and political grounds, then, the bombing of the North no longer seems to be worth the cost. Increasingly, American losses exceed the damage inflicted, while the political gains in stopping the bombing will be large. Even more important, the international political pressures toward deëscalation, negotiation and so on would then shift from Washington to Hanoi.

VI

As a second element of a new strategy, the United States should gradually but progressively turn back responsibility to the Vietnamese. The present situation, in which the American role and responsibility are so overwhelming, tends to alienate the

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population and to encourage their tendency to hang back while we take over. Yet it seems obvious that the only possibility of achieving a politically viable result in Viet Nam requires effort by the Vietnamese themselves.

With a shift to a clear-and-hold strategy, the ARVN could concentrate on clearing the populated areas of guerrilla irregulars, and the American troops could be used as a reserve to reinforce ARVN units or individual villages attacked by superior forces, and as a screen to protect the "pacification" effort from large-scale attacks by main-force units.

Second, responsibility for carrying out the "pacification" effort must be given to the Vietnamese—even if it is done less efficiently than the Americans would like. The job of winning the allegiance of the peasant to his government can be done only by Vietnamese, and it is only by doing that the Vietnamese will improve their performance. The Americans can run the supply effort, and if necessary can manipulate supplies to reward the honest and successful and punish the venal and incompetent, but the rest must be done by Vietnamese. Americans engaged directly in implementing the program should be withdrawn.

The same principle must be observed all across the board. Today, Americans are conspicuous in every aspect of government activity, especially the effort to manage the economy. Progressively, but increasingly, this responsibility must be turned back to the Vietnamese.

It would be foolish to offer any assurance that the South Vietnamese will rise to the challenge of regaining responsibility for their country and its fate. But there is in truth no choice but to give them an opportunity, for a "victory" achieved principally by American efforts would last only so long as the Americans remained in occupation. Even a compromise solution, if it is to have any hope of stability, will require a greater commitment to the struggle than the South Vietnamese are now showing.

The third step in a new strategy would be either to broaden the Vietnamese Government or to work for a more reformist, responsive (even though paternalistic) government with greater strength—or, more realistically, both.

Significant elements of Vietnamese society remain outside the present Government or have only token representation in it. These include some of the important religious sects, several of the old political parties, youth, labor and the "young Turks" of

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the army. Even if all of these cannot be brought in as a practical matter, the Government can bring in some and adopt policies that will appeal to these groups even if their leaders remain uncoöperative.

A government that feels threatened rarely broadens its base, and the military junta will resist pressures in this direction. American leverage, furthermore, is not so great as some imagine, but it does exist and, paradoxically, it would increase if steps were taken to de-Americanize the struggle. So long as the Americans are willing to do the job, the junta has little incentive to broaden the Government or to become reformist and responsive. But if responsibility is turned back to the Vietnamese, the junta is more likely to realize that Viet Nam can survive only if wider segments of the population become committed to the struggle and to the Government.

There is, of course, risk in broadening the Government. Many of those now excluded, though good nationalists and not pro-communist, are neutralist and often unsophisticated. A broader government might well enter into talks with the Viet Cong almost immediately and might fall into some traps. But the risk in no way changes the elemental fact that a more responsive and responsible Vietnamese Government is the only conceivable route toward a political outcome that does not lead directly to a communist take-over as soon as the Americans have withdrawn. And if an agreement with the Viet Cong could be worked out in a way acceptable to broad elements of the South Vietnamese, nothing would be more in the interests of the United States.

VII

A major point of this strategy is that it can be sustained politically and militarily without being dependent on a favorable response from Hanoi. Whether there is a response may depend crucially on the Soviets, who appear to have an interest, if not in ending the war, at least in seeing it damped down. The Soviet leverage on Hanoi is small, but it does exist; it is Russian aid, for example, that makes the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft screen so effective. Also, the Soviets probably understand that, if an American policy of deëscalation brought no results, the domestic pressures for drastic solutions would become greater than ever. This is a risk, but if the Soviets are genuinely interested in deëscalating the struggle, as they say they are, they

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might well be willing to explain the elemental political truths of American politics to the North Vietnamese. As a concrete step, for example, the Soviets might suggest that the North Vietnamese pull back their regular divisions from the South—for if the bombing of the North is the principal American action that makes the war international, it is the presence of these regular units in the South that also makes the war international.

A North Vietnamese representative to a neutral country, when asked what Hanoi would do if the United States stopped the bombing and the Soviets suggested that it respond by withdrawing its regular divisions, said, "We in the North are convinced that the 14 million people of South Viet Nam, who support the National Liberation Front, would be able to carry the struggle to a successful conclusion without our direct military help."

This statement should be taken with a grain of salt. Even if the Soviets did exercise their full leverage on Hanoi, not much should be expected. It seems very doubtful that Hanoi would withdraw its divisions; the most that probably could be expected is that the divisions would retire to positions along the Laotian border, in a communist version of General Gavin's "enclaves"—to protect their supply lines and to wait and see what happened next. There might be "talks," but it is unlikely that there would be the "meaningful negotiations" that President Johnson has demanded.

Nevertheless, the threefold strategy of deëscalating the struggle, de-Americanizing it, and broadening the Vietnamese Government and making it more responsible, would reduce the level of violence, lower the casualties and create a political situation which would increasingly favor the United States. The political pressures for deëscalating and negotiations would be transferred from Washington to Hanoi. If, on the other hand, Hanoi chose a vast escalation of the struggle—introducing additional North Vietnamese divisions—an appropriate response from the United States would then be more acceptable politically, both at home and abroad.

Barring this possibility, the likelihood of events spiraling out of control would be greatly lessened. The pressures for an invasion of North Viet Nam would be eased; we would be off an escalation track and onto a deëscalation track. The conditions number of different capitals to explore calmly the next steps in would be created in which serious efforts could be made in a

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damping down the war and moving toward meaningful negotiations.

Deëscalation of the war would permit concentration in the South on the task of protecting the people and winning their allegiance, which historically has been the only successful strategy in dealing with guerrilla insurgency. A broader and more reformist South Vietnamese Government would not only engage wider segments of the population in the fate of their country, but would open up still another dialogue—between the non-communist, neutralist elements in South Viet Nam and the Viet Cong.

Most important, finally, is the de-Americanization of the struggle, the progressive turning back of responsibility to the South Vietnamese. The result, when the Vietnamese know they are responsible for their own fate and the Government is changed in character, may be surprising. But even if the Vietnamese refuse to accept responsibility or if they fail in exercising it, then at the very least the United States would be in a position to consider withdrawing from Viet Nam without fateful consequences to our true commitments to our allies—which are to protect them from direct military aggression and not from their political failures inside their own countries—and without fateful consequences to the overall American position in Asia.

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SQUARING THE ERROR

By Sir Robert Thompson

"IF you wish for peace, understand war—particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war." Thus runs an old maxim, as rephrased by Liddell Hart. It seems to me, as an outside observer and commentator (although I was involved in Viet Nam for nearly four years), that understanding the war has been the crux of the American problem and that the two great obstacles to understanding it have been the military and the liberals. Both have failed to understand what Mao Tse-tung calls "the time, place and character" of the war. Moreover, the domestic clash between the two within the United States has led to a polarization of extreme views, as between the doves and the hawks, for withdrawal or further escalation. Both these courses are, in my view, losers, as is the enclave theory, which is no more than an agonizing withdrawal—like Aden. The only difference between the two is that, by withdrawing, you merely lose, but by further escalation, you lose stinking. When I put this view to a leading member of the Administration, he said: "You mean, like barbarians?" It would be just that, and, when the conflict ended, the question would indeed be, in Senator Dirksen's words, "Where will you stand and with whom will you sit?" But the real question is: If these are losing options, is there a winning one?

Before considering this, I must first say that I do not question either the legal or moral right or the good intentions of the United States in being in Viet Nam. Indeed, I consider that the outcome of the war will be of vital consequence to the future of the world (admittedly more so now that so much has been laid on the line than would have been the case a few years ago), and that it may well prove to be as decisive as any war in this century. I am not suggesting that defeat, quite apart from the disastrous effect that it would have on the domestic politics and foreign relations of the United States, would lead automatically to falling dominoes, but that there would be a rapid seepage not confined to South-east Asia alone. The Chinese strategic concept of revolutionary wars, of using the "countryside of the world" to encircle the "cities" (North America and Europe), would be several steps nearer fulfillment. Viet Nam needs to be considered therefore in

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the context of grand strategy and one of the aims in this regard must be to give hope and encouragement to all peoples of those "countryside" areas, not just by winning but also by the manner of the victory. This means that the U.S. response, military and civil, should be tailored to fit the object of grand strategy. It is no good winning in such a way that the whole position of the United States in the world is thereby weakened and discredited. In the long run that too would be defeat.

There are a number of basic points about the nature of Peoples' Revolutionary War that need to be clearly understood. The first is the superb organization of the Viet Cong within the country. The most important element is the underground organization within the population (commonly referred to as the "infrastructure"), designed to provide a popular and logistic base for the guerrilla forces. This underground organization has taken years to build up using the cell system, or "bead-stringing," to spread both throughout the country and within all classes of society. From the point of view of control it is necessary only that the underground organization should be able to obtain from the people the essential needs of war—money, supplies, recruits and intelligence. Except in so far as it has to tax and to propagate its cause it does not need to govern in the accepted sense of the term. Without a functioning underground organization no guerrilla forces could be raised or maintained. They would be no more than loosely knit bands of brigands existing from day to day. As this underground organization has expanded within the country, penetrating into the major towns and even into the Government, so automatically have the strength and capability of the guerrilla forces expanded. If it could be reduced, or its control over the population loosened, then equally the strength and the effectiveness of the guerrilla forces would decline. This has operated in Viet Nam, as it did in Malaya, irrespective of direct outside support.

Direct outside support, over and above propaganda and political encouragement, has been almost an essential factor in successful revolutionary war. To understand the nature of this support it is necessary to define the three forms which it may take—infiltration, raids and invasion. Invasion, in the sense that the invading forces commit aggression in a conventional form and depend on their own logistic supply line, can be ruled out. It is both too overt, thereby running the risk of worldwide political

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condemnation (as in Korea), and too vulnerable to the application of conventional power. On the other hand, infiltration of men, weapons and supplies can be maintained as a covert operation and, however public it may become, can either be disowned, as it was up to 1965, or justified, as after 1965. It is almost immune to conventional power but is limited by the amount which the local revolutionaries can absorb at any given time, because the infiltrator, once he has entered the country, is dependent on their logistic base for his continued existence. Infiltration can therefore only accelerate the momentum of an insurgency and will always be subsidiary to it. Raids, in the sense that the raiding units are mainly dependent on what they carry into the country and have to leave when this is expended, are designed to contain and keep occupied the maximum government forces in unpopulated areas of little importance to the main issue.

In the build-up of an underground organization and in its expansion during the revolutionary war period, the techniques of subversion and terror provide the instruments of control. Subversion is designed indirectly to sap the will of the country and directly to penetrate the whole structure of its society and government. Terror is designed both to cow the population, or more euphemistically to "mobilize the masses," but also to eliminate key individuals around whom the population in any area might rally. It is normally selective but can also be brutally indiscriminate, as we have seen recently.

It is not surprising that those who do not understand these techniques tend to exaggerate the cause and "motivation" of the insurgent and to adopt and promote them in terms which are comprehensible in the West but almost irrelevant at the scene of action. Quite obviously, the insurgent will label his cause with respectable motives from nationalism to land reform, to neither of which, in Viet Nam, the Viet Cong have the best claim (communism is anti-national and collectivization is not land reform). Labels can be conveniently changed as the situation develops and the current one is straight "anti-imperialism," *i.e.* to get the Americans out, which rather begs the question as to why the Americans are there in the first place. Far more important in Peoples' Revolutionary War than the ostensible causes are the natural "contradictions" within the threatened society. These have been exploited to the full and in Viet Nam there is no shortage of them, as between rich and poor, landed and landless,

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Catholic and Buddhist, Cochin-Chinese and Tonkinese, youth and elders, factions and secret societies, government and revolution.[1] If anything brings South Viet Nam down it will be these contradictions rather than any cause sponsored by the communists.

There is little new in the military tactics and strategy of guerrilla forces on the ground. Their method will always be to strike where the Government is weak and, as their base within the country expands, to nibble steadily away at the foundations of Government support. But the higher strategy of Peoples' Revolutionary War is conceived in the context of time, space and cost. Time (or perhaps patience) is the key to this strategy. Its value is greatly enhanced if there is a large measure of impatience on the other side. While the revolutionary forces are forged, the Government forces are infected with a growing sense of futility and frustration. Time also allows for the exploitation of opportunity, for advancing when possible or for taking "one step backward" when trends are unfavorable. It is part of the doctrine that victory is inevitable, even if it takes half a century.

Time, however, can be gained only if there is the space for which to trade it. The concept of space is more easily understood by saying that, if an insurgency is confined to one group of people and one area of a country (compare Mau Mau), it presents a very limited threat and can easily be overcome by any reasonably competent government. It has been the aim of the Viet Cong, therefore, to ensure that the insurgency has been spread right throughout the length and breadth of Viet Nam and into every element of its society so that the Government is threatened in every quarter. Moreover, if the war is expanded outside the country, so will the problems increase to the advantage of the Viet Cong. If the Viet Cong are to hold space, not in the sense of holding ground in positional warfare but of maintaining the threat over a wide and spreading area, then space in turn must be paid for by manpower. In all other respects the cost of a Peoples' Revolutionary War is comparatively low, but the cost in manpower at this point becomes high. In addition to the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese can call on the 250,000 young men who reach 17 years of age each year. They can be spent as the United States spends dollars. If the women and the old are not

[1] See Dennis J. Duncanson, "Government and Revolution in Vietnam." London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

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enough to keep the North going, there is always the unlimited reserve of Chinese labor "volunteers" (not troops), but there is no sign that this point has been reached. I would estimate that Hanoi can afford to lose roughly 100,000 a year and not feel it politically or economically. This explains the battles of the last eighteen months. Manpower is being spent, not to win battles—that would be a bonus—but to hold space and to keep U.S. forces unproductively occupied.

These costs, in communist terms, are not comparable with the costs being imposed on South Viet Nam and the United States. On the South Vietnamese side the cost in casualties and material damage, while high and tragic, is likely in the long term to have less effect (given two years of peace, law and order, the country would recover very quickly) than the damage which is being done to a young country by the loss of development time, the breakdown of government and the whole demoralization of society by the side effects of war—inflation, corruption, draft dodging, prostitution and so on. Similarly, on the American side, the greater damage is being done by the dissent within American society and the strain now being imposed on America's relations with her friends and allies.

The net effect of this cost situation is that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, at a cost which is indefinitely acceptable to themselves, are imposing on the South Vietnamese and Americans a cost which is not indefinitely acceptable to them. In its way this is a Dien Bien Phu except that it does not require a victory in battle at one particular place. If this cost advantage can be maintained by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and to a large extent the initiative in this respect remains with them, they have several channels to victory, all of which are interrelated. If American or Vietnamese resolution fails, if the Americans fail to adopt the correct counter-strategy, or if the South Vietnamese fail to build, with American help, a stable and viable state and government, then in the end Hanoi must win.

In these circumstances, there is not one valid reason why Hanoi should accept the offer of negotiations. In any case negotiations are not regarded by Hanoi as a means of achieving a settlement or peace. They are part of the play and are designed solely to secure an advantage or to gain a respite—in their own words: "Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front."[2]

[2] Captured document, quoted in Duncanson, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

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If Hanoi were to see that the channels to victory were being closed and were convinced that American and South Vietnamese resolution would not fail, while at the same time the South Vietnamese Government's capacity and performance were improving to such an extent that the base of the Viet Cong's support within the country was being steadily reduced, then they might negotiate not for peace but to secure the withdrawal of American forces (for which Hanoi would trade her own and the regular units of the Viet Cong) and to retain in existence the powerful Viet Cong underground organization within South Viet Nam, as a means of continuing the struggle through subversion and terror in the hope that these would achieve victory through an eventual collapse within the faction-ridden South. No offer to negotiate (other than generous surrender terms for individuals) was made by the Government in Malaya. It was the Malayan Communist Party, when it saw it was losing, which offered to negotiate on almost precisely these terms—that, in return for the surrender of all arms, the party should be recognized as a legal political party. It was a big juicy red apple but Tunku Abdul Rahman was shrewd enough to realize that it was poisoned. He refused and was committed to a mopping-up period of another five years, to Malaya's great advantage.

The first outstanding feature, therefore, of People's Revolutionary War, as developed by Mao Tse-tung and refined by the North Vietnamese in the two Indochina wars, is its immunity to the direct application of mechanical and conventional power. This was not so evident in Mao Tse-tung's wars against the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek but was very marked against the French in the first Indochina war. Even so the lesson has not been learnt although the message has come booming through during the last three years in Viet Nam. The second is that a Peoples' Revolutionary War is a fight to the finish through a long, arduous, protracted struggle. There is really only one issue in Viet Nam: either the North is going to get the South or it is not. That decision will be reached, not on the battlefields of the Annamite Chain, but in the minds of the South Vietnamese people. In this respect the battles just beginning in Saigon and the cities as these lines are written are the real battles designed to promote a "general uprising." It is the Khesanhs which are the diversion.

If that is the nature of the war which the United States is fight-

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ing, then it follows that Americans need to be very clear on four main points: a precise constructive aim, a consistent and effective counter-strategy, firm civilian control and, last but not least, the maintenance of the highest moral standard.

I have asked many Americans what the American aim is in Viet Nam and have never yet received the same reply. The replies have varied from containing China, preventing aggression and defeating the Viet Cong to giving the people of South Viet Nam a free choice. An aim must be positive and constructive, not negative and destructive, and represent the final object of the war—in other words, what you want to end up with. I would, therefore, put it something like this: "To establish a South Viet Nam which is free, united, independent, politically stable and economically expanding." That would mean that South Viet Nam must be capable in the end of standing on its own feet with the minimum of outside support—no more than any underdeveloped country is entitled to expect from its friends. It will be seen that, if this aim is achieved, then every negative aim that anyone has ever thought of will in fact be achieved within it. The aim should dictate policy and strategy, and any action which is not consistent with the aim can then be recognized for what it is—a contribution to defeat. It was the achievement of this aim as a whole, little understood though it was at the time, which secured victory in Malaya, not, as so many people have assumed, just the fostering of democracy and the granting of independence. The latter were the consequences of the achievement of the aim. They even represented a risk, not because the Malayans were unprepared for them, but because they meant giving political power to the Malays. They had little appeal for the Chinese, who were at the root of the insurgency problem, and, if promoted prematurely, might have given the Malayan Communist Party, itself almost entirely Chinese, a chance of becoming the political champion of the Chinese against the Malays, which could have been fatal.

Excluding for the moment the employment of American combat forces, it is not easy to point to any one facet of American military policy within South Viet Nam that has been consistent with the aim. The build-up of a large conventional military force, the proliferation of paramilitary forces, the indiscriminate issue of arms and the conscription of all able young Vietnamese into the forces could not have been better designed to create both in-

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stability and a lack of unity. Similarly on the political side, the encouragement of regional factions, multiple parties, premature elections and social revolution (which has promoted chaos rather than reform) has contributed further to a state of affairs which makes the aim that much harder to achieve.

The lack of a clear precise aim has in turn made the achievement of a consistent and effective counter-strategy to Peoples' Revolutionary War equally difficult. This strategy is best defined as the deployment and application of the means, both military and civil, to achieve the aim. All the experience of war and history, including past counterinsurgencies, teaches that the strategic approach must be indirect rather than direct. There has been a tendency to divide the war up into three parts—the military, *i.e.* the battles; pacification; and nation-building. The direct strategic approach to this has been to defeat the enemy's main-force units, then subsequently to turn to pacification, which will be followed by nation-building. The effect has been to focus the main attack along the line of the enemy's toughest resistance. When this has failed, the effort has been doubled. The net result has been that no decision is in sight, while the chances of successful pacification and nation-building have become more remote. This was what I meant some years ago by the sometimes quoted remark: "The trouble with you Americans is that whenever you double the effort you somehow manage to square the error."

Because little or no progress has been made in pacification or nation-building, the amount of aid required to keep South Viet Nam from sinking has been enormous. The aid itself has swamped the boat and the Viet Cong have got their sufficient share of the cargo, thus bolstering still further their resistance. Indeed, it is probably true that they get as much benefit, if not more, from American ships entering Saigon as they do from other ships entering Hanoi. The insurgency has become truly symbiotic. The direct strategic approach has also naturally led to a situation where the options are becoming narrowed to either withdrawal or further escalation. These options have produced some queer arguments: for example, that it would be better to cut American losses at 15,000 killed (for naught) rather than run the risk of 50,000 being killed (to achieve the aim). There is no concern here for the fate of the South Vietnamese, who, encouraged by the American commitment, have stuck their necks out against the Viet Cong. Are they to be allowed to go to the wall? Nor does this

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argument concern itself with the effects which deserting the South Vietnamese would have on other neighboring countries, and some further afield, where more Americans may have to be sacrificed, or with the effect of the subsequent post mortem within the United States. On the side of escalation it has led to the argument that if you want to kill the flies you must get at the muck heap. Unfortunately the manner proposed to get at the muck heap would merely spread it all over Asia and, with it, the flies.

The major reason for adopting the direct strategic approach has undoubtedly been the outside support of Hanoi for the Viet Cong insurgency, mainly by infiltration and raids. There is a very interesting parallel here in the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia. Indonesian infiltration failed, in spite of more favorable borders and a more vulnerable coastline than in Viet Nam, because there was no insurgency within Malaysia at that time to receive and support the infiltrator. This reduced the Indonesian effort to raids, of which there were over one thousand, including one in which regular army parachutists were dropped by night from C-130s into central Malaya. What should the response have been? The direct approach would have dictated that the Indonesian airfields should have been taken out, in which case there is no doubt that there would have been a major war in that area, involving probably the United States and others, and that Sukarno and the communists would still be in full control of Indonesia. Instead the decision was that, since the British and Malaysians could handle the enemy action, it would be reckless to escalate and provoke further action that might get out of hand. By maintaining the emphasis on security within Malaysia and on the performance of the Government, the outside threat was thwarted, thus allowing full play for the tensions and contradictions within Indonesia to defeat its own policy.

The answer in Viet Nam, in my view, is a complete switch of strategy to the indirect approach, with the emphasis on nation-building concurrent with limited pacification, and a mere containment of the military threat. It should be recognized that, even though an offensive action against the enemy's main force units may be tactically aggressive, it is strategically defensive, for the strategic offensive lies in the nation-building and the pacification. This strategic offensive requires an intensely practical approach in its initial stages to the rebuilding of the whole Vietnamese government machine: the selection and training of quali-

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fied administrators and technicians at all levels; the consolidation and clarification of the law (which is chaotic); the promulgation of terms of service and simplified government procedures; the reëstablishment of the civil courts, the revival of the ministries and of the administrative structure from the ministries right down to the villages, so that requirements come up and action goes down; and the restoration of law and order, which requires absolute priority—above all else—for a professionally qualified police force (a task which alone will take ten years, not six months). Not until you get performance—and that is the key word—can you hope to have any semblance of democracy in Viet Nam. Democracy is not elections and voting; it is the liberty of the individual and his protection by law, not just against the Viet Cong but against all the local factional secret society cliques, so that he can make a free choice. Only when some of this rebuilding begins to have a discernible effect (and past impatience has delayed its start for several years) will pacification start to make sense, because no areas will be pacified until they are well administered and the individual is protected. The key to the strategy of pacification in its turn is to take the line of least resistance where there is also, geographically, a greater number of alternative objectives. This means starting in the less difficult areas, from which an advance can then be made in more than one possible direction. This rules out the coastal enclaves at the start and requires that the major initial effort should be in the middle of the Mekong Delta where the line of advance can be flexible, but, at the same time, will threaten bases vital to the Viet Cong.

Meanwhile the major military task, apart from supporting pacification, is to prevent the enemy's main-force units from interfering with this strategic offensive. They do not have to be destroyed, though obviously "prevent" means that they must be kept stirred up and occupied. Their eventual destruction will come in two ways. First, as their popular base within the country declines, so will their strength and capacity correspondingly decline, leading to a steady deëscalation of the conflict and, secondly, as the advance of pacification threatens their vital areas, so will they have to come out and fight for them on ground not of their own choosing.

It is not easy for a nation which has been brought up to regard Gettysburg as more decisive than Vicksburg to understand the strategy of the indirect approach. It means cutting at the

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roots of the Viet Cong's strength among the people of the Mekong Delta (marching through Georgia—but not quite like Sherman) rather than a head-on approach against the main-force units (Gettysburg). A corollary to this is that the more the enemy's military threat, and with it the war, can be confined in area, the easier it will be to contain. It is highly doubtful whether driving the enemy's main-force units back to and across the frontiers has produced a worthwhile result—at least in the southern section of the Annamite Chain—in relation to cost and time. It may be harder and more expensive to contain their threat there than it would have been in places like Zones C and D, where their supply problem would have been greater and their communications more vulnerable. Moreover, the American forces containing the threat around those areas could have given limited assistance to pacification at the same time. To try now and push them further beyond the frontier "in hot pursuit" would quite definitely be a disadvantage, because the space over which they can maintain a threat will be that much greater.

If the strategy is to be switched to an indirect approach, then, in a war of this nature, it requires as much if not more of a civilian than a military effort because it embraces every field of government. Civilian control is imperative, though this does not mean that it cannot be exercised by a general in a civilian post. This is possibly, as in the case of General Templer in Malaya, the best arrangement, because a general can compel military compliance with the strategy and aim. There is no need for me to emphasize the importance of control in other ways to ensure a coördinated and integrated effort between all departments, agencies and headquarters, both Vietnamese and American. The lack of this control has been the most prominent feature of Saigon for years and has been sufficiently exposed in numerous publications.[3] The military predominance in Saigon has, of course, led to the tail wagging the dog and everyone else has been required to conform. The concept of the military as auxiliary to the civil power has yet to be learnt. Lack of control has also tended to divide the war into compartments. It is a commonplace to talk about three separate wars when there is only one war. This war is like a chess game and the chances of winning it are not going to be improved if the military decide to change the rules and go off playing poker instead.

[3] See Roger Hilsman, "To Move a Nation." New York: Doubleday, 1967.

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If the aim, strategy and control are the foundations of a successful campaign, the final structure must have an attractive look about it. The war is not being fought on enemy territory but on friendly territory. In addition to performance, therefore, behavior and style are also important because they help to make the final aim credible. Ordinary people must believe in American good intentions. When these cannot immediately be fulfilled, the manner in which the means are applied to achieve the end becomes of paramount importance. This covers not only military power but also, of course, all civilian aid. As only one example, which emphasizes the need for civilian control, it staggers belief that American helicopters were under instruction, and for all I know still are, to fire on any village which fires on them in the course of their flight (I am not here referring to an opposed landing but to a few passing shots). This return fire reinforces every word the Viet Cong say, with the result that American intentions cease to be credible. It is this sort of thoughtless direct response reaction, where lives are not even at stake, which is helping to prolong, if not lose, the war. The decision becomes harder when lives are at stake and it is a very tough commander, as required in this type of war, who is prepared to risk increased casualties to achieve the right effect rather than hold down casualties to get a statistical result but the wrong effect. The emotional argument, that anything which saves the life of one American boy is permissible, will in the long run waste the deaths of many more. The rule of law and the maintenance of the highest standards are prerequisites to the creation of the right image, which is vital both in South Viet Nam and in relation to the grand strategy.

Peoples' Revolutionary Wars are by their nature destined to be long, arduous, protracted struggles; but I have no doubt at all that if the means are correctly deployed and applied they can be won. That it will now take much longer is not something for which the South Vietnamese and their history can be entirely blamed. The question which still has to be answered is whether the United States can do it before it is too late. That is not for me to say. All I can add is what I said five years ago: "If we plan for a long haul, we may get quick results. But if we go for quick results, we may at best get a long haul."

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THE COMPLEXITIES OF NEGOTIATION

By Chester L. Cooper

AS the war in Viet Nam grows in bitterness and destructiveness, the call for negotiation grows more insistent. The issue we confront, however, is not simply whether a settlement of the war should be negotiated. The question rather is a threefold one. How should we go about it? What can we expect from it? Can we arrange a settlement that has a fair chance of success? During the next several months, the American people, already emotionally tortured and intellectually frustrated by the war, are destined to be treated to large doses of oratory which will do nothing to lift the veil of confusion surrounding the question of negotiations. It may be worthwhile, then, to explore some of the issues and implications that we (and our allies and our adversaries) will have to deal with if, in fact, negotiations get under way.

At the outset we need to examine several critical preliminary factors which seem obvious when discussed in the abstract, but which become increasingly befogged as we get down to actual cases. There is, first of all, the assumption, made explicitly by some and implicitly by others, that negotiations = settlement. This assumption is not without some validity; once the negotiating process starts, the pressure of domestic opinion in the countries actively involved, and of international opinion generally, may force both sides to move toward an agreement. However, we should recognize that public pressure, whether domestic or external, will operate with more intensity and with more effectiveness on our side of the table than on theirs—and this will not necessarily result in a "better," or a more lasting, final settlement. Moreover, those counting on domestic pressures to force the United States to water down its terms in order to reach an early agreement would do well to look at the recent swing of American public opinion in the direction of a "hard" rather than a "soft" line; the pressure of the present mood of public opinion on American negotiators might result in a walkout rather than major concessions. North Viet Nam is relatively free from the pressures of domestic opinion on government policy-making; more often than not it ignores international public opinion, except to the extent that it can be manipulated for propaganda purposes. On the

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other hand, the leaders of North Viet Nam can vividly remember the pressures exerted on them by Moscow and Peking at Geneva in 1954. Indeed, that experience almost certainly is one reason why Hanoi is reluctant to participate in another Geneva-type conference.

When all is said and done, the force of domestic and international public opinion will play a definitive role only if the actual negotiations are conducted under the glare of klieg lights in, for example, the Palais des Nations at Geneva. It is more likely, however, that the hard bargaining will take place in secrecy and that a public "International Conference" will follow only if and when basic agreement has been reached on the tough issues.

In short, to argue that the process of negotiations is a desirable end in itself, on the assumption that it will automatically lead to a settlement, may be dangerously irresponsible to the cause of peace. The difficulties involved in inducing preliminary talks among the various belligerents are by now too obvious to mention. When "talks," to say nothing of "negotiations," actually take place, the belligerents will have had to reach a prior decision to make a serious effort to conclude a settlement; a premature or insincere approach to the process carries great risks of failure and consequent dangers of intensified warfare. If negotiations are begun and then broken off, there could be great difficulty in resuming them, and the hawks on all sides (including the opponents of negotiations in Peking) would carry the day.

Another matter we should note at the outset is that the process of negotiating is very different from arranging the surrender of the enemy. Obvious? Yes, in the real world; but when one goes through the looking glass with some latter-day Alices, there is a tendency to think of a "half-dozen impossible things before breakfast." It must be recognized that neither we, nor the Government of South Viet Nam, nor the Government in Hanoi and its cohorts in the National Liberation Front will enter into negotiations with the prospect of being on the wrong end of a surrender ceremony. When we are able to observe the bedrock of realism through the flow of rhetoric, it is apparent that virtually every advocate on each side of the argument is aware that negotiations on Viet Nam will produce agreement only if all participants feel they can emerge with dignity and the preservation of their minimum objectives. But an inflated sense of our own military and political leverage has produced a number of euphoric

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propositions for a final settlement—propositions replete with hopes but barren of prospects. On the other hand, proposals advanced by the more zealous American advocates of U.S. withdrawal are less realistic and less acceptable to the South Vietnamese and the United States than some of the proposals put forward by the National Liberation Front or Hanoi. If we are serious about negotiations, we must think in terms of a satisfactory (*vs.* ideal) and a realistic (*vs.* theoretical) settlement.

Thus, under the circumstances likely to prevail in the foreseeable future, talks will not necessarily lead to negotiations; negotiations, if they occur, will mean tough bargaining and will not necessarily lead to an agreement. If an agreement is reached, it must be one that each side can tolerate.

There are other preliminary considerations: for example, if we hope to achieve a "satisfactory" and "realistic" settlement, we must first define our fundamental objectives in Viet Nam. Our stated goals are very limited. One of the most frequently cited goals is to provide the circumstances "to permit the Vietnamese in South Viet Nam freely to choose their own future." Another goal, which recently has been given greater emphasis, has a somewhat broader character. Secretary Rusk formulated this in a press conference last October when he defined our central objective as "an organized and reliable peace."

No matter how we have stated our objectives, it is clear that we are not bent upon the elimination of the régime in Hanoi or the death or surrender of every member of the National Liberation Front (indeed, we have taken care to make this point time and time again). Yet in formulating our negotiating position and, perhaps more importantly, in looking ahead to the negotiating process itself, we must recognize that these objectives are likely to be buffeted by domestic pressures—that large sectors of American public and Congressional opinion may well feel that the costs in lives, money and forsaken or postponed domestic programs warrant setting our goals in Viet Nam higher than they are.

A hint of this gap between public expectations and realistic goals was made evident in a recent Harris Poll. In answer to the question, "Which . . . do you think is our objective today in Viet Nam?" 45 percent of those polled thought that our goal is "to stop communist aggression once and for all in Southeast Asia." Another 24 percent felt that we are in Viet Nam "to force North Viet Nam to withdraw from South Viet Nam completely and

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eliminate all communist influence." It should be noted that the question asked was not what *should be* the U.S. objective, but what "*is* our objective today." This is not a matter of semantics. Short of an unconditional surrender by both North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front, it is highly unlikely that the United States could achieve either of the objectives postulated by Mr. Harris. Even the most optimistic military analyst would heavily discount the possibility of an unconditional surrender by the communist forces. And if this cannot be achieved by the military defeat of the enemy, it certainly cannot be achieved through negotiations. In short, if Mr. Harris has selected a representative sample of our population, and if almost three-quarters of our people really feel that the American objective in South Viet Nam is to "stop communist aggression *once and for all*," or that we are attempting to "eliminate *all* communist influence" in Viet Nam, the Administration is confronted with a difficult problem. It must either forsake a policy of negotiations in the foreseeable future and settle down for a long war or make a major effort to achieve more complete public understanding of its limited objectives.

II

Moving beyond the questions of expectations and objectives, we must recognize the lack of trust and even basic communication between Hanoi and Washington. The American Government and, to a greater extent, the Government of South Viet Nam have been reluctant to accept North Vietnamese or Viet Cong assurances at face value—and with good reason. Hanoi's complete disregard of the Laos Agreement from the moment of signature is a case in point. The Viet Cong's cynical and dramatic behavior during this year's Tet "truce" is yet another. For their part, the North Vietnamese and their friends quite clearly neither understand nor trust us. It is in this hostile environment of distrust that both sides have been conducting their probes. It is in this static-laden atmosphere that we and the South Vietnamese Government have been listening for a clear signal that the North Vietnamese are ready to move from fighting to serious negotiating. We can assume that Hanoi, too, is straining to identify our genuine intentions from the welter of "informed" commentary, public oratory and private communications that are emitted daily from Washington and Saigon.

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To the decision-makers in Hanoi, subtle signals, nuances of language and such concepts as "freedom of choice," "free elections," "genuine neutrality" may very well be unintelligible, perhaps even untranslatable. The American position, as outlined in the "Fourteen Points for Peace" (January 7, 1966) and in such documents as the Manila Communiqué (October 25, 1966), is probably viewed by them as unadulterated propaganda. This gap in basic communication and mutual trust compounds the normal, formidable problems involved in moving any war to a conference table. As we have learned from the Marshall Mission to China, the negotiations at Panmunjom, the Geneva Conference of 1954 and the Laos Conference of 1961–62, the problem of communicating with communists and, in particular, with Asian communists, makes actual negotiations a frustrating experience.

In order not only to begin negotiations, but also to engage in fruitful negotiations, we must break through this communications barrier. We must try to reach the stage where, if the communists ignore our signals or reject our proposals, they do so from policy considerations rather than from misunderstanding or suspicion. Thus, our problem is to ensure that what we propose is clearly understood by the other side. Some of our difficulties in communicating with the Hanoi régime may stem from its inability to understand our proposals. On the other hand, some of the propositions we have advanced over the past eighteen months may have been ignored or rejected simply because Hanoi did not believe that we meant what we said, or because Hanoi did not believe we would follow through on what we offered.

In an effort to fathom the thoughts of the leaders of North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front, we examine with great care every one of their statements for new or possibly even hidden meaning. Hanoi's use of the words "unconditional" or "definitive" or "permanent" in their latest reference to a halt in our bombing is noted with great interest by both government and lay analysts. A change from "could" to "will" in a speech by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister was the occasion for memoranda, editorials, orations and intense diplomatic activity. We must assume that the communist analysts, policy-makers and publicists examine with equal care any apparent or real changes in our own formulations. Thus, it is safe to assume that the fact that the President used different formulations in his San Antonio speech last September and in his State of the Union address in January,

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with respect to Hanoi's "not taking advantage" of a bombing cessation, must have caused the kerosene lamps in Hanoi to burn late into the night. Hanoi claims that the change in *its* formulation was significant, and Washington stated that the change in *its* formulation was *not* significant. (The issue was publicly resolved only by Clark Clifford's explanation in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of State's subsequent endorsement of the formulation.) But the trust-gap between the two capitals is so wide that the affirmation and denial were received with great suspicion. The lesson for us, of course, is to repeat with absolute, even if boring, precision the formulation of our proposals, unless we consciously want to convey a new signal.

III

How do the various protagonists in the drama of Viet Nam approach the question and regard the prospects of early negotiations?

Hanoi's motivation and rationale deserve a close look, for it is with the leadership of North Viet Nam that we and the South Vietnamese will have to deal. We know very little about the decision-making process in Hanoi. We know even less, if that is possible, about the way decisions are made in the National Liberation Front's jungle redoubt, although we do know that the NLF is not an independent entity. It is safe to assume that very few people are involved at the top levels of either group; staff work must almost certainly be minimal; information about the outside world is inadequate and distorted; there are pulls and tugs from Peking and Moscow in the case of North Viet Nam (and from Hanoi and Peking in the case of the NLF); the leaders are harassed, suspicious and doctrinaire. The experience of both the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong with the West must be highly colored by three major factors: their military victory over the French, their political defeat at the Geneva Conference in 1954 and their exposure to pacifist or leftist Western visitors. Hanoi's demeanor toward the West reflects an amalgam of old-style Marxist contempt for "degenerate capitalists," Asian xenophobia, Buddhist obscurantism, the emotional scars of Western colonialism, an innate sense of oriental superiority and an almost pathological feeling of inferiority and insecurity.

In short, what we face is an abrasive, insulting and uncom-

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promising style of communication and conduct. This was evident in the Viet Minh's behavior at Geneva in 1954 and in Hanoi's conduct during the Laos Conference of 1961–62. It was equally so in Ho's response to President Johnson's letter in the spring of 1967. It is clear that if we are successfully to engage the men of Hanoi or the NLF in negotiations, we must ignore the *tone* and concentrate on the *content* of any written or direct communication with them.

We should acknowledge, moreover, that the leaders of North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong distrust the very process of negotiation; they are wary of international forums which will surface Sino-Soviet quarrels; they are concerned that, once negotiations start, they will be forced, as in 1954, to make damaging concessions. We should also recognize their abiding faith in the righteousness of their cause and in ultimate victory. They defeated the French and they have withstood three years of pounding by powerful U.S. ground, air and naval forces. Finally, we must reckon with their tremendous confidence in their military forces, in their political apparatus and in their staying power. To deny them these attributes would be to delude ourselves.

We know enough about relations between Hanoi and the National Liberation Front to assume they would adopt parallel approaches to the whole process of negotiations—from preliminary talks to a final settlement. This can be expected not only because of the tight control exercised by Hanoi over the NLF and its fighting arm, the Viet Cong, but also because there is a considerable community of interests and motives. There may, however, be certain basic differences between some members of the NLF political apparatus and the Viet Cong, and between both of these and Hanoi. These differences could come to the surface as negotiations and a political settlement become a more realistic and imminent possibility. A great deal will depend on our initial approaches, on the course of the actual negotiations and on the attitude we and the South Vietnamese take toward any dissident elements that may become evident within the NLF.

Assuming that the communists decide to enter into talks, what are the broad categories of problems likely to be of interest or concern both to Hanoi and, perhaps with some modifications, to the National Liberation Front? Most important, Hanoi must be worried about threats to its security. The presence of American forces and the maintenance of American military bases in South

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Viet Nam are matters of prime concern to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leadership. Since a formal settlement would incorporate the terms and timing for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the communists would probably prefer to end the war through negotiations rather than through a Viet Cong-North Vietnamese "fadeaway." It is doubtful that Hanoi has given serious consideration to the proposition advanced at Manilla in October 1966 that allied forces would be withdrawn from Viet Nam "as soon as possible and not later than six months after" North Viet Nam "withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides." But there is no question that we will be reminded of this formula when negotiations begin.

Hanoi and the National Liberation Front have already announced their demands to secure an overt and influential role for the Front in the political life of South Viet Nam. In addition to a role in the Government, the communists will almost certainly insist on the postwar "neutrality" or "nonalignment" of South Viet Nam. Yet another matter that we will confront is the question of reunification, one which Hanoi is advancing with more vigor than the National Liberation Front. Over and above these, there probably are a host of other military, political and economic items on Hanoi's shopping list.

These demands present formidable, but not necessarily insurmountable, problems for our negotiators. One of our first tasks will be to determine with more precision what Hanoi and the Front mean by "participation in the government," "neutrality" and "reunification." We may not be able to do this until we are well into negotiations. But if we contemplate negotiating a political settlement rather than undertaking the cost and risks of attempting to achieve the military surrender of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, we must be ready to come to grips with Hanoi's interests just as the North Vietnamese must realistically confront ours.

Peking's position with respect to negotiations appears to be harder than that of any of the other communist capitals. Unless the Chinese Communists foresee disastrous defeat for Hanoi and the Viet Cong, or some important political gains that seem certain to emerge from negotiations, they want the war to continue. Peking would like to settle for nothing short of the military defeat of the South Vietnamese and, more importantly, the United

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States. The Chinese communist leaders have urged the North Vietnamese to press forward with "armed struggle," and have almost certainly fortified Hanoi's natural inclination to view U.S. proposals with skepticism and suspicion. The extent to which serious negotiations with Hanoi are likely to occur, and to be expeditious when they do, will depend on Hanoi's ability to withstand Chinese pressures. This may require both substantial economic assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and perhaps even security guarantees.

As for the Soviet Union, it is questionable whether Moscow would be prepared to drag an unwilling Hanoi to the negotiating table, even if it thought it could do so. What does seem clear is that Moscow would encourage any North Vietnamese manifestations of a willingness to negotiate, and would act as an intermediary for or channel to Hanoi if the North Vietnamese requested such services.

But we must also recognize that we face a major task of diplomacy over the next year, not only in Hanoi and Moscow, but in Saigon as well. If we have to drag the South Vietnamese kicking and screaming to the conference table, negotiations are not likely to go well. Gnawing away at the South Vietnamese leaders is their fear that the Viet Cong will achieve by political means what they had failed to achieve by force. They are also concerned that the necessary degree of cohesion and organization among the non-communists in South Viet Nam has not yet been achieved. They view the war as an important instrument, not only in grinding down the enemy, but in building up the strength of the non-communist elements in South Viet Nam.

As a result of the troop contributions of third countries (Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Philippines, Thailand) there has emerged yet an additional set of interests and influences that must be taken into account in our approach to negotiations and a settlement. This is a price we must be ready to pay for their support. Some of the governments involved have made contributions in the face of significant domestic opposition. All of them have a genuine stake in the shape of an eventual peace settlement. We might be able to persuade them to remain flexible on the question of their actual participation in every stage of the negotiations, but we must take seriously their demands for full consultation.

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IV

Up to this point we have been addressing some of the key, albeit general, considerations that those advocating or planning for negotiations should bear in mind. It may now be instructive to highlight some of the specific issues that may arise when the problems of communication and mutual distrust are sufficiently disposed of and when both sides decide to sit down for serious, substantive talks.

The 1954 Geneva Conference Syndrome. Both the United States and North Viet Nam have publicly stated their willingness to return to the "principles," or the "essentials," or the "spirit" of the Geneva Accords of 1954, but thus far neither side has spelled out with any precision just what this means. Surely a reversion to the 1954 Accords, in toto, is not the remedy for the present situation. There are certain provisions, such as those dealing with amnesty, the sanctity of the DMZ, the integrity of the two national entities, and elections leading toward eventual unification, which are still applicable. However, it is quite clear that the international supervisory and policing mechanism (the International Control Commission), while still valid in principle, would need careful review and considerable strengthening if we are to have any confidence in communist compliance with the terms of an eventual agreement.

Perhaps the best argument against reconvening the Geneva Conference, as such, is that under present circumstances some of the participating countries would be redundant or would be considerable impediments to the achievement of a final settlement. On the other hand, there are other countries which now have a direct stake in a settlement and were not among the original conferees. In any case, "reconvening Geneva" may turn out to be an academic issue, for both Moscow and Hanoi seem reluctant to try to reach a settlement in the format of the Geneva Conference of 1954 because of difficulties implicit in a public confrontation with China.

A Ceasefire. We have learned from Korea that negotiating a ceasefire can be a long, costly and literally bloody experience. A ceasefire with built-in safeguards will be much more difficult to work out for Viet Nam because the disposition of forces there is infinitely less clear-cut than it was in Korea. Moreover, our experience in the Laos Conference of 1961–62, where continued

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negotiations were at the mercy of the integrity of an informal ceasefire, has taught us that such an arrangement can be very fragile and tenuous; any trigger-happy or ill-intentioned junior officer can throw the negotiations into jeopardy.

The problem of arranging a ceasefire in Viet Nam is, in fact, painfully complicated because it involves the disengagement of opposing forces operating at two different levels: the conventional, publicly acknowledged and exposed forces of both sides, and the clandestine guerrilla forces and political infrastructure of the insurgents. It is evident that a ceasefire arranged in haste and without adequate safeguards and supervision could involve serious risks for the United States and South Viet Nam.

The complex issue of a ceasefire has become dangerously oversimplified in various proposals advanced by U Thant and others. To the extent that the concept has actually been spelled out in these proposals, it is reduced to a situation wherein each side voluntarily refrains from offensive operations and undertakes military action only in self-defense. By and large, this was the understanding on which the Christmas and Tet truces of the past few years were based—with unhappy consequences. Such a frail and delicate arrangement tends to have a predictably short life expectancy. If we do agree to a de facto ceasefire as a step toward negotiations, it should be viewed as a means to achieve a more propitious atmosphere in which arrangements for a more robust, de jure ceasefire would be worked out. In short, the timing and terms of a ceasefire could have a fundamental effect on shaping the outcome of an eventual settlement, and we must, therefore, have a well-prepared position.

Withdrawal of Forces. Agreement in principle with respect to the withdrawal of outside forces from South Viet Nam might be relatively easy to achieve, but the implementation of any agreement is likely to prove very complicated, partly because of Hanoi's adamant refusal to admit to having any troops in South Viet Nam. Basic to the problem of implementation, of course, would be the organization and operation of a control body to supervise the withdrawals. The International Control Commission, as presently constituted, would be unable to handle this task. Major changes in its terms of reference and its mode of operation must be worked out, together with provisions for increasing its strength and improving its mobility on both sides of the De-Militarized Zone and within the DMZ itself.

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Over and above the question of troop withdrawals per se, there are certain technical questions of particular interest to the United States and its allies which must be taken into consideration when the modalities of a phased withdrawal are being worked out: the rotation of men who have already served their time in Viet Nam; the replacement of sick and wounded; the problem of moving troops in and out of Viet Nam for rest and recuperation. The Control Group will have to ensure that these normal replacement measures will not be seized on by the North Vietnamese as an excuse to make a net augmentation of their strength.

The Southern Regroupees. Perhaps as many as 35,000 Regroupees, South Vietnamese who went North in 1954, were returned to the South by Hanoi between 1957 and 1964. We do not know how many of them are alive, though it is safe to assume that battle casualties, disease, desertions and defections have probably reduced their ranks substantially (especially of the military cadres). Since the Regroupees would play a vital role in any continuing effort by Hanoi to subvert the South after a settlement, we should attempt to assure their return to North Viet Nam. However, the problem of obtaining a reliable estimate of numbers, let alone the identities of individual Regroupees, will pose a formidable task.

Surrender of Arms by the Viet Cong. Negotiating the disarmament of the Viet Cong may prove to be the most difficult and complex issue of all. The basic problem is one of mutual confidence—confidence by the Government of South Viet Nam that the Viet Cong will not cache more arms than it surrenders, confidence by the Viet Cong that it will not be attacked once it disarms and that, in exchange for disarming, it will be permitted to play a legitimate political role in the nation. The experiences of the Greek Government and the British in Malaya in the 1940s have taught us that neither cash inducements nor the threat of punishment is likely to result in the wholesale surrender of arms by the guerrillas. Somehow the communists must be convinced that they, too, have a stake in law and order.

The GVN Constitution. Any meaningful discussion of a political role for the National Liberation Front will also have to address the question of the constitution of South Viet Nam. This document, less than a year old, was developed after a lengthy and democratic process of discussion and negotiation. The constitution could, of course, be modified or amended to provide for

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changes in the political structure of Vietnamese society or perhaps even the structure of the Government itself. What we and the South Vietnamese must avoid is casual and capricious rewriting of the constitution, lest we set an undesirable precedent that would militate against the establishment of a stable and democratic country. Either the constitution should be regarded as a serious document or it should be discarded. It should not be tampered with lightly.

V

It would be unfair and inaccurate to leave the impression that those in our Government who have been working on a negotiated solution have turned up nothing but complexities, problems and questions. Much hard thought has been put into developing approaches, alternatives, contingencies and fail-safes in connection with many of the problems alluded to above and to many more which have not been mentioned. Nor should the impression be left that the process of negotiation would be so difficult and so fraught with risks and disadvantages that we should consciously try to sidestep or ignore opportunities to work out a political rather than a military settlement. On the contrary, the United States and its allies have the skills, the leverage and the experience to work out a satisfactory political settlement *provided* that we are, in fact, talking about a negotiation and not a surrender ceremony, and *provided,* too, that Hanoi is willing to engage in serious discussion. Thus far, at least, the prospects for negotiations evoke the White Queen's lecture to Alice: "The rule is jam tomorrow and jam yesterday, but *never* jam today."

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POWER IN A SIEVE

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

AMERICANS tend to think there is a solution to every problem. In a corollary—equally misleading though not unnatural, given the unrivaled material strength of the United States—they imagine that when the problem is international the solution to it will be American. Most international problems, however, do not have final solutions. Only a Carthaginian peace is final; and short of that, as even unconditional enemy surrenders have demonstrated, the distribution of rewards and punishments soon turns out to have results very different from those the victors foresaw or desired. Applying these truths to the situation in Viet Nam, we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is not a final solution to the war there; that neither a preliminary nor a lasting solution will be determined by the amount of force which we are able or willing to use; and that in neither case will it correspond to our idea of "victory."

Although the physical strength of the United States has grown phenomenally since shortly after World War II, our direct and usable influence in the world has not kept pace. We have immense military power, but the nuclear core of it, however indispensable in maintaining a balance of terror with the Soviet Union, is power we are powerless to use in remote situations of danger where our national interests, real or assumed, become involved. Pronouncements from Washington have not always made public opinion realistic in this respect. Military spokesmen are not in the habit of minimizing the effectiveness of their weapons or the wisdom of their strategy (although some of our most experienced battle-tried commanders have recently done so in very plain language). Political leaders faced with winning a war or an electoral campaign find it expedient (usually, that is: Churchill did not, nor did F.D.R. always) to sustain morale and gather support by issuing optimistic reports and predictions, minimizing risks and deficiencies and explaining failures to live up to prophecies by assurances that the causes have been understood and rectified.

In making an estimate of our responsibilities in the world and of our capacity to carry them out (not always to our own

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advantage only), we must not ignore how much the Viet Nam war is isolating us from other nations. The movement apart is from both sides. American neo-isolationists emphasize the indecisive nature of the war to show that we have greatly exceeded our capabilities; they identify our dispatch of aid to Viet Nam in the mid-fifties as only one more example of a fatuous urge felt by Americans after the last war to "do good" wherever asked; and they urge that in future we follow a policy of hemispheric defense only and adopt a thoroughly selfish approach to the needs of backward countries. Even some who for years have urged that we take our share and more than our share of responsibility for world security and social and economic development are beginning to falter; they wonder whether if our statesmanship is so shortsighted we should not limit our involvement abroad to occasions where it is clearly inescapable.

Somewhat similar questionings have risen abroad as to whether the United States can sustain its expected global role. Many leaders in friendly and allied countries feel that our entanglement in Viet Nam is unwise and unnecessary and fear it will be futile, even ruinous. This may be of more consequence for our future influence in the world than the vituperation directed at us in great sections of the foreign press. It is no use replying that practically every country where the public is given to these self-righteous outbursts has a record of inhumane actions in time of war. The *tu quoque* argument is never effective. Nor can we make it with any degree of satisfaction to ourselves. Too many of us are horrified by the suffering and sorrow we are causing, the wiping out of villages and devastation of cities in South as well as North Viet Nam, the relentless recitation of body-counts, the herding hither and yon of pitiful refugees now numbered in the millions, and the admission that (as many have known from the start) any bombing from great heights cannot be pinpointed, will cause indiscriminate destruction and must kill numbers of civilians.

These facts raise for sober discussion the question whether the incongruity between our original motives and the reasonably probable results of the war justify us in continuing it with the present methods, on a mounting scale, with increasing havoc in South as well as North Viet Nam and with a growing toll of Vietnamese and American lives. There are risks in any course we follow. Indeed, the stark fact is that the factors we must weigh in our minds and consciences are not advantages but disadvantages.

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II

There is no need to recapitulate how step by step we have stumbled into a situation where every attempt to extricate ourselves will be painful. Looking back, we see that our grossest miscalculation was not military; it lay in failing to understand the people and society we were setting out to help. We did not foresee that a mainly military effort, no matter how massive, would not sustain their confidence through a long nightmare of guerrilla savagery.

When our first efforts to stabilize and reinforce the Saigon Government by sending it economic assistance and military advisers proved insufficient, we failed to make reappraisals of where each new political and military step would lead and what problems we would face in consequence. By 1965 we found ourselves forced either to admit that our intervention had been a mistake or to save the South Vietnamese army from dissolution and defeat by taking over most of the fighting. Since then it has become plain that we probably cannot be defeated militarily. Neither can we "win." No one can disparage the courage of our fighting men, certainly no one who has been among them in the field. But they are fighting under handicaps that are not military in nature. One is the apathy of the population around them; after years of colonialist exploitation and confused struggle, and lacking dynamic leadership like that of the North Vietnamese, the people of South Viet Nam are understandably weary, numb and uninterested. Another handicap is the inadequacy of the governments in Saigon which we have been fighting to maintain; these have been flagrantly and persistently corrupt, have shown little concern with principles and do not exercise effective influence over great sections of the population.

Of critical importance, no political or social underpinning has been built for such military successes as we have had. Almost without exception, competent observers have long been saying that "pacification" of the country was the number one issue. Washington and the American establishment in Saigon agreed. They promised—again and again—vast efforts to give the villages security, responsive civilian officials and the beginnings of modern conveniences. But the task was Herculean and they unfailingly put real reliance on the military and gave its needs and objectives precedence. Over the years, "pacification" projects bloomed

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and died. The attacks begun by the Viet Cong at Tet forced abandonment of the latest program; field teams and security troops had to be drawn back into the towns and cities to help restore order there and guard against fresh attacks. Any new effort will be begun on country-wide débris. It will be handicapped by the increased disillusionment of the rural population and, on our side, by the realization that these people are less disposed to coöperate with us than we assumed in the past. For the Viet Cong's ability to prepare and mount a coördinated operation throughout the country revealed that they commanded the help or at least the acquiescence of unexpectedly large segments of the population. It is a question whether the assistance to the Viet Cong in the jungles, mountains, rice paddies and towns was mainly active or passive, given enthusiastically or out of fright; but it was massive enough to mute the intelligence reaching our military establishment to such a degree that the Viet Cong secured a shattering tactical surprise.

Our Government seems to have suspected as little as did the American people that the cumulative commitment it was making would end in a land war fought on the Asian mainland mainly by American troops and almost wholly by American resources, exceeding in dimensions any foreign war except the Two World Wars and the Korean War. Even in Korea, though the casualties were greater than those we have so far suffered in the present fighting, the maximum number of troops committed at any one time was 470,000, a figure already surpassed in South Viet Nam, and growing fast.

On all possible grounds, political and humane, the President must desire peace. His problem—our problem—is one of means and costs.

III

If at this point the Administration recognizes that our original goals are not attainable, it should identify new goals and adopt the new policies needed to reach them. This involves a reassessment of our obligations to the present Government in Saigon. We are honor bound not to accept any situation which puts or leaves in physical danger those who have supported the war. (If this means providing a future for many of them abroad, the problems involved would be minor compared to the troubles we face in an indefinitely continuing and widening war.) But our

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obligation to the Saigon Government does not extend to letting it determine the basis on which we deal with the enemy to settle a war in which Americans, not the South Vietnamese, are now the principal protagonists.

In this regard we recently made one advance. Ambassador Goldberg, by his announcement on November 2, 1967, that the United States would support a move to invite the Viet Cong to participate in U.N. Security Council debates on Viet Nam, opened up the possibility that, despite Saigon's known objections, we might be willing to negotiate with the Viet Cong as well as the National Liberation Front and the Hanoi Government. It seems clear today that it was a mistake ever to have ruled out the enemy with whom we were most directly engaged from participating in talks to end the fighting. For one thing, the relationship of the Viet Cong to the Hanoi Government is not precisely known; its eventual objectives in South Viet Nam may well differ in some respects from those favored in Hanoi (as might become more evident at a time when it was no longer dependent on Hanoi for military supplies and reinforcements). Secondly, since we aim to preserve South Viet Nam as an independent state separate from North Viet Nam (assuming it so desires), it was unwise to proceed as though all the power of the enemy to determine the future of South Viet Nam was situated in the North.

When we first intervened in South Viet Nam our asserted aim was to help the people maintain their independence and decide their future for themselves: and this purpose we have many times confirmed. It is difficult to maintain that they exercised the right of free choice in the election of the present Government, on which so much of our policy is predicated. Granted that under the conditions of harassment which prevailed it was a feat to hold an election at all, the ruthless exclusion of rival leaders and of potential candidates with pacifist or neutralist leanings invalidates the claim that it is representative, impairs its authority and makes it a partner for which we are continually having to apologize. The ability of the people of South Viet Nam to make decisions may all along have existed only in our illusions, and *a fortiori* may be illusory today. Eventually they should be given a fairer chance to attempt making a choice than they have had so far: but under prevailing conditions of turmoil and insecurity this is impossible.

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Given that impossibility, there seem to be two remedial actions which we can and should take.

First, we should make clear to the Theiu Government that we cannot any longer assume the major military burden of the war without some greater influence on the political environment in which we must operate and on which a successful outcome must depend. We cannot wish to take over responsibility for governing a society which is so sundered and indifferent. But if a last effort is to be made to constitute a political organism capable of surviving—on the supposition that a measure of military stability has been achieved—we must now insist that overdue reforms be put into effect forthwith. Promotion must be made on the basis of ability, not local influence or in-group political loyalty. Patently corrupt and incompetent officials must be dismissed. The arrest of non-communist political opponents cannot be tolerated. Land reform must be aggressively pushed, with more haste than might be desirable in a well-ordered society, but with an urgency that conveys an awareness that the peasant really matters. Other reforms, long discussed and rarely implemented, must be carried through.

Second, in order that there may be a real prospect that these reforms can be put into effect, we should insist that the Government widen its base willy nilly by forming a coalition régime containing representatives of the major elements in the South which are not communist but also are not unwilling to negotiate for peace. Some leaders who would have to be considered for inclusion are now in jail on some pretext or are, like "Big" Minh, in exile. To a government thus reconstituted we should make clear that if its members do not submerge their personal enmities for the common good, if they allow their political rivalries to interfere with pursuit of the war and an effort to achieve peace on tolerable conditions, we would consider our obligation to the South Vietnamese people fulfilled to the best of our ability. Our original commitment was to give them the opportunity to choose their own destiny; we can neither choose it for them nor indefinitely keep their options open.

The two procedures suggested are essential if we are to have reasonable flexibility in undertaking moves that we decide may be helpful in order to begin negotiations and in making any concessions that we decide are proper (in return for concessions from the enemy) to bring the negotiations to success.

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President Johnson realized as long ago as February 2, 1967, that compromises would be necessary. He said then in a press conference: "I think that any peace agreement will involve understandings on both parts and contain concessions on both parts."

The pros and cons of suspending bombing in the North as a basis for opening negotiations have been argued out exhaustively and will not be rehearsed here. It must be said, however, that the President may have missed an opportunity to halt the bombing under favorable conditions when U Thant returned recently from consultations in Moscow, New Delhi, Paris and London and assured him that on the basis of those talks he was confident that a halt would result in Hanoi's entering into early negotiations. The President would have won wide approval by acting on this opinion; and if the experiment failed, the responsibility would not have been his but U Thant's, Kosygin's, Mrs. Gandhi's, Wilson's and de Gaulle's. Perhaps another opportunity will come to involve the prestige of several great nations in our effort to open negotiations looking to peace.

It has sometimes been urged that we relax our military pressure in the hope that the example will be followed by the other side, thus letting the war simmer down; this seems a less feasible procedure since the Viet Cong assumed the initiative by their sustained attacks on the cities. It has also been proposed that either U Thant or some foreign personality of undisputed bona fides undertake mediation. And there are other suggestions.

Nobody outside government, and probably nobody in government, can say with confidence what moves toward peace are likely to be reciprocated by the other side. But anybody is free to state the premise that our country cannot in conscience or good sense continue sacrificing lives—our own, those of our friends and those of our enemies—in an enterprise which was designed to help a people to freedom and prosperity but which instead is destroying them. Circumstances have changed and our policies must change to accord with them. We can assert with proper pride that our motives in first intervening in Viet Nam were of the best, and without humiliation that, in spite of great efforts and painful sacrifices, our calculations—or lack of them—somewhere along the way misled us. That is the truth which must be at the base of any new policies we adopt.

If these policies worry our Asian allies we must reassure them

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with acceptable guarantees that we shall continue to be involved in the region, at least until such time as the international community can provide an alternative. Their preference, like that of the Southeast Asian governments not directly involved, is that the whole area or part of it should be neutralized under an explicit international guarantee. It is not impossible that after the war is over the Soviets would be ready, as part of a general accommodation of interests, to join in such a guarantee. Viet Nam would be included, whether divided or united, and regardless of the character of régime. As one of the guarantors, the United States, if requested, would maintain a sufficient military presence in the area to deter overt aggression for some time to come. This might consist chiefly of air and naval forces based at strategic points but might also include land forces if, for example, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore or perhaps the Philippines would welcome them. After Viet Nam, the nations of Southeast Asia will understand that any protection promised from outside, however guaranteed, will be efficacious only if they themselves are determined to defend themselves. As Malaya proved, "dominos" need not topple if, with the right help, they prove to be made of the right stuff. In addition to joining in a military guarantee of the area, the United States would inaugurate a long-range program of economic aid on the scale suggested by President Johnson in the past. The details of such undertakings are less important at this stage than acceptance of the responsibility to carry them out.

Negotiation, of course, is not peace; it is only a means—a possible means—to peace. The Government of North Viet Nam may refuse to negotiate with us or with the present or a new South Vietnamese Government on any terms. There is no particular reason to suppose that the Soviets will press the North Vietnamese to let us extricate ourselves from a situation which is sapping our strength, creating domestic dissent and earning us worldwide disapproval—all without their having to do more than supply Hanoi with munitions for the fight. Moscow refuses to reassemble the Geneva Conference or some replica of it. Even with the continuing chaos in China, it fears to offend segments of the communist world by a move that would be interpreted as "helping the imperialists."

If the war continues in its present indecisive phase, pressure will mount in this country for what will be called a showdown; there will be demands for very greatly increasing our forces com-

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mitted to Viet Nam and extending their operations into the North, either directly, or by an outflanking landing on the coast north of the Demilitarized Zone like that at Inchon in the Korean War, or even by employing tactical atomic weapons. Before we slip into a war spreading beyond all control, and with consequences that cannot be estimated, we should admit to ourselves that no practicable solution will correspond to our idea of victory and that our efforts to end it must accord with that hard fact.

In a moment when both Washington and Saigon seem almost in a state of shock, outsiders—if any American is an outsider at this point—must be free to express their profound concern, to press for a fresh look, a willingness to break out of frozen attitudes. Fear of losing prestige should not be a factor in determining our course. In the final accounting, the United States will be judged by its behavior when the fighting is over. We are strong enough to do what we think is right, and praise will come to us for doing right and fearing no man.

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GERMAN POLICY TOWARD THE EAST

By Willy Brandt

OUR foreign policy toward Eastern Europe is concerned with two closely linked areas: the Soviet Union, and the European states to the east and southeast of Germany which are connected with the Soviet Union in many ways. Although our foreign policy toward these states is called "East European policy," this term is relative. Countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia may lie east of Germany, but they have perfectly good geographical, historical and cultural reasons for regarding themselves as part and parcel of Central Europe.

A third area indissolubly linked with this East European policy is the other part of Germany. This does not involve foreign policy in the exact sense of the word, for neither part of Germany is a foreign country to the other. However, the East German régime is so completely interlocked with the group of states led by the Soviet Union that any East European policy disregarding the German problem would be unrealistic.

In all three areas our goal is one and the same: to safeguard peace, reduce tensions, improve relations and contribute to a system of peaceful order in Europe. Particularly since the two great democratic parties formed a coalition government, several changes have occurred in Bonn with regard to how these aims may be better realized; and these changes are not merely ones of form or degree.

This is not acknowledged in the East. It is claimed there that our policy is a smokescreen behind which we cling all the more relentlessly to a "denial of realities," a "policy of strength" and a striving for nuclear weapons and continuation of the cold war. This is mistaken. Naturally, there are certain basic features in our policy—as in those of any state—which cannot be altered. Anyone who thinks of foreign policy in terms of a swinging pendulum fails to comprehend its underlying laws. Even in Germany's present situation, our policy is grounded in a set of facts and requirements which cannot be forfeited. We will persevere in our demands—not only for our own sake but for the sake of our allies and friends and in the interest of international order. The reproaches leveled at us by Eastern propagandists have nothing to do with our real purposes.

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One reality with which we must come to terms is the division of Europe and the attachment of its parts to one of the heavily armed power blocs. The split runs right down the middle of the continent and divides Germany in a way that is dangerous, artificial and unjust, for it prevents a people from living as a nation according to its own will. We know, however, that this division will not vanish overnight and that, as far as one can tell, it will be overcome only in conjunction with a general improvement in East-West relations in Europe. Thus, we not only have to take this time element into account politically, but we also have to make a greater effort to find rules by which the two parts of Germany can live side by side.

At the same time, we reject any German policy that lessens the solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or limits the decisive participation of the United States in safeguarding freedom in Europe. On the contrary, we are convinced that we will improve our relations with our allies by facing up to the realities without illusions and by avoiding any shade of ambiguity. Without a balance of power provided by the presence and active participation of the other world power—the United States—a solid and lasting détente with the Soviet Union is impossible. The American commitment is indispensable to any system of peaceful order in Europe.

A reduction in the overheated temperature of East-West relations has been noted in recent years, though it applies primarily to Europe. To believe that it is worldwide would be wishful thinking. Yet we can take note of the American assessment that, despite the current problems burdening American-Soviet relations—and not just in Southeast Asia—it still is necessary to work toward a détente. We can now assume that Europe is no longer in a cold war that could turn into a hot one at any moment. Of course, there is no such thing as a guarantee against setbacks. But it appears justified to count at least partially on a mutual sense of responsibility on the part of the world powers. As a result, Europe's fear of falling victim overnight to a violent conflict has receded into the background.

In both the Eastern and Western camps, this has had consequences for the relations of allies to one another and between the two major alliances. The consequences are by no means all positive, but at least a process of progressive economic, cultural, political and human relations has begun. Neither nationalistic aspira-

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tions nor claims to hegemony have halted the expansion of this process. Europe—which is to say Europe as a whole—is moving toward a transformation of historic dimensions in the course of which old kinships will be rediscovered and new ones found. Peoples are talking to one another again. Technical, economic, scientific and intellectual communications are leading to a fruitful exchange and increasing understanding of the situation and of each other's interests. More and more, dialogue is being mixed into the monologues of political propaganda. People are listening to each other.

German policy does not intend to be an obstacle to this development; indeed we want to further it. We have realized that professing peaceful intentions is not enough: we must make an active effort to organize peace. This includes a renunciation of the use or threat of force in any form, not only because war must never again emanate from German soil, but because it is in our own vital interest. The Federal Republic would automatically be drawn into any major military struggle between East and West. It would inescapably be the first victim. Our people would cease to exist, for the number of troops, war matériel and means of nuclear destruction amassed in the narrow area comprised by the two halves of Germany is unique in world history. As a result, the Federal Republic has a special interest as well as a special duty to persevere—but without wishful thinking—in reducing mistrust and tensions. This process cannot advance without the active coöperation of both world powers, the European states both East and West, and both parts of Germany. Within this process, we have a particular responsibility toward the other part of Germany.

II

During the past two decades, the Federal Republic has offered a great deal of evidence of her reliability. She has allied herself so closely with a group of European states that an irreversible process of integration and of creating supranational institutions has been set in motion. We have followed this path consciously and resolutely, not in an effort to undo what had been done—for that was impossible—but because we wanted to start afresh in awareness of what had happened and of our ensuing responsibility. In doing so, we sloughed off many things which had previously seemed—and are still considered by many to be—essential

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to a traditional nation-state and to national policy. Thus, as everyone knows, we renounced having troops under our own national command.

In domestic affairs, we have developed a democratic system that has grown strong enough to cope fairly and firmly with extremist political groups. Nationalist fringe groups exist in the Federal Republic as in any nation with freedom of political expression. We do not underestimate this phenomenon. In the light of the past, the foreign distrust that it arouses is understandable. Nevertheless, I am certain that nationalistic groups will never again grow into a danger in my country as they did in the twenties and thirties. The overwhelming majority of Germans, and especially German youth, can no longer be taken in by such false doctrines or be impressed by emotionally hazy ideologies with obsolete vocabularies. Furthermore, the responsible democratic forces in Germany can, in all good conscience, give their word that they are determined to prevent political adventurers from becoming a danger to Germany or her neighbors. We have learned from the past.

We want to prove that we are a modern, reliable, trustworthy state. Starting from this conviction, the opinion has been rapidly gaining ground since the grand coalition took shape that the Federal Republic bears a particular responsibility in the present world situation. This is consistent with the interests of our friends and allies. It corresponds to the frequently expressed desire of the leading power of the Atlantic Alliance as well as to the ideas of our European allies. German policy has become more independent, but we are not thinking of going it alone, of doing a "Rapallo," as that catchword has come to be understood. It is a moot question whether "Rapallo" ever encompassed the political facts commonly associated with that term. In any case, there will be no seesawing or doing a balancing act between East and West or exploiting tensions. Political conditions, historical facts and the involvement of new forces relegate such possibilities to the realm of phantasy. Our policy includes close consultation with our allies and is grounded in the realization that we do not have authority over matters that involve the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community as a whole.

Our political goal has changed in one fundamental point. Previously, we and our allies assumed that an arrangement with the Soviet Union and a bridging of political power conflicts in Central

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Europe were unthinkable unless the problem of Germany's division was solved first. The result was a demand that every step taken by the major powers toward one another, at least as it concerned Europe, had to be simultaneously a step toward the elimination of the division of Germany. This demand was meant to prevent a sanctioning of the division and to avoid leaving Europe's main unresolved problem at a standstill. This idea has remained correct in its essence, but not in its exaggerated form of demanding priority for the reunification of Germany.

Today, our policy is based more strongly on the interrelatedness of the German problem and European development generally. It concentrates on the improvement of the present climate of distrust, tension and conflict. This means that a long and arduous road lies ahead of us, for many stretches along the way are blocked by debris that will have to be cleared away by patience and good will on both sides. Preconditions should not be put in the way. The less either side is prepared to meet the other on this road, the longer will be the process of achieving détente, a true reconciliation of interests and the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe.

Of central importance is our relationship to the leading power in the group of socialist states, the Soviet Union. This is self-evident from an assessment of the facts of world affairs, the power relationships and the pattern of interests in Eastern Europe. It is not our goal nor even a peripheral intention of our new Eastern policy to isolate the G.D.R., nor do we intend to create or exploit differences between the Soviet Union and her allies—often as this is claimed in Eastern propaganda.

One of the most important realities of the current political situation is the fact that the Soviet Union has grown into a modern world power—that is, a power whose interests and influence are worldwide. The power of the Soviet Union is especially perceptible in Europe; no one would wish to deny it. Our relations with the U.S.S.R. are far from being as good as we would like them to be. In a continuing effort to improve them, we are trying to start talks in those areas in which some sort of agreement might now be possible—those involving bilateral relations. But initial approaches have also been made for discussing more difficult questions. One day, in a pre-coördinated policy of trust with the United States and our European allies, we hope to discuss openly all problems existing between our countries so that we can

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take the first steps toward solving them. It is our hope that reason and objectivity will some day prevail. We have the necessary patience.

Another important reality is the fact that the Soviet Union and a number of other countries are attached to one another by manifold ties of a political, ideological and economic nature and that the other part of Germany, the G.D.R., is tightly held in this "field of forces." We would be ignoring this if we disregarded East Germany in our policy of détente—if we neglected this important area in which we Germans have a special responsibility and in which something is expected of us. Such neglect would be detrimental to the very détente we are striving for. The struggle for a secure peace in Europe cannot be handled in a piecemeal fashion—as can be seen in other parts of the world where we ourselves are not engaged.

The other part of Germany is also a reality—one involving us in particular duties and possibilities. Our new policy means that we are prepared to arrange our relationship with the other part of Germany in a different way than has been the case hitherto. We have, however, made it clear that international legal recognition of that part of Germany, in which one-quarter of the German nation lives, is impossible precisely because of this special relationship. We are convinced that no other people who had met with a similar fate would act any differently. This will of the large majority of a whole nation is also a political reality and one which is realized even by the G.D.R. If we speak out in favor of the whole German nation, if we express the desire of the overwhelming majority of the Germans in both the Western and Eastern parts of our country—as we know we do—we are not trying to impose a majority claim, but merely expressing a common desire to reunite.

III

German policy today is based on the assumption that overcoming the division of Germany will be a long process whose duration no one can predict. For the time being, we have to do whatever is possible; otherwise we shall fall prey to wishful thinking or resignation, neither of which can be justified. Nor can we take the path of least resistance by granting to the G.D.R. régime a democratic legitimacy which it does not have. Our most immediate task is to strive for an orderly way for both parts of Germany to

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live side by side. We want to reduce the tragic consequences of the division under which so many Germans are suffering bitterly. We want to preserve and strengthen the feeling of belonging together.

So far, these efforts have remained mostly one-sided. East Germany has actually tried to evade coöperation in reducing the present absurdities. Instead, it has made new demands and stipulated that they must be met as a precondition for starting discussions. One may regard this as an attempt to acquire a better negotiating position. However, judging from experience—for example, the reaction to Chancellor Kiesinger's letters of June and September 1967 to Herr Stoph, chairman of the East Berlin Council of Ministers—we have reason to assume that the decisive group of East German leaders are trying to avoid discussions, even if we refrain from setting any preconditions. We must conclude that they are not really interested in a détente and do not see the larger issues that are so important to Europe today and even more so tomorrow. The G.D.R. is holding fast to conceptions which—if they were ever valid—now belong to the past. This inflexibility is leading East Germany more and more into a situation so inconsistent with reality that it is encountering greater and greater difficulties. Over and over again, it has to evoke the solidarity of its allies, striving for their support in a policy that does not always work to their benefit.

A rigid policy of this sort may not only lead to East Germany's becoming an island of obsolete cold-war ideas within the current of European change; one day it will simply become too costly to keep a big nation in the middle of Europe under the tension of an unnatural separation against its will. This holds true not only for that other part of Germany but also for its allies. Everyone affects everyone else, and no one can forever act in disregard of the limitations imposed by his real interests and capabilities.

Even the Soviet Union, which must think as a world power and a power with responsibility for Germany, will have to reflect coolly on its real interests in this matter. It will not be able to evade this, and perhaps has already embarked upon such a process without admitting it. In any event, during the fifty years of its history, the Soviet Union has more than once reconsidered important aspects of its foreign policies.

If the G.D.R. complains that we are trying to isolate it, I can only assert that such is not our intention. On the contrary we are

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convinced that isolation, whether imposed by others or self-inflicted, can only slow down and hamper the entire process of reaching a détente in Europe. We desire to turn the confrontation into an orderly process of living side by side, safeguarded by a mutual renunciation of force. Only under these conditions can we conceive of living together in future within an all-European system. But so far the G.D.R. has been placing obstacles in our path. It is not *we* who are isolating East Germany; rather it is East Germany which is isolating itself.

Moreover, our efforts to establish normal diplomatic relations with the countries of East and Southeast Europe have been obstructed primarily by East Germany. In spite of this, we have made progress and it should not be underrated. We have normalized our relations with Rumania, placed our relations with Czechoslovakia on a new basis and resumed diplomatic relations with Jugoslavia. And we have reason to hope that the possibilities are not yet exhausted. Political, economic and cultural relations are also developing with other East European countries, to our mutual benefit.

Last year, three conditions were set forth which we were required to meet if the signatory powers of the Warsaw Pact were to normalize their relations with the Federal Republic of Germany: (1) Bonn would have to recognize the German Democratic Republic as a state; (2) Bonn would have to recognize the demarcation line between the two parts of Germany and the Oder-Neisse Line as national borders; (3) Bonn would have to renounce its alleged ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons. A further demand was made: Bonn would have to acknowledge that West Berlin is an autonomous political entity in the territory of the G.D.R.

What can be said about these demands? The policy of the Federal Republic is such as to permit constructive replies to all these conditions. With good will, and with a realistic evaluation of the existing realities and the significance of détente for all concerned, they need not be obstacles on the road to establishing a security system and peaceful order in Europe. However, if such conditions are set in order to avoid talks, then they may be dressed up as insurmountable—the sort of concessions that could not be made in advance.

(1) The G.D.R. knows that we are prepared to issue mutually corresponding, reciprocal or multilateral declarations renounc-

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ing the use of force. We have thus gone further than the previous Federal Government's "peace note" of March 1966. Our proposal for the renunciation of force in the Government's statement of December 13, 1966, refers explicitly to the problem of the division of Germany. Such a renunciation means that each side gives assurances that it will not infringe by force upon the integrity of the other, either from outside or inside.

(2) The Western border of the Polish state is included in our offer to refrain from any sort of aggression against anyone. We place great importance on good relations with Poland. This is a cornerstone of our policy in the East, just as is our good relationship with France in the West. Our position toward Poland is also guided by the realization that this nation, with its proud tradition in European history, has suffered greatly under forces of aggression. We understand her desire to live at last within guaranteed borders, and not be a "state on wheels." A reconciliation with Poland is our moral and political duty. This reconciliation implies not only that through our efforts every thought of force must be banished; we must also make sure that no seed of future conflict is planted.

A concordance of interests between the German and the Polish people is perceptible in many areas, if we think about it soberly and in terms of the future. Trade, technology and science are among them, as well as armament limitations, with a simultaneous and equal reduction of armaments in Central Europe as the goal. We believe we can sense, despite all the polemics, that in Warsaw, too, this question is given serious attention. We will study with great care all Polish comments on these topics. The earlier impression that this has not always been the case can be corrected.

The drawing of borderlines should not impede the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe. If forces in Europe are strong enough to create a system of security and ultimately a stable and equitable order, they will not be held up by border questions of the past. Perhaps the declarations we have offered regarding the renunciation of force can be formulated and safeguarded in such a way that the present borders of Poland can be recognized for the period for which the Federal Republic can commit itself, *i.e.* until a peace settlement. Thus, in the interest of both nations, the border question would no longer stand in the way of a détente or of a European security system. At the same time, this would

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prevent this question from being used any longer as a pretext for those who oppose a German-Polish settlement.

(3) The Federal Republic is unique in having renounced in 1954 the production of nuclear weapons of any kind. Furthermore, she has agreed to submit her entire atomic industry to international controls. And if an acceptable worldwide nonproliferation treaty, which would allay humanity's fear of an atomic conflict, could be brought about in the near future, she would welcome it. Such a treaty ought to be the first step toward the ultimate elimination of all nuclear arms and comprehensive disarmament.

Even the fourth condition can be surmounted. The Federal Republic has always respected the fact that in 1945 Berlin as a whole acquired a special status—the four-power status—based on international agreements. As things developed, the three Western powers were left with a special responsibility for West Berlin, but this does not imply that the four-power status of the entire city has ceased to exist. However, it does mean, among other things, that the Soviet Union cannot claim more rights regarding West Berlin than the three Western powers can in regard to East Berlin.

Different opinions on details of this status have been expressed in East and West. This became particularly clear when the Wall was built in 1961. However, there is no reason why, with good will, practical solutions and improvements cannot be achieved. We, at any rate, are doing our best to prevent Berlin from becoming a hotbed of dangerous tensions. This is why we have not infringed on the status of West Berlin and have remained in full agreement with the three Western powers protecting the city. The Soviet Union also has repeatedly expressed its interest in Berlin, recognizing—in principle at any rate—that East Berlin, too, has a special status. This shows that on this point there need not be such profound antagonisms as to prevent a détente. If, nevertheless, the most rigid elements in the leadership of the G.D.R. were to try unilaterally to alter the status of Berlin, they would endanger the whole effort toward peace in Europe. The Western powers would have to act in accordance with their rights in Berlin and their obligations toward the people of Berlin. This would ruin all efforts toward a lasting détente. No one ought to take such a responsibility upon himself.

Here, as in the entire German question, our policy aims at

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practical solutions, which—without encroaching upon the special status—would make life easier for the Berliners, who through no fault of their own have been involved in the fate of this city, a living organism, never before divided. This is a specifically German responsibility and the Soviet Union is aware of it. It realizes, too, that we have no intention of negotiating in lieu of the Western powers.

IV

In all three areas, then—Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the G.D.R.—we have taken the initial steps toward a new Eastern policy. The road hereafter will be arduous. We think that it will ultimately lead from an agreed renunciation of force via a guaranteed and balanced European security system, with the participation of both world powers, to a durable and just order in which can be found a solution of the German question, in full accord with the Germans themselves and their neighbors.

I am not trying to draft a vision of the future. Yet today we can already affirm that what I have outlined is the only way in which Europe can find peace and quiet; and the destiny of the world is inseparable from Europe's destiny. Time is pressing, for we can already perceive the social and economic tensions which are increasing in large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the effects of which are also felt outside those areas. A catastrophe can be forestalled only if all the industrial nations—from North America all the way across Europe to Japan—can combine their energy to serve this great task rather than fritter away their strength in fruitless and dangerous confrontation. These are the truly great and creative tasks of our time. This final third of the twentieth century will decide whether the nations of the world are so caught up in the past that they will forfeit the future or whether they have the vision to master that future.

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THE ABM, PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

By Robert L. Rothstein

THE contemporary strategic era, dominated by ballistic missiles, has appeared to possess a curious kind of stability. Despite its uncertainties and dangers, two factors were apparently beyond dispute. On the one hand, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could eliminate the other's missile forces in a first strike or effectively defend against a retaliatory missile strike. The offense seemed to have made a quantum jump against the defense: the old pattern of oscillation between defensive and offensive superiority had apparently been superseded by a period in which, for the foreseeable future, defense would be definitely inferior and incapable of matching offensive gains. On the other hand, missiles were so expensive and required so much technical sophistication that very few countries could either afford them or build them. The vexing problem of nuclear proliferation thus appeared in a new light. Even if a state could develop a nuclear bomb, it was assumed that it could not be a truly "effective" member of the nuclear club unless it also developed a missile to deliver it somewhere. The double task of building a bomb and a sophisticated delivery system inevitably seemed so difficult that the problem of preventing a thoroughly destabilizing nuclear proliferation appeared relatively simple. At worst, the process could be "managed."

We may, however, be entering a strategic era in which neither factor holds true. Whether ballistic missile defense ever achieves the level of effectiveness (near perfect) some of its proponents foresee in the next decade, and whether the costs and difficulties of developing rocket vehicles are as sharply reduced as others contend (so that the ability to deliver the bomb in high style spreads rapidly) are obviously uncertain. But to the degree that these prophecies are accurate, or believed, the stability of the missile era may prove to have been very transitory.

At any rate, one point deserves emphasis. Deployment of an ABM system and the beginning of a process of nuclear diffusion (which may be directly related to the ABM decision), irrespective of whether they occur because of political or technological

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reasons, may thrust us into a new strategic environment in which even the tenuous stability of the present will evoke nostalgia. In the circumstances, policies which would have appeared dangerous or unnecessarily provocative yesterday may perhaps begin to appear more prudential and realistic today or tomorrow.

II

The recent announcement of the decision to begin installing a "thin" ABM system elicited a great deal of negative comment in the American and European press. This is hardly surprising for, on the basis of publicly available information, the arguments against the ABM seemed much more persuasive than those for it. In fact, anyone who troubled to read Mr. McNamara's statement on the budget in January 1967 would come away quite convinced that the arguments justifying early installation of an ABM system were at best premature and at worst spurious. Yet within the year Mr. McNamara had apparently changed his mind and committed the United States to early deployment of a partial ABM system. The San Francisco speech in which he announced the decision may, perhaps, be read as an ambiguous and even anguished justification for the ABM; but it still may have committed us decisively.

It is possible, of course, that there were objective military and political reasons for Mr. McNamara's about-face. A new technological breakthrough might have occurred or intelligence might have yielded firmer and more dangerous information about Soviet or Chinese capabilities or intentions. To a certain extent this indeed appears to have happened. Soviet development of a "fractional orbital bombardment system" (FOBS), reports of heavy Soviet investment in *both* offensive and defensive missile systems, new predictions about Chinese capabilities and significant advances in our own ballistic missile defense research (especially with X-ray warheads) all tended to point in the same direction: prompt deployment of a "thin" ABM system.

Now, it is a mistake to argue as if the installation of an ABM system would have only negative consequences and that a delay would have only positive consequences. Decisions such as these are a wager about the future and they are made—or ought to be made—"on balance," and with full realization that the possibility of unanticipated consequences or mistaken consequences is very high. In the circumstances, there is great temptation to

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buy insurance by developing everything that can be developed, and to do everything possible to reëstablish or maintain a situation which seems to be advantageous. The virtues which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have seen in immediate deployment of the ABM system may be regarded in this light. Their arguments, in isolation, seem persuasive: more effective deterrence, a reduction in the number of lives lost should deterrence fail, a reduction in the possibility of accidental or "catalytic" wars, a halt to nuclear proliferation and, above all, a stabilization of the *existing* strategic balance (*i.e.* one in which the United States possesses "dominance"). ABM deployment, according to the Chiefs, would "continue the Cuba power environment in the world. . . . At the time of Cuba, the strategic nuclear balance was such that the Soviets did not have an exploitable capability because of our vastly superior nuclear strength."

None of these arguments is as clear and uncontroversial as the Joint Chiefs of Staff appear to assume. Mr. McNamara himself apparently found them unconvincing as recently as a year ago. Under some circumstances, and in certain future contexts, an ABM system promised several limited advantages; on balance, however, they were apparently outweighed by the disadvantages. Under the best of circumstances, the ABM seemed prone to obsolescence (as new offensive missiles appeared), uncertainly effective,[1] enormously expensive and politically inexpedient. The obvious question is whether various technological developments in the past year, as well as new uncertainties about Soviet and Chinese behavior, justified a reshuffling of priorities and a definite decision to plunge into a new strategic environment. Even for those with access to all the available information it must have been an agonizing choice: the stakes are frighteningly high.

It ought to be said, however, that there are a number of very knowledgeable people in Washington who maintain that the foregoing considerations were irrelevant. They contend that the decision was almost completely a response to domestic political pressures.

While the argument is not very subtle, it is also not entirely

[1] As one Department of Defense expert has noted: "Any defensive system can really do no more than to raise the entrance price which an attacker must pay in order to destroy a target." Charles M. Herzfeld, "BMD and National Security," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,* 1965, reprinted in *Survival,* March 1966, p. 74. The best analysis of the ABM problem which I have found is J. I. Coffey, "The ABM Debate," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1967.

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implausible. With the political costs of the Vietnamese war accelerating, the Johnson Administration may well have felt that it could not risk providing the right wing (both Democratic and Republican) with another security issue in the forthcoming elections. It may be, as some have said, that the Administration overestimated the degree of Congressional pressure for an ABM system. However, it was quality not quantity which was probably decisive: the Congressmen who were most vociferous on this issue were also among those who could harm Mr. Johnson most in the next year. In addition, the Joint Chiefs, whose discontent is frequently noted, had to be pacified: their leverage on the President and the Secretary of Defense went up as their threats to resign became increasingly dangerous in political terms.

That the decision to begin deployment of a "thin" ABM system was not the result of a considered evaluation of all the military and political evidence may perhaps be inferred from the confused manner in which it was publicly justified. While it was said to be aimed solely at the emerging dangers of a Chinese nuclear strike against the United States, and not at the Soviet Union, against which it was patently ineffective, both Mr. McNamara and various military officers indicated that it would indeed have an indirect effect on the Soviet-American strategic balance. By providing point defense for our Minutemen it clearly would cut down the effectiveness of a Soviet strike against them. However, since the Administration was in the throes of a public and private effort to convince the Soviets that the ABM deployment was not aimed at them, and that discussions to curtail ABM deployment were necessary and possible, "clarification" was needed.

A public speech by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke attempted to provide it. Mr. Warnke argued "that our Chinese-oriented ABM deployment should make it easier, and not harder, for countries in Asia to sign the NPT [nonproliferation treaty]." The ABM, he maintained, would make the American commitment to defend Asia credible, since henceforth Detroit or Los Angeles, etc., would be safe from Chinese retaliation. He also maintained that it would emphasize the "unique disparity" between the United States and China, and thus make it "even clearer" to the Asians that they could safely sign the nonproliferation treaty. He concluded by declaring that the Soviets "knew" that the system was not designed for use against them,

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and therefore need not respond to it—surely one of the more naïve imputations of faith in recent years, especially given the contradictory testimony from other officials of his own Department.

Mr. Warnke's analysis of the possible effects of the ABM is peculiar in that he apparently presumes that it can be deployed while everything else in the strategic and political environment remains static. The Russians will not respond, or will respond by agreeing to arms-control measures, because they believe in our good intentions. The Asians will agree to forego nuclear weapons because their faith in our good intentions will rise. The Chinese, who have no faith in our good intentions, will "finally" realize that we can destroy them and will behave more rationally. And our European allies will, of course, realize that, as we have from time to time maintained, our efforts to improve our own defense have nothing to do with our commitment to come to their aid; and it is merely a nasty impertinence to insinuate in Gaullist style that we are leaving them exposed and ignored.

Many of our strategic analysts have tended to view strategic problems from a systemic point of view, almost to the exclusion of other vantage points. As a result, particular events or developments have been assessed primarily from the global perspective of the superpowers. Since the strategic configuration which has existed over the last twenty years has, for the most part, reflected conditions of American dominance and relative stability, new developments have inevitably been foreseen as destabilizing unless they were controlled by, or symmetrically limited to, the superpowers.

The response to the problem of proliferation is a case in point. Granted it is potentially very destabilizing, how does one prevent it? The usual answer has been by persuading potential nuclear powers that their efforts will be extremely costly and that, anyway, they will be useless if not counter-productive against the United States or the Soviet Union. That is, the systemic perspective has been maintained: the behavior of small and middle powers has been evaluated almost wholly in terms of its possible impact on the whole system. Since we have favored the status quo, our efforts have been limited to trying to convince others not to rock the boat. The whole syndrome can be perceived in the arguments designed to convince France not to join the nuclear club; they were perfectly logical but also irrelevant. To Paris,

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and perhaps to many potential nuclear powers, the problem appeared in a wholly different perspective when evaluated in terms of national (*i.e.* sub-systemic) interests.

Mr. Warnke's speech may be read in this light. Again, it is assumed that other states will perceive the situation in the same way as we do and will be as concerned with international stability as we are. There is no attempt to examine the problem from other points of view. If we do attempt to interpret the impact of the ABM decision from local perspectives, the picture which emerges is not nearly as optimistic as the one drawn by Mr. Warnke.

III

We can begin by discussing China's possible reactions. It is doubtful that anyone seriously believes that the ABM, as currently described, is aimed at China. However, since public justifications have insisted that the essential aim of the ABM system is deterrence or defense against Chinese threats, the argument must be examined.

It should be clear that the political and psychological advantages of China's nuclear weapons are not directly related to American defensive capabilities. There is thus no sense in the simplistic argument that an ABM system will actually induce the Chinese to forego missile development. In addition, the assumption that the Chinese will react to an increase in our defensive capabilities by decreasing their offensive capabilities is not psychologically convincing: the opposite reaction may be more likely.

The usual contention, however, is not that the Chinese will give up their missile program but that a "thin" ABM system will substantially lessen the impact of a Chinese nuclear attack. What is the probability of such an attack? To some, the likelihood is high; the Chinese are more aggressive and less rational than the Soviets and will strike rather than accept humiliation. In effect, a Cuban missile crisis with the Chinese is destined to have a different scenario. To others, the behavior of the Chinese has been as cautious and nonprovocative as that of the Soviets and the probability that they would strike the United States seems very low. Acceptance of the latter point of view has to be tempered by several considerations. The first, obviously, is the current internal instability of China, which might lead to extreme or

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irrational behavior in a crisis. Another point is that China has not yet reached the stage where war—as the fashionable argument goes—becomes increasingly unpalatable and unlikely as energies are concentrated on the accomplishment of domestic tasks. Finally, the Chinese tradition is different from our own, we have miscalculated their response before, their standards of rationality may diverge as much from ours as Japan's did in 1941—and so on. In short, it is not altogether unreasonable to worry about aggressive and irrational behavior by the Chinese. The critical question concerns the relationship between that assumption and the installation of an ABM system.

Reports on Chinese missile capabilities suggest that they might have a small but operational ICBM force in the early 1970s. What damage that force could inflict upon the United States depends on a range of factors which defy simple summation. The "thin" ABM system promises area coverage of the whole land mass of this country against a light attack. Thus even if the Chinese were willing to trade payload for range (and reach cities considerably east of the Mississippi), it would do them little good since those cities would be as protected by the ABM as our west-coast cities. They could, in theory, saturate one or a few areas with all their missile strength, but the effectiveness of that tactic would depend on the capability of our ABM system and the actual number of ICBMs the Chinese could launch.

It is difficult to take these calculations very seriously. It is hard to imagine a set of circumstances in which the Chinese would actually strike first with their small ICBM force, and one is inevitably obliged to create scenarios of ever increasing degrees of improbability. They *could,* in some *Götterdämmerung* fashion, launch all of their force against San Francisco; or they could spread it out in the belief that our ballistic missile defense was a "paper wall;" or they could gamble on odd forms of delivery (the proverbial bomb in the cargo hold, or nuclear torpedos against coastal cities, or small planes launched from ships and carrying small bombs, etc.). But the probability of their doing so is surely very low. And since we cannot prepare for *all* potential dangers, regardless of plausibility, and since even reasonably prudential calculations suggest that a Chinese ICBM attack on the United States is highly improbable, an ABM system justified by reference to Chinese threats to ourselves does not make much sense. This is the more true because lead times

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are such that we could still meet the threat if it became less improbable at a later date.

The case seems even stronger if we try to foresee the response Peking might make to our ABM system. It is very unclear at the moment, especially to anyone not privy to whatever information we are collecting about the mainland, just what the Chinese are attempting to develop. They will probably produce some ICBMs, if only to prove that they can do so. However, they are most likely to concentrate on medium-range missiles in order to threaten neighboring states in Asia. This would allow them to delay investing heavily in an ICBM until they are capable of producing an improved second-generation weapon. The Chinese could, in a sense, hope to duplicate the efforts of the Soviets in the late 1940s and 1950s, when, being clearly inferior to the United States in strategic power, they deployed their ground forces and short-range missiles to threaten Western Europe. The message was clear. If we attacked Moscow, confident that *we* would not be hurt badly, we were warned that Europe would be devastated in the process. An asymmetric balance seemed to exist, and the weaker side appeared to deter the stronger by threatening an area which the stronger valued but could not easily protect.

Though the analogy is obviously imprecise, the odds definitely favor a Chinese strategy designed to threaten us only indirectly, at least until that day, probably in the late 1970s or 1980s, when the Chinese are able to produce a force capable of achieving nuclear parity or stalemate with ours (and the Soviets'). In the meantime, the ABM system we are committed to install will rapidly become obsolescent. In sum, against the Chinese, our ABM system promises advantages only if the Chinese are foolish enough to launch an attack on us with their first generation ICBMs.

Presumably, then, the ABM system must serve other purposes. The one most frequently cited is the possibility that it will enhance the credibility of any commitment we offer to a non-nuclear country (*e.g.* India or Japan) threatened by a nuclear power. The idea has a certain plausibility in that, in a world in which all calculations were rational, the possibility of limiting destruction to ourselves ought to convince our friends that we are more likely to live up to our commitments to them. If true, they will not need to develop their own nuclear weapons and can then

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sign the nonproliferation treaty, for they will be assured that we will counter mortal threats to their existence.

It is difficult to speculate on this point, for the evidence is both slight and ambiguous. The Suez episode of 1956 provides one illustration of a nuclear threat against a non-nuclear state (France), but it is probably not a reliable analogy. At any rate, it did nothing to convince the French that they were better off without nuclear weapons of their own. India's reaction to the Chinese bomb is also ambiguous: at the least, India has begun to consider seriously the possibility of becoming a nuclear power.

Unfortunately, one is left with the impression that the contention that our ABM system will facilitate nonproliferation reflects profound hopes and desires, but not a very realistic judgment about how other states will view their own interests. Improvement in our defenses is likely to be of only marginal significance in affecting Asian calculations. Given the inherently low credibility of our nuclear guarantees outside Western Europe (and it has not been spectacularly high there either), the critical question is not *our* "damage limiting" capability, but that of the Asians. Japan or India, threatened by a Chinese nuclear attack, will undoubtedly prefer an American guarantee to nothing at all. But it is possible (even probable?) that they will view it as only a temporary umbrella while launching a crash program to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The only way to short-circuit this process may be to provide threatened states with an effective ABM defense of their own. If we really want them to forego developing nuclear weapons, we must provide a direct defense of their territories. This could be accomplished in several ways, but some combination of an explicit American guarantee, the provision of a reasonably effective area ABM system (preferably at least initially under our control), and perhaps even the promise of a small, offensive nuclear force if a threat of a specified nature arises—all these may be necessary to make our guarantee credible and thus inhibit the process of proliferation.[2] It is an extreme policy, and can be justified only in terms of the kind of environment it may be forced

[2] The worst danger of a guarantee policy is that it might commit us to involvements we would prefer to avoid; the decisive question, which cannot be discussed here, is the extent to which we really have a viable option of noninvolvement open to us. The idea of a seaborne ABM force under our control may be worth investigating and might even be reasonably effective against a relatively small and unsophisticated Chinese missile force.

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to contend with. The costs would be very high, not least in the sense that promising or providing a nation with an ABM system may be the first step toward its acquiring offensive nuclear weapons—on the uncertain but not implausible presumption that an ABM system without a complementary offensive capability is as unsatisfactory as entering a battle with a shield but without a sword. Moreover, the problem of defending against an MRBM is almost insuperable, given their limited flight time, and especially if they are delivered in number. Hence, the pressure for offensive weapons as a deterrent will be heavy.

This suggests that the possibility of signing an effective non-proliferation treaty is bound to decline rather sharply in the near future; that many states will be seeking their own nuclear defenses; and that we shall have to consider new nuclear arrangements if we want to do more than wring our hands piously as the environment becomes more and more dangerous.

IV

What effect may our ABM system have on our relations with the Soviet Union and our European allies? The argument that an ABM system would "continue the Cuba power environment in the world," and thus reinforce our ability to deter the Soviet Union, is superficially plausible until it is placed in context. The assumption that the installation of an ABM system will enhance our ability to deter the Soviets depends on what kind of system we build and how the Soviets respond to it. Some systems and the responses they evoked would decrease our ability and increase the chance of an even more destructive war.

All the denials notwithstanding, our ABM system is primarily designed to counter an apparently growing Soviet threat. In the past, we have tended to assume that the way in which we developed or deployed our weapons systems signaled something to our enemies about our military intentions. It has never been very clear that the Soviets actually read these signals in the desired fashion. They may simply have been following their own technological genie wherever it led them: that is, they may have developed and deployed weapons not in response to what we did but simply as a response to their own technological capabilities.

At any rate, it is difficult to resist some such reasoning in the light of the Soviet decision to begin installing their own ABM

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system. After all, if they were "reading" us accurately, they should have known that we would respond by building our own ABM system and by increasing our offensive missile capability to penetrate their defenses. They would then be in an even more inferior strategic position and would have expended scarce rubles for very little return in security. Our rearmament in 1950–53 and our reaction to the "missile gap" are only the most obvious illustrations of our unwillingness to remain behind.

Yet the Soviets have apparently rebuffed all efforts to reach an agreement prohibiting ABM deployment—almost as if our response left them indifferent. The normal explanation offered by Western analysts is the extreme defense-mindedness of the Soviet Government and people. Marxist theory, a history of invasions and fears of encirclement apparently justify what seems to be an excessive concentration on defense—a phenomenon the Anglo-Saxon powers have always found, for obvious reasons, difficult to comprehend. Nevertheless, defense-mindedness alone does not seem a sufficient explanation for Soviet behavior.

Another rationale is that, as a relatively weaker power, the Soviets may feel considerably more threatened by the proliferation of small nuclear forces than we do. The French and Chinese nuclear forces, and the possibility of a West German force, not only have the potential of inflicting considerable damage on the Soviet Union but also—given Soviet history and predilections—might appear more likely to be actually used than we presume. To a weaker state, weaker nuclear forces appear more dangerous: the attacking smaller state could no doubt be destroyed in retaliation, but in the meanwhile it might have hurt the Soviets grievously and exposed them to American retaliation. If one presumes that they have reordered their hierarchy of threats and have upgraded the dangers of living in a "world of nuclear powers," the installation of a primitive ABM system does not look quite so "irrational." That it simultaneously worsens relations with the United States could be accepted as a reasonable price to pay.

Still, this argument could be completely wrong. The Soviets may still see us as the prime threat, and the ABM system may be designed to deter us and to limit damage in the event of a major war. The geographical placement of their ABM sites would seem to confirm this. In that case, the rationale for the Soviet decision remains very unclear, and the disagreements on this

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issue among Soviet leadership groups very understandable. To many Western observers, however, the Soviet decision seems to be a manifestation of a kind of intellectual lag in strategic thinking which has persisted for two decades. The Soviets have seemed to be several years behind us not only in weaponry but also in drawing the political, psychological and military implications of various technological developments. Current ABM systems thus seem more effective when compared with the capabilities of an earlier generation of missiles. The Soviets may in fact have much greater faith in the technological capacities of their ABM than we tend to credit them with—a circumstance which could be dangerous.

What effect will the mutual emplacement of ABM systems have on the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union? There is no clear and unambiguous answer. It will obviously depend on the kind and extent of the systems installed, and, perhaps even more, on each side's subjective estimates of the likelihood of war or probable behavior of its antagonist in major crises.

It can be said, though, that ABM defense—at least a less than perfect defense—is of more relative utility to the aggressor than to the defender, whose retaliatory force must strike back in a weakened condition against a fully alerted defensive force. And since there is no situation in which striking first is not of *some* relative advantage, defensive forces can have a very destabilizing impact on any strategic balance to the degree that they make it appear as if striking first is becoming a more and more "attractive" possibility to either or both sides. This is especially true if one side is aware that it holds the weaker cards in any strategic exchange and is less than firmly convinced of the peaceful intentions of its adversary. Its propensity to gamble on striking first in a crisis may then be fairly high. This is a familiar syndrome and it suggests why many analysts argue that installation of an ABM system will force a return to the dangerous and unstable years in which we were troubled by the "consequences of expecting surprise attack."

The way in which each side deploys its ABM system is thus of great significance. But as long as the Soviets remain the weaker side, their decisions are somewhat less important than ours. That is, we possess a larger margin of error and therefore can be more flexible. If our system is designed only or primarily

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to protect our retaliatory missiles, the decision may not be too destabilizing; the Soviets will still retain the capability to destroy our cities in retaliation, just as we would theirs. However, the area system we are on the point of installing is, for the moment anyway, designed to protect cities from weak missile attacks. It is not intended to protect our Minutemen. It *looks* as if it is designed to handle a Chinese attack or some sort of accidental firing by virtually anyone. But it may not be read that way by Soviet leaders.

Unfortunately, many hints and suggestions are already appearing that the system ought to be expanded. We cannot have it both ways: if it is to deter the Chinese, extension of the system is unnecessary, for they do not have a technological capability to endanger our missile sites. If it is against the Soviet Union, official spokesmen are not only lying about our true intentions but also have begun installation from the wrong direction: obviously protection of missile sites is the first task.

These circumstances suggest that it is a fair presumption that our "thin" system will shortly begin to put on weight. Whether it is in reaction to Soviet offensive or defensive moves, or whether it is done in response to other considerations (*e.g.* domestic political pressures), is not especially important. In either case we will have begun a major new phase of arms competition with the Soviet Union. Whatever else one can say about the resulting situation, it is unlikely that it will be very stable or that it will actually reduce damages in a war. In effect, an ABM system guarantees decreased casualties *only* if both sides refrain from simultaneously increasing their offensive capabilities, or if the system achieves virtual perfection. Both are unlikely. Moreover, by another familiar dynamic—the "self-fulfilling prophecy"—we may actually increase the likelihood of war by acting as if it is more and more possible. Our ability to deter the Soviets may decline as we begin to threaten them in a more dangerous fashion, and our ability to defend more successfully (to lower casualties) may also decline as offensive force levels increase.

The decision to expand the "thin" ABM system may not be inevitable. The burden of the foregoing argument is that it ought to be resisted as long as this remains feasible. The point is not that installation of a larger ABM system is wrong in all circumstances; rather, that, on balance, it seems wrong in the set of circumstances determining strategic calculations at the moment and for

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the next few years. Compared to us, the Soviet Union is clearly the weaker power. The choices before it on the ABM issue are not only fewer but also starker. They have to respond to our actions, whatever the cost, unless they willingly accept an acknowledged state of conspicuous inferiority. We are not so narrowly constrained (except domestically): as the stronger power we need not meet every Soviet increase in strength with a symmetrical increase in our own force structure.

The underlying rationale for restraint on our part is twofold. On the one hand, given our current superiority and given our lead-time advantages, we do have some time in which we can safely delay expansion of the ABM system—at least until we believe that the Soviet ABM system represents a significant threat to our retaliatory force. On the other hand, restraint now represents what may be our last significant opportunity to delay the emergence of an environment in which stability is increasingly tenuous. In so far as possible, we should not only refrain from expanding our ABM system but should also limit the expansion of our offensive forces to whatever minimum seems safe. A too extensive expansion of our offensive force, so that it appeared capable of a credible first-strike attack, could be as destabilizing as the installation of the wrong kind of defensive system.[3]

It is still much easier to increase the striking power of offensive forces than the damage-limiting capabilities of defensive forces. It is possible, therefore, to limit our response to increasing our offensive capability to penetrate the Soviet ABM system; our cities would still be hostage to a Soviet strike and the Russians would not necessarily have to increase their own retaliatory force substantially. We could still penetrate their defenses and they could still penetrate ours, defense expenditures would not be extravagant, and some element of stability—albeit the uncertain stability of a nuclear balance—might still persist.

[3] After this article was written, Secretary McNamara, in his farewell report, announced that the Soviets are apparently not installing a full-scale ABM system (though they have substantially increased the size of their ICBM force). He said that the Galosh system around Moscow had not been expanded or extended to other cities and that the Tallinn system across the Soviets' northwestern approaches is no longer believed to have "any significant ABM capability." It is difficult to take a charitable view of why a different impression had been given earlier, for serious doubts about the reliability of the evidence concerning Soviet ABM installations have been justified from the beginning. At any rate the arguments in this article are reinforced by the Secretary's admission; there is even stronger reason to slow down (if not halt) our own installation of an ABM system; thus far no move has been made to do so.

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Something ought to be said about the presumed impact of our ABM system on our European allies. Official spokesmen have been very quiet on this aspect of the decision. When pressed, they have contented themselves with platitudes about common interests and the like: anything we do to improve our defenses must, by definition, improve Europe's defensive situation also.

The Europeans do not see it this way. Many of them, and not only Gaullists, see the ABM as increasing their vulnerability. They stand wholly exposed between our missiles and Soviet missiles. Moreover, the British and French nuclear forces are inevitably downgraded as deterrents, for the ABM systems have a much higher probability of success against small strikes. Some of our commentators have seen this as a virtue, since it presumably would inhibit potential nuclear powers from joining the club and perhaps even induce the French to bring their force under our umbrella.[4] Unfortunately, this is likely to be true only if the French and other potential nuclear states have developed or will develop their nuclear forces to garner *military* advantages vis-à-vis the superpowers. That is not the case: their nuclear forces have been, and will be, designed to extract political and psychological advantages from the superpowers and to serve a military purpose only on the local level.

Great Britain and France are not going to dispense with their nuclear forces, or turn them over to our control, solely because of developments in ABM technology. On the contrary, our defensive efforts will probably succeed only in exacerbating present disagreements. Our minimal effort to consult our allies before making decisions is not conducive to good relations. Worse yet, they may respond by seeking their own ABM systems. This would probably signal the end of the nonproliferation treaty, for signing it would preclude independent development of the necessary technology. While the Europeans may not rate the probability of Soviet military action very high, they will not be able wholly to ignore the military significance of a new arms race between

[4] Thus one writer argues that "possession of ABM systems by the great powers could deter non-nuclear countries from obtaining nuclear weapons while at the same time increasing the deterrent value of the great powers' nuclear forces." (Lewis A. Frank, "ABM and Nonproliferation: Related Issues," *Orbis*, Spring 1967.) This piece seems to me a classic example of the tendency to overemphasize the degree to which decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union about their forces will affect the decisions of non-nuclear states.

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Washington and Moscow. Moreover, the task may be so difficult (since the direct threat against Europe consists of a large number of medium and short-range missiles against which the defensive problem is fantastically difficult and expensive) that they will prefer to decrease their ties with the United States. It may appear that this is the only way in which they can reduce their chances of being an exposed pawn in a resurgent cold war.

This article has suggested that the deployment of ABM systems may have a number of unfortunate consequences, none of which have been sufficiently stressed—and, perhaps, understood—by official spokesmen. There are undoubtedly ways in which these developments can be avoided or at least mitigated. If they do come about, it will not be because we are prisoners of some inexorable technological process or because the demands of security can be met only by policies which are ultimately self-defeating, but because of very human errors of will and foresight.

Finally, if this writer has not been misguided, two propositions must be emphasized: first, in our own security interests we should under-respond to Soviet ABM deployments, at least in the immediate future; and second, our friends and allies have every right, not to say obligation, to place what we (and they) can do for *their* security—not what we can do to limit damage to ourselves—in the center of their calculations.

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WHERE IS BRITAIN HEADING?

By Robert V. Roosa

THE devaluation of the pound sterling on November 18, 1967, and the announcement on January 16, 1968, of a firm timetable for Britain's withdrawal east of Suez have been widely lamented as marking the "end of an era." Along with such spectacular domestic reversals as the imposition of charges for medical care and the promise of still heavier taxation, the events of the past several months may at least justify the clichés, so often repeated, that Britain is at a "turning point" or has reached a "crossroads." But does all of this necessarily mean continuing deterioration or indicate that Britain's economic base can no longer support her as a major power? Or can those of us looking on from outside reasonably hope that what Labor Ministers have called the "second Battle of Britain,"[1] will result in new patterns of economic expansion?

Grounds can be found for predicting either outcome. The attempt here will be to search out some of the more encouraging possibilities. To fit these into perspective, one must first take a closer look at what has been going wrong in Britain during the post-Marshall Plan period, and then at what seems to account for the climax reached near the end of 1967. Indeed, any appraisal of where the British economy is heading must be mainly based on an analysis of where it has been.

II. WHAT HAS BEEN GOING WRONG?

Britain's root problem is that she has been attempting for too long to do more than her own capabilities, as currently mobilized and motivated, could support or afford. The gap between ambition and performance has revealed itself most arrestingly in the succession of balance-of-payments deficits, culminating with increasing frequency in balance-of-payments crises, and climaxing at the end of 1967 in the devaluation—in effect, a repudiation of 14.3 percent of Britain's external obligations to unprotected holders of sterling, in a last-resort effort to bring her receipts into line with her outpayments. A diagnosis of what went wrong must clearly begin, therefore, with the balance of payments; but it must

[1] This is also the title of an article by Walter Guzzardi, Jr., in *Fortune* for February, which has a remarkably similar approach to much that is discussed here.

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then be extended back into the functioning of the British economy itself.

Britain's shortfall of total receipts below total expenditures was not conspicuously large in most of the years following the completion of the Marshall Plan in 1952. Moreover, her current accounts (which in British accounting include merchandise trade, the "invisibles" such as interest and services and all government transactions except those for long-term capital flows) have actually been in a condition of modest surplus more often than in deficit over the fifteen years through 1966, with an average current-account surplus of nearly £50 million per annum. This was far from sufficient, however, to cover both the private capital outflow, short-term as well as long-term, and the Government's long-term capital transfers. That is why Britain had to turn to the International Monetary Fund for borrowings and standby credits in every year from 1958 onward (with the exception of 1960), while also arranging a succession of short-term loans from various central banks over the years from 1961 onward.

Although these various drawings and borrowings were periodically "cleaned up," a residue of increasing dependence upon special credits steadily accumulated. When devaluation came, the cumulative total of the indebtedness incurred by the Bank of England for balance-of-payments purposes was probably larger than the total of Britain's official monetary reserves, which have customarily been between $2.5 and $3 billion. The annual repayment and interest required on these official borrowings may well be more than a billion dollars for several years ahead.

Because the United Kingdom had for so long failed to satisfy Mr. Micawber's rule equating ha'penny surpluses with happiness (and ha'penny shortages with disaster), holders of sterling became nervous whenever events took a turn for the worse. As a result, outflows of capital aggravated any significant increase occurring in the current balance-of-payments deficit. To be sure, this amplification of the swings could have been avoided by following a course that Mr. Micawber would also have readily understood: by increasing the inflow a little, or reducing the outflow a little, or perhaps doing a little of both. While acknowledging self-consciously that the same kind of prospect has long confronted the United States, without our finding an effective answer, one may ask more comfortably from a distance why Britain did not translate Micawber's homilies into effective action.

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Part of the difficulty seems to have come in Britain (as it has for some years past in the United States) from focusing on immediate results, as these show up in transactions across the exchanges, without adequately treating those parts of the cause to be found in the action of the domestic economy. Export drives, easier terms for exporter credit, an interval of import surcharges, wage and price and profit limitations, credit squeezes and higher interest rates to attract or hold shiftable funds—all these and more were tried in Britain's attempt to reach a sustainable equilibrium. The emphasis, as it had to be in each specific situation, was upon transfers of goods or capital from one use to another, rather than upon the longer-run potentials for expanding the economy as a whole in ways that would also assure a closing of the balance-of-payments gap. To be sure, the underlying need for greater productivity was often discussed, as well as the desirability of greater growth, but not until after devaluation had occurred was moderate expansion spelled out as the way to grow out of the persistent deficits (for example, in Chancellor Jenkins' speech to the Overseas Bankers Club on February 5).

In so far as generalizations can be permitted in situations of such intricacy, it is probably fair to characterize most of the British approaches over the past fifteen years as "static" rather than "dynamic." The unspoken assumption in Britain has been that a fundamentally sound economy had merely slipped out of balance, with its obligations to pay out funds temporarily running ahead of its receipts. Such an assumption was not simply a case of traditional British complacency; it had some basis in fact. For the recorded accounts of the private sector (taking trade and capital flows together, but excluding balance-sheet changes on the books of the monetary authorities and the banks) were actually in surplus for twelve of the fifteen years from 1952 to 1966 inclusive; for all fifteen years the average annual surplus in the accounts of the private sector was nearly £200 million.

What threw the overall accounts out of balance was the uninterrupted and growing deficit on government account for goods, services, transfers and capital flows, aggregating on average some £320 million over these same years. From a magnitude of something under £100 million in 1952, the Government's overseas deficit had grown to a magnitude of £525–550 million in 1964 to 1966. The outposts of the Empire and Commonwealth were absorbing more development capital; the extent of Britain's over-

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seas defense commitments was continuing largely unchanged, and the cost was growing.

On looking further behind these results, however, one finds that the private surplus (as has usually been true since data first became available in 1696) was entirely attributable to the "invisibles"—that is, the earnings from overseas investments and the financial and trading services which Britain had performed with incomparable skill and imagination for so long. Merchandise exports, though growing, rose more slowly than the gross national product, and the size of the gap between imports and exports was almost exactly the same in 1966 as it had been in 1952. In sum, the overall picture was roughly this: with overseas government disbursements rising rapidly, the trade deficit did not improve so as to help cover those costs; private capital outflows fluctuated around moderate levels with little sustained change; and the gains from growing private invisible earnings were not enough to offset all of the other continuing or increasing drains.

The obvious corrective would seem to have been either a reduction of the Government's overseas spending or a reduction of the deficit in merchandise trade. Despite some trimming as the bonds of empire were being loosened, the record of year-by-year rises in government overseas spending continued uninterrupted until 1964, when it was stabilized at the high levels already mentioned. Only now, through the dramatic decision to withdraw militarily from east of Suez within four years, has a major reduction of spending commitments been attempted.

So far as Britain's competitive position in world trade was concerned, the "static economy" approach was again evident; her potential for an aggressive expansion of exports was limited by the influence of the "underemployed economy" mentality, surviving from the thirties and earlier. It was reflected in the thinking of men more concerned to redistribute income than to enlarge the total, or more concerned to protect existing investment or an existing job than to take a chance that redirected investment or rearranged working conditions could soon yield greater rewards. Though certainly not unique to Britain, it is a cast of mind that has led there to providing state assistance for medical care, housing and education—all urgently needed, to be sure—on the unspoken assumption that legislative authorization was enough to assure that the economy could produce the needed resources and transfer them to these worthy ends.

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In practice, however, this emphasis on redistribution has also brought about a remarkable leveling of incomes from which, as further noted below, major new influences must eventually begin to flow. Within the decade from 1954–55 to 1964–65, the distribution of incomes had so shifted that by the latter part of it nearly one-half of all after-tax incomes were closely clustered around the national average, whereas at the beginning of the decade the proportion had been only slightly more than one-third. While all money incomes had risen in those years, the proportion of total wage earners in the lower-income brackets had shrunk sharply, as had the proportion in what might be called the "upper-middle" income range.

The result was a social explosion, as millions of people moved out of the settled grooves of centuries and began to take advantage of the opportunities of middle-income living. These people will probably come in time to identify their own interests with the greater growth of the economy as a whole. But thus far a restrictionist and redistributive state of mind has apparently continued to dominate the attitudes of many groups in Britain, including those unions which still insist on featherbedding, for example, and those employers and unions which oppose the introduction of highly productive new investments. While the new middle class is already enjoying greater educational opportunities, which will mean undoubted gains for Britain's future productivity, this has not yet attained the proportions of a decisive change. At the latest count, only 19 percent of the 15–19 age group were in school or university (while in Japan, for example, the figure is over 40 percent).

With public policy emphasizing redistribution of income and welfare programs, the rate of household saving has remained relatively low—considerably below that of the seven principal European countries for which comparable data are available. With business saving also comparatively low, the overall rates of gross saving, as well as gross capital formation, on average from 1958 to 1965, have been lower in Britain than in any of the European countries covered in the OECD's "Capital Markets Study." (Paris, 1967.)

Successive governments have tried, too, to provide special incentives for new investment. But even in these cases, the emphasis has been put largely, for good social reasons, on relocating industry so as to absorb local pools of unemployment, rather than

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on stimulating generally all constructive investment capable of improving productivity and output. Moreover, when governments have acted to encourage new initiatives, a peculiar insensitivity to the effects of their actions upon incentives has ironically allowed them on several occasions to take other actions almost simultaneously which had offsetting effects upon business confidence. What matters is not the details of particular episodes, of course, but rather the fact that neither government stimulus nor private enterprise had by November 1967 generated a higher level of productive home investment.

The end result in terms of the gross national product has been that over the years 1960–65 (the years covered in the OECD study) the average growth of the United Kingdom at constant prices was only 3.3 percent, while the rates for other reporting OECD countries ranged upward from 4.3 percent, generally averaging better than 5 percent. The implicit orientation of so much of public policy and private objectives toward the premises of a static economy had, perhaps not surprisingly, produced one.

By 1967, other factors, some of them long in the making, also assumed a dominating importance. Among these, perhaps the most significant was the increasing vulnerability of the large volume of outstanding sterling balances. Now let us take a closer look at the events leading up to the November 1967 crisis, before proceeding to appraise the opportunities which it may have opened up.

III. THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS

Each of Britain's crises, in 1956, 1961, 1964, 1966 and 1967, was characterized by a speculative run on sterling. The proximate cause each time was different, but the underlying preconditions were the same: the weakening balance-of-payments position just described, and, superimposed upon that, the instability of sterling balances.

Total sterling balances in 1967, including both private accounts and those of foreign central banks and governments, were close to £5 billion, not very different from the figure of twenty years earlier. To meet these liabilities, Britain held official gold and dollar reserves equivalent to about £1 billion and unused rights to draw on the International Monetary Fund and temporary central bank credits of perhaps £750 million more. To be sure, in a broader sense, the combined overseas investments of the British

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Government and its nationals were several times the total of sterling liabilities; there was no question, in banking terms, that Britain as a whole was solvent. But the question asked, not only by holders of sterling balances but also by the bankers and traders entering into contracts payable in sterling, was whether Britain could muster enough current assets to meet whatever part of her current liabilities might reasonably be expected to come in for conversion.

Britain's special vulnerability thus came from the fact that, in addition to questions which any country must face as to its ability to meet its own current payments, she also was exposed to demands amounting to many billions of pounds arising from the current commercial transactions of other countries, denominated in sterling; and in addition she had to cope with the £5 billion of sterling balances, many of which were not involved in these outside commercial transactions but rather represented investments and monetary reserves.

If there was confidence that Britain could always convert sterling into other useable international assets—and this ordinarily meant into U.S. dollars at $2.78–$2.82—then there would be no occasion for holders and users of sterling to rush to convert their pounds into something else whenever Britain's ordinary accounts showed an increasing deficit. But as crisis followed crisis, that confidence wavered, and the holders and users of sterling had to take what precautions they could against the risk that Britain would in desperation have to devalue her currency in order to scale down the amount of other foreign exchange which she would have to pay out against the presentation of sterling.

Right up to the eve of devaluation, the British authorities met that risk by contracting to purchase pounds for future delivery, against payment in dollars on agreed later dates, at only a nominal discount from the market rate. This reassurance, combined with the Bank of England's access to sizeable supplies of foreign exchange through swaps with other leading central banks, was effective until the final days in keeping the doubts and pressures from creating a disorderly rout in the markets for sterling. But even the evidence of the Bank's increasing use of these defensive facilities, from 1964 to 1966 and then in 1967, proved in the end a somewhat unsettling factor.

The underlying concern was always, however, with Britain's balance-of-payments position; what happened to sterling ex-

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ternally was only a symptom of this concern. And with respect to the balance of payments, timing played some perverse tricks. Following Britain's courageous and drastic effort in July 1966 to control home inflation and promote exports, the world was waiting for evidence that she could begin to earn enough above her current requirements to start strengthening her own reserves. At first, there was an improvement in her reserves; as in-payments shot ahead toward the end of 1966 and early in 1967 it seemed that a turn might have come. For the twelve months ended June 1967 she had reached an overall balance in her total accounts. And some of the tighter constraints she had imposed were eased, particularly those on wages.

Yet underneath, the trade position as such was worsening. Even though mainly for temporary reasons, related to the slowdown in Europe and particularly in West Germany, exports declined after the fourth quarter of 1966, while imports bounded upward. Then in June came the war in the Middle East, the blockage of the Suez Canal and additional costs or losses for Britain totaling several hundreds of millions of dollars. As a further exacerbation, in mid-September, when reserves had already begun to flow out again, the dock workers in London and Liverpool began a costly two-and-a-half-month strike. This had a peculiarly perverse effect upon Britain's trade, in that it had a heavier impact on exports than on imports. The earlier improvement in reserves was also misleading because it had reflected, in part, another of those short-term shifts of funds between New York and London which had for a long time been distorting the accounts and disturbing the exchanges, despite official efforts to offset them.

The timing of still another set of events occurring in the summer and autumn of 1967 had a perverse impact upon sterling. This was the conclusion of a four-year series of studies and negotiations among the leading industrial countries and within the International Monetary Fund which pointed toward the creation of a new form of multinational reserve asset. Though the long-range implications of the agreement reached at the Annual Meeting of the IMF, held in Rio de Janeiro at the end of September 1967, were reassuring, the very fact of concentrating world attention upon the need for reform had unavoidably also set off new questioning and nervousness about the monetary system and, thus, about its key currencies.

In this environment, against a background of worsening trade

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figures, speculative elements began to take over. No outsider can know as yet how much Britain had to pay out across the exchanges as the crescendo of sterling sales mounted in the last hectic days before the markets closed for the weekend on Friday afternoon, November 17; nor how much sterling she contracted to buy some months in the future, at prices in line with the pre-devaluation exchange rate. Certainly at the pace then prevailing, she would have consumed all her reserves and all available temporary central bank credits if the run had continued much longer; gold sales through London were close to $1.5 billion in the two-month period, November–December.

Fundamentally, the run was unnecessary. Certainly it was inflamed by a sequence of invidious rumors from one source. But once the run intensified, Britain had little choice left. Then, having devalued, she still faced the same essential problems and the same need for a more dynamic home economy that had been becoming increasingly apparent with each of the preceding crises. She did, however, emerge with two advantages—both of them similar to those enjoyed by France as a result of her 30 percent devaluation nearly a decade earlier.

One advantage was that, apart from a few countries very closely knit within her own currency area, almost no other country devalued. By contrast with Britain's own previous devaluation in 1949, when countries accounting for 50 percent of the industrial world's exports all devalued, this time the countries which did so accounted for only 2 percent. Her other advantage was that she was able to set the pound at a clearly undervalued level, while benefiting from the consistent solidarity of the other leading countries in holding the line on their own exchange rates. Statisticians differ widely in these matters, but those whose calculations indicated a need for devaluation put the figure between 6 and 8 percent. Having cut the pound by 14.3 percent, without suffering any offsetting retaliation from other major countries, Britain acquired a built-in stimulus to her exports and a restraint on her imports. These can prime her entire economy as well as the needed correction in the balance of payments—provided she can hold the domestic line on inflation of wages and prices. That the British Government appears determined to do.

Britain is still going through a strenuous transition as these words are written and will still be suffering from the aftereffects of the November crisis when they appear in print. Immediately,

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she had to find the means to pay off her huge forward commitments incurred in October and November, 1967. Over a longer period, she will also have to deal with the fact that her central bank borrowings will mature and her drawings on the IMF dating back as far as 1966 will come due. Judging by the performance of the exchange markets and the assurances of her Ministers, these debts are being met. No doubt most of the wherewithal for meeting them comes out of return flows as confidence revives, but also some may be coming out of funds attracted by interest rates that conform to a Bank rate of 8 percent, and perhaps a slight amount may represent the first returns from a rise of export orders.

Both 1968 and 1969 will, none the less, be years of trial. The Government has made it clear that austerity in home consumption will have to continue; a severe budget is anticipated for March 19. There is little doubt, however, that the present Government, chagrined but determined, can by one device or another make ends meet during the remaining three years of its official life—unless combatted again by a speculative fever aroused by fears that there will be another round of devaluation.

Apart from fears that might be created by irascible harassment from outside, which doubtless could be contained by a massive show of coöperation among central banks, there would seem to be only two ways in which new pressures could build up against sterling. One might be through generalized fears about a breakdown of the international monetary system, particularly fears that the United States might run out of gold and thus jeopardize confidence in the $35 price of gold as the fixed base of the system, before the special drawing rights (SDR) had been put into place as a multinational buttress for that price. Against that contingency, there is little that Britain can do on her own. But this threat does underline the crucial significance of the U.S. assurance that all of its gold is available to maintain the gold price, and of the U.S. program to restore a balance in its own accounts promptly. It also emphasizes the need for all countries to work with deliberate speed for the completion of the SDR arrangements.

Other possible incentives to speculation against sterling would be indications that Britain was not making the most of the time gained by devaluation and temporary austerity to establish a basis from which to launch a dynamic expansion of her home

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economy and create a lasting equilibrium in her balance of payments. Let me now focus on some of the possibilities for success in these directions.

IV. THE PROMISING PROSPECTS

For at least a decade, outside observers have looked to the possibility of Britain "joining Europe." Despite her own myopia in earlier years, and General de Gaulle's periodic rebuffs more recently, she might still join the European Economic Community. In addition, other alternatives to waiting for entry on the present terms may emerge. French efforts to dominate the EEC have annoyed other members and may ultimately persuade them that the Rome Treaty went unrealistically far; that the plan to fuse nationalist motivations will for some time remain an unattainable ideal; and that the more promising course will be to develop workable economic integration rather than risk becoming entangled in the obstacles to political unity. If such a shift occurred, the prospects for joining most of the countries of Western Europe in some kind of economic alliance would improve. There might be room, too, in this kind of evolution, for an economic orientation as broad as the Atlantic community, even defined so loosely in geographic terms as to include Japan, the newest member of the OECD. Whether or not any of these developments begin to appear soon, there is also the possibility, once again being aggressively explored, of a closer trading association among Britain, Canada and the United States.

Without attempting to choose among these possible alternatives, one can see that they offer Britain a wide range of opportunities. None is likely to reach the action stage soon enough, however, to provide the major focus for British efforts during the precious months of 1968, or even 1969. In all cases, however, the prerequisite is the same: that Britain achieve a fundamental equilibrium in her overseas accounts. The shock and humiliation of devaluation may now have given Britain the needed consciousness and motivation to attain it.

The contemplated reduction of the British Government's overseas commitments announced on January 16, significant as this is, also will not produce sizeable results soon. But the scheduled withdrawals and reduced overseas expenditures should provide a reasonable prospect for improved net earnings over the years ahead. That is what the Chancellor needs if, in redesigning the

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role of sterling, he should wish to fund a substantial part of the shorter-term sterling liabilities, those owing to private and public creditors alike.

There are numerous proposals along these lines, including several outlined in the present writer's "Monetary Reform for the World Economy."[2] The details are relatively unimportant; the techniques used can be various; it is the objective that matters—namely to recast the role of sterling in the international monetary system. The aim presumably would be to neutralize the volatile portions of the sterling balances while continuing to service and build upon the considerable volume of sterling accounts that would continue to be used as a "vehicle" currency in international payments.

But curtailment of overseas government commitments, and a funding of some of the overseas sterling liabilities, will still go only part way toward the lasting resolution of Britain's problems. Her most elemental need is for a revival of dynamism in the home economy. If she can make a quantum jump to a higher and steeper growth trend and at the same time hold wages and prices to moderate increases, she should be able to maintain and improve upon the initial export advantage arising from the devaluation. That kind of performance in the home economy should, in turn, give British bankers and traders a further impetus to utilize their incomparable experience in helping to bridge the merchandising and financing gaps that occur throughout the confusing network of world trade and world investment. (Their ingenuity, for example, has already been mainly responsible in the last decade for developing the Euro-dollar and other Euro-currency markets.)

Is there reason to believe that Britain has a real chance of doing any or all of these things? No doubt if the potential exists, it has been there all along. Clearly something has been missing. Perhaps it has simply been the stimulus to break out of established routines, to take greater chances and of course at times to take losses. The stimulus could have come from the jolt of beginning membership in the EEC. It might still come that way. But it is possible that devaluation itself and the national sense of a back-to-the-wall struggle may energize the British effort.

The answer to this question will be found in the spirit of the Government itself, in whether it is essentially defensive, punitive,

[2] New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 100–110.

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indeed "static," or whether it can give a dynamic, dashing lead to creative innovation. Evidence of this spirit is already beginning to appear, as the initial state of shock dissolves. Ministers are speaking of profits, incentives and opportunity in tones implying a commitment to the motivations of business enterprise. Massive mergers of business and banking firms are under way. Abroad, new risk investments on a large scale are being explored by British firms with large overseas holdings. And four young lady secretaries have initiated a spreading campaign for greater labor effort—"I'm Backing Britain." There is a spirit moving. It is far from universal; it could vanish quickly before the counterforce of management inertia or labor "rulebooks." Hopefully, it will flourish.

In that event, there is much more that the Government can do, both negatively by smoothing some of the rough edges of the constraints that must remain and positively by providing more encouragement and scope for initiative (and for rewards, even if deferred for a time). The zones for action, already visible through the welter of government statements, are the rationalization of union procedures and of employment practices; the stimulation of savings along with a greater diversion of savings into equities; and a broadening of incentives for constructive domestic investment in order to raise productivity and help hold down prices.

So far as labor practices and procedures for determining wages are concerned, the problems caused by craft restrictionism, rising costs and inflationary bias are universal among nations committed to maintaining full employment. But their implications in a world on the move, where nations must also compete successfully if they are to remain viable, have pushed Britain closer than any other leading country to the edge of national disaster. Perhaps, as labor in Britain approaches a middle-class status, it will come to identify its continuing objectives with the maximizing of productivity in the national interest. To say this may be only grasping at straws, however, and such change will in any case be slow to produce major results. Meanwhile, the disciplines exerted by a responsible Labor Government, itself fully aware of the urgencies, must provide the necessary degree of amelioration.

Perhaps it is more realistic to hope that the same redistribution of incomes which might erode the combative and restrictionist "labor class" attitudes toward productivity, profit and growth

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will become a source of enlarged saving. The missing link, if there is one, may be an inadequacy in the marketing organization needed to reach new potential savers and show them what an array of investment possibilities exists, with varied returns. To be sure, the insurance companies, pension funds, building societies and unit trusts do, along with the banks, form an impressive aggregation of privately motivated facilities for mobilizing savings, but they need to be revitalized by government encouragement. And to whatever extent greater savings can be mobilized to raise Britain from its position at the bottom of the European scale of savings, this will not only aid development but generate a powerful force in support of price stability.

Britain in the last three years has created a number of attractive inducements to physical investment in producing facilities. More is done, to be sure, to encourage investment in the depressed areas; and much is confined to other priorities established in Whitehall. There may also be a place for something analogous to the more generalized "investment credit" which has been so useful in the United States (with one lamentable lapse) over the past five years, and has more than paid for itself through resulting increases in overall taxable income. In any event, due to the buffeting which Britain has suffered in 1966 and 1967, the various inducements to investment have not yet had an adequate opportunity to work.

If the incentives to investment are to have their full effect, some further response may have to be made to the widespread criticism in Britain that the present corporate tax and the Selective Employment Tax, with its various per-head rebates, need revision in order to give greater encouragement to equity-oriented venture capital. Both the comparatively low rate of business reinvestment of earnings, and the surprisingly low proportion of savings that flow into equity issues argue the need for further attention. And since Britain is second only to the United States in the scope and scale of its scientific research, there should be ample opportunities, if the equity funds become available, for any entrepreneur who can bring together new capital, advanced managerial techniques and the new research.

In addition to whatever Britain may do to revitalize her home economy through labor practices, savings and investment, she has a great resource in the skill and adaptability of her people in providing services of finance and trade wherever these are needed

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throughout the world. And there will be room, too, when the state of siege can be relaxed, to ease the tight restraints that now inhibit the switching of overseas assets from less attractive into more remunerative uses.

Britain's political or military withdrawal from distant areas need not handicap her business relationships there. Other nations have been able, without exercising political or military control, to maintain worldwide networks of trade, investment and cultural relationships in successful competition with systems based on political and military hegemony. Japan is a case in point. Stripped of her military capabilities, she is effectively using her talents throughout East Asia and beyond. It might be argued, moreover, that because Japan was forcibly relieved of the burdens of maintaining a military establishment, she became able to lead the entire world in the rate of her domestic industrial advance, at the same time that she extended her economic relationships abroad. To be sure, Britain cannot finesse entirely the question of military support for political stability in the world; she must also find ways to avoid any implied dependence upon the United States alone to fill the vacuum (as must Japan also). But that is a vast and different problem, worth studying by a new NATO or its successor.

V. IN CONCLUSION

Enough has already happened to suggest that shock therapy may be at work to remake Britain's economy. She may be casting off the premises of a "static economy" which, implicitly embedded in her economic policies, have made her performance in domestic saving and investment, national income and balance of payments the poorest among the leading countries of Europe since the Marshall Plan ended in 1952. If, as various hints now suggest, she can convert her financial crisis into an economic mutation, if by accepting the principles of a "dynamic economy" she can break through into a new stage of expansion, she may in time securely reëstablish balance-of-payments viability.

Although their material resources at home are not abundant, the British people are equipped by their past experience to fill the growing need for a middleman between the expanding resource capabilities of all of Europe and the investment and service requirements of much of the rest of the world. Britain has been relieved of what were becoming unbearable military burdens

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of empire; she apparently is now prepared to discard the burdensome aspects of providing a reserve currency for the world. She may thus be ready and able to regain the benefits of her comparative advantage as a world trader, a world capital market, a world banker and insurer, a world shipper and a source of talent to develop resources throughout the world. For all this to come about, entry into the Common Market would surely be a useful catalyst; but it may not be essential. What she must have, however, for success in enlarging her role as middleman is a widening scope for freedom in trade and payments throughout the world.

Britain's potentialities are still, to be sure, only dimly discernible. The seriousness of her present position is still partly obscured by a post-devalution spending spree. If she does not succeed, through a draconian austerity, in bringing her foreign outpayments into balance with her receipts over the next two years, the longer range possibilities may never materialize. Moreover, even when her foreign accounts have been brought into balance through a forced contraction, she must create the domestic environment for dynamic change—energizing management where it has been lethargic, and freeing labor where it has been handcuffed by the constraints of obsolete craft protectionism.

If she fails, the consequences will almost certainly be stagnation at home and eventually a turn toward bilateral balancing of trade and payments with each of the major trading nations. The pound sterling, in which about one-third of world trade was still being conducted in 1967, could fade from use even as a "vehicle" currency. The decline of Britain would inevitably jeopardize the effort to multilateralize trade, investment, production and marketing in the world and the continuation of an international monetary structure capable of supporting the multilateral system that has been evolving with such bountiful results since World War II. That is why, wholly apart from diplomatic or political or sentimental considerations, all countries must have a deep interest in the resurgence of a new Britain.

With her experience and her traditions, Britain may find her greatest new opportunities in quietly exporting her economic and financial talents throughout the world. In losing the panoply of Kipling's Empire and the dominating power of Montagu Norman's sterling area, she may have gained an opportunity to replace these with a role of a different kind—helping to fulfill the potentialities of a world being led by the doctrines of Keynes.

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INDIA IN TRANSITION

POLITICS OF MANOEUVRE

By Dilip Mukerjee

THE fall in India's stock with her friends abroad is matched by the doubts that assail her own people. To misgivings about economic prospects have now been added a deep disquiet about the political future. The marked increase in tensions within Indian society, accelerated by intensified competition between the political parties since the general election in February 1967, raises fears that the consensus which has so far sustained the Indian experiment in democracy may break down. These fears, now at the center of the political debate within the country, testify to a crisis of confidence which is far more debilitating than the actual difficulties faced by India as a result of the loss of economic momentum and political coherence. But, paradoxically, the crisis is also a sign of hope. India has reasonably well-evolved political institutions and a fair leavening of educated public opinion, and these give her a sporting chance of pulling through. The practical solutions are still difficult to perceive, but the fact that all political elements are searching for them is itself reassuring.

Apart from the economic situation, on which a great deal will depend, India has, among developing countries, two special problems of a politically explosive character. A well-established educational system, one of the best legacies of the British, has been expanded very rapidly since Independence. There are twelve million students in secondary schools, about two million in colleges, and almost half a million in professional and technical institutions. Absorbing this very large output of qualified manpower was difficult enough even before the Indian economy started running down, but now the problem is even greater. The frustrated hopes of the unemployed, infecting those still in schools and colleges, constitute a major political liability, as evidenced by the rash of student violence spreading throughout the country. Add to this the handicaps imposed by a high rate of urbanization, with which the country simply does not have the resources to cope, and the result is a precipitate deterioration in living conditions in cities, especially in a metropolis like Calcutta. Both these factors contribute to a growing alienation of the politically articulate middle classes, thereby providing a ready market for extremism.

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An election fought in this dismal setting had the predictable result of severely punishing the ruling Congress Party. Its share in the vote fell from 43.4 percent in 1962 to 40.1 percent in February 1967.[1] The majority party's loss benefited neither the right nor the left in particular; the two came out of the election pretty evenly balanced. The Communists' share of the vote showed no rise, nor did that of the Swatantra (Freedom) Party, their ideological antipode. The Samyukta (United) Socialist Party (SSP), a militant social democratic party, did improve its showing, but this gain on the left was cancelled out by the gain of the Jana Sangh, the Hindu party.

In some states, the swing against the Congress was much sharper than the national average suggested: 12 percent in Orissa, around 8 percent in Bihar and Punjab, and 6 percent in West Bengal. The view is widely held that the Congress lost out among the newly enfranchised—the 36 million who have reached the voting age since 1962. Assuming that the Congress' share in the vote remained unchanged among the older groups, the support received from the new generation of the electorate would seem to have been as low as 10 percent in some states.

In a number of states the Congress lost more sharply in terms of seats than of votes. This resulted from electoral alliances of all the main opposition parties against the Congress. In the past, the Congress had obtained a majority of seats quite disproportionate to its actual share of the votes (58 percent to 68 percent of the Assembly seats between 1952 and 1962 on a vote which at its highest, in 1957, was 45.65 percent of the total). The Congress lost its majority in eight out of the fifteen states that went to the polls.[2] In two of these eight, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (UP), it managed to regain power by securing the support of independents and defectors from other parties. In the case of UP, the success was short-lived: within weeks, a massive defection in the other direction brought down the Congress ministry and paved the way for the installation of a non-Congress united front. The same thing happened earlier in Haryana, and was to be repeated in Madhya Pradesh.

[1] This is in terms of the voting for the 3,400-odd seats in the state Assemblies; the simultaneous voting for the 520 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house in the federal Parliament, disclosed an identical trend.

[2] Kashmir, the sixteenth, constitutes a special case, as does the seventeenth, Nagaland, which goes to the polls this year. In both states, important elements of the population refuse to participate.

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The breakdown of party discipline within the Congress was to be expected. It has been, and still is, an umbrella party combining many ideologically disparate elements which hang together because the Congress as an organization has held the key to power. The loosening of this bond was bound to lead those whose ambitions remained unfulfilled within the Congress to seek new moorings outside it. Before the tide began to turn last November, nine out of the seventeen states, accounting for half of the country's total area and two-thirds of its population, were under non-Congress governments.

The almost complete monopoly of power enjoyed by the Congress since Independence (a Communist ministry held office briefly in Kerala, while Orissa had an equally short-lived coalition led by the Congress) lay shattered. This need not have been a disquieting development; the punishment inflicted on the Congress via the ballot box would, in fact, have earned the Indian experiment in democracy high marks if viable alternatives to the Congress had been thrown up in the process. A change was indicated on several counts. The Congress had been getting flabby for want of competition; at the grass-roots level, its leadership had come to take its position so much for granted that its links with the electorate were sadly in need of renewal. Quite apart from the fortunes of the Congress, India's development effort would have gained if a different set of politicians had asked the people to sacrifice in the present for a brighter future. More important, the emergence of a successful alternative government could have deepened India's commitment to democracy by proving that the ballot can accomplish peaceful change.

II

The reason none of these hopes has been fulfilled by the dramatic swing against the Congress in the 1967 election is that the voting was essentially negative in character. Clearly enough, it reflected widespread exasperation with the party in power but did not reveal a specific preference for any alternative. Against the Congress Party's 40 percent share in the national vote, the Jana Sangh—the Hindu party, which was the runner-up—got less than 9 percent, though it may be argued that the national percentages are misleading, since the other parties have influence in pockets but not in the country as a whole.

As an illustration of the seeming absurdity of electoral results,

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the Congress increased its share in the vote in Kerala, the state where it faced the strongest challenge. Although the Congress has been reduced to insignificance in the state legislature, this reflects the eccentric way in which the system of simple plurality sometimes works, as well as the disadvantages at which the party was placed by the electoral alliances of its opponents. Kerala is the only state where Communists have secured a position of decisive influence in the legislature. Its two Communist parties, having managed to avoid an electoral clash, gained sufficient seats to obtain a legislative majority on their own. In West Bengal, the pro-Peking Communists emerged as the second largest party despite losing a good many seats in an electoral confrontation with the pro-Moscow wing. Their superiority relative to all other non-Congress parties gave them a dominant voice in the united-front government that held office in West Bengal for nine months.

This possibility of a legislative stalemate was foreseen—hence the appeal of some politicians for broad unity among the lesser parties in disregard of ideological considerations. The right, represented by the Swatantra Party and the Jana Sangh, had scruples about this approach, and so had the Moscow-oriented Communist Party,[3] but scruples of both the right and left were cast aside at the prospect of power opened up by the Congress débâcle. In state after state, ragtag coalitions came into existence to unite the Communists, the Jana Sangh (or the Moslem League, its counterpart in Kerala), and even the strongly conservative Swatantra Party. The alliances were defended on the plausible ground that the people had shown an unmistakable desire to end Congress rule; it would have meant a breach of faith if differences among non-Congress parties were to pave the way for a return of the Congress to power. For a while the mutual forbearance of the parties seemed a fine example of the give-and-take that is the stuff of democracy, but it was too unreal to last.

Ideology, some Western observers argue, is irrelevant to Indian politics, but this is an oversimplification. Socialism may be a meaningless abstraction which leaves the voter stone cold, but he certainly knows which side he is on when it comes to deciding issues like the proportion of the produce to be allocated between the sharecropper and the landlord, or the preëmptive claim of the state on the surpluses of the better-off farmers, to be used to

[3] The pro-Peking Communists were more amenable; all-out anti-Congress unity suited their tactical aim of worsting Moscow's friends as well as the Congress.

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feed the cities and the rural poor. It was on issues of this kind that the contrived unity of the coalitions soon came to grief.

Despite the attempts made in every state to consolidate the non-Congress vote through formal electoral alliances or informal adjustments among parties, in votes as well as in seats they remained hopelessly divided. Except in Kerala and Orissa, majorities based either on preëlection alliances or subsequent understandings among like-minded parties proved quite out of the question. Madras was the only state where a single non-Congress party managed to win an outright majority.

Mercifully, the Government at the center was spared these experiments in ideological promiscuity. In contrast with its poorer showing in the states, the Congress managed to bag 55 percent of the seats in the Lok Sabha on the basis of 41 percent of the votes, giving it a majority of 48. Bigger majorities have crumbled in the states, as in Madhya Pradesh, but the reason why the Congress stays safe at the center is that the kind of spurious non-Congress unity achieved at the state level would be even more unworkable in the federal legislature.

III

No one need have shed any tears at the collapse of non-Congress united fronts in one state after another since last November but for the chaos which has followed. Instead of the Congress coming forward to form viable alternative governments with the support of like-minded groups—which it could well do as the largest single party in all but three state legislatures—it continues to sit on the sidelines. This is not wholly by choice: the electorate's antipathy to the Congress is still so strong than any party joining with it risks losing out with the people. In a period of political uncertainty, when at any moment a mid-term poll may be called, parties are understandably chary of taking risks.

Another disincentive to coalition is the quite legitimate fear of small parties that they will lose their identity in alliances with the Congress. This danger is greatest for parties least differentiated from the Congress ideologically, as for instance the Praja (People's) Socialist Party (PSP), a mildly social democratic party, or the various groupings of those who have recently bolted the Congress. In fact, antipathy between these ex-Congressmen and the present-day Congress leadership is particularly sharp, and compromise is difficult to achieve.

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Finally, the Congress is caught in a dilemma when it comes to making a choice between possible partners. To offer an opening to the right—as S. K. Patil, the Bombay Congress leader, has suggested more than once—would be to relinquish the long-cherished claim to the middle of the road. A large part of the Congress leadership seems convinced that the party can regain the support it has lost only by attuning itself more closely to the radical temper of the Indian people. This explains the hurry with which the Congress, immediately after the election, reaffirmed a series of socialist pledges of long standing. If the Congress should now take the pledges seriously (and it well may, judging from the mood of the rank and file), it might have to shed its rightist membership. That would be no great calamity. But just as the party will resist moving to the right, it will also avoid identifying itself too closely with the left. Should polarization in Indian politics proceed farther than presently seems likely, the Congress will draw the moderate elements on the left within its fold, rather than lose its own left wing. But polarization of this kind is still not a serious possibility.

Just now, any move to seek allies on either the right or the left would expose the precarious unity of the umbrella party to an intolerable strain. Therefore the Congress cannot take advantage of divisions among its opponents and has relied instead on weakening the united fronts by luring away their individual members, a course which encourages opportunism. Worse still, resentment of these tactics gives the spurious unity of the united fronts a new lease on life and prolongs the isolation of the Congress. This is precisely what has happened in West Bengal, Punjab and Bihar and is likely to be repeated elsewhere. In each of these states, the Congress secured enough desertions to deprive its opponents of their legislative majorities. The turncoats, however, were for the most part political nondescripts and the governments they have formed with Congress help lack the stamp of legitimacy, making it well-nigh impossible for them to win popular support. The ousted united fronts, invested with a halo of martyrdom, are able therefore to take the issue to the streets. This continuation of the political debate by violence erodes the confidence of the people in the possibility of peaceful change via the ballot box.

The Congress has also suffered from changes in party affiliations and in consequence was unseated in three states. A partial tally shows that one in every ten state legislators has changed

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sides since the election, some more than once. The motive in many cases was personal aggrandizement; but the individual legislator's lust for the powers and perquisites of office (in some cases an outright cash reward) was less distasteful to public opinion than the willingness of party leaders to offer them. In Haryana, where horse-trading was mercifully brought to a halt by the Governor's dismissal of the ministry in preparation for mid-term elections, three out of every four members of the ruling party had been given offices of one kind or another. In Bihar, the united front, retaliating for the defections from its ranks, induced six Congress legislators to cross over: five of them were immediately rewarded with ministries. Although this problem of fluid loyalties afflicts only some states, chiefly in politically backward North India, it contributes to a much wider loss of faith in the political system. An ominously similar instability in party loyalties in Pakistan created a mood of disenchantment with parliamentary democracy which paved the way for the military take-over of 1958.

IV

In this unedifying game of musical chairs being played by political parties, the Congress' control over the federal Government gives it a definite advantage. The Indian Constitution gives the center very substantial powers of intervention in state affairs via the President, who acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers. There has been growing disquiet about these prerogatives since the election. Both left and right parties, especially the former, voice the apprehension that extraordinary constitutional powers may be used illegitimately to advance party ends. India, it is conceded on all sides, is too large (and perhaps also too highly evolved politically) to fall prey to a military dictatorship. But a constitutional dictatorship, sustained by the backing of the police and the military and claiming legitimacy by reference to the emergency provisions of the Constitution, is conceivable.

The sorry record of Congress interventions in the past gives warrant for these fears. In 1959, a Communist government was dismissed from office in Kerala ostensibly because of a breakdown in law and order which a Congress-supported agitation had helped to bring about. The functioning of the Rajasthan State Assembly was suspended under Presidential orders immediately after last year's elections on the ground that a stable government was not in sight: neither the Congress nor the alliance led by right-wing

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Swatantra, it was argued, had a durable majority. The suspension was lifted a few weeks later when the Congress had made sure of gaining office by weaning away some support from the other side. Unfortunately, the founding fathers failed to write into the basic law adequate safeguards against the use of arbitrary power by the center; the need to obtain ex post facto parliamentary approval does not serve as a control since the Central Government must, by the very fact of its existence, be assumed to have the majority to obtain endorsement of its actions.

As it is unlikely that India will ever return to universal one-party rule, the first requirement for peaceful coexistence is a new set of norms to guide the center's relationship with the states, not only with regard to the emergency provisions but also to the extra-constitutional leverage which the federal Government enjoys through its vast economic and financial powers. When the Constitution-makers, following the centralizing tradition of British rule, deliberately strengthened the center at the expense of the states, they failed to foresee the present phase of intensely competitive politics in which excessive central authority may do more damage to the country's unity than a willingness to accommodate diversities.

While it may not be practical to make major changes in the Constitution, the Congress could, while it still has exclusive control over the center, enunciate healthy conventions to achieve the same ends. As the only party with roots all over the country, it is uniquely qualified to reconcile the divergent pulls of the states vis-à-vis the center. The party's leadership has the political maturity and the skill required to perform this task, as well as the incentive to undertake it. The Congress' strongest suit in the electoral free-for-all is its demonstrated ability to hold the country together: this could be strengthened further by a display of statesmanship in steering the country safely through its present troubled phase.

Placing the responsibility for unity on the Congress is not to belittle the role of other parties. It cannot in its present enfeebled circumstances do the job all by itself: it will certainly need allies. Yet because of its sheer size and spread, the Congress must act, at least in the foreseeable future, as the pace-setter. The extent to which its initiatives meet the felt needs for unity, stability and the rule of law will determine the response it evokes—tacitly from political rivals and explicitly from public opinion.

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This has been clearly brought out by the progress made on the highly emotive issue of language policy during the past year. The Constitution gives full freedom to the states to conduct their official business in the language of their choice, but in practice the widespread use of local languages was made difficult by the inadequacy of educational resources—especially textbooks. Following a report by a new Education Commission, the Central Government now stands committed to support a switch to regional languages at all levels of education, the pace wisely being left to the judgment of individual authorities.

On the trickier issue of the official language of the Union, a law has been enacted to provide legislative assurance (which Mr. Nehru shied away from giving) that English shall continue to be used until every single non-Hindi state decides otherwise. The willingness of the pro-Hindi majority to accommodate the non-Hindi minority in this matter is a splendid example of forbearance; it is the result largely of patient efforts by the Congress leadership over a number of years, and has led to changes in the attitudes of other parties as well. The language controversy is by no means ended: wrangling over important details continues, punctuated by occasional outbreaks of arson and violence by unruly student mobs. Yet the thrust is unmistakably toward a consensus, with all national parties taking a hand in hammering out an acceptable formula.

Predictably, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) has upped its demands; the party could hardly do otherwise, since its phenomenal rise to power in Madras, the only state in which it operates, came on the crest of anti-Hindi agitation. Intransigence like the DMK's is more manageable, the stronger the consensus at the national level. It is noteworthy that the secessionist slogan which was featured so prominently in the party's credo until the early sixties has been quietly dropped; there is no danger of it being revived now that the DMK has won for itself a share of power within the system.

The moral to be drawn is that timely concessions on the part of the majority can successfully tame minority extremism. This has happened also in the case of the Akalis, the party of the Sikh religious minority. Since the Central Government conceded the Sikhs a separate state within which they could be sure of having a dominant voice, their call for an independent Sikh homeland has been reduced to a harmless eccentricity.

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Despite these distinct gains in cohesion, India's political leadership still has to deal with the far more awkward problem of reassuring the Moslem and Christian minorities. The Congress has made impressive gestures to the Moslems; at a considerable risk it pushed through the election of a Moslem as India's President last year, and has since appointed another to head the Supreme Court.

Not surprisingly, the Moslem community sees a danger to itself in the gains made by the militantly Hindu Jana Sangh at the hustings last year. This view overlooks, however, the corrective supplied by keener political competition: Moslem support should now be more eagerly sought because, as the 1967 election demonstrated to the cost of the Congress, it is sufficient to tilt the balance in many constituencies. This was certainly one reason why the Congress lined up in support of a Moslem President. It also explains why the SSP and the Communists pushed hard in Bihar for a better deal for Urdu (the language of most North Indian Moslems), almost to the point of breaking up the state's united-front government. Even the Jana Sangh is trying to accommodate Moslem sentiment.

In the future, all minorities—linguistic or religious—should benefit from this conscious striving for a broader electoral base, but right now the main burden of reassuring Moslems falls on the Congress-run Central Government, which has to deal with problems of separatism in Kashmir, the only state where Moslems constitute a majority. No doubt Kashmir is not merely a Moslem problem: it is an international cause célèbre. But the only way India can hope to integrate Kashmir is by respecting its separate identity. Even this will work only if the Kashmiris can be satisfied that India is a truly secular federation in which their co-religionists elsewhere in the country are not subject to discrimination.

Some in the Congress leadership do see the problem in this light but they are badly in need of support from outside the party to deal with the hawks in their own ranks. This is now forthcoming in some measure from such diverse quarters as the right-wing Swatantra, the DMK and both wings of the Communist Party. A memorandum last summer urging Sheikh Abdullah's release secured the signatures of MPs from almost all parties except the Jana Sangh. The motives of the signatories may have

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been mixed, but their response does reflect a willingness to look anew at an old problem. This represents an advance, however small, giving promise that India may yet find within herself the resources of statesmanship needed to solve ticklish social problems.

Still more hopeful is the evolution of attitudes toward the Christian Nagas, in whose case regional and religious separatism again coincide. The Naga rebels' ten-year war for independence from India has now been in abeyance for over three years; the long cease-fire period is being utilized to seek a modus vivendi which would guarantee the Nagas full freedom within their area without jeopardizing India's security. The unspoken assumption in these protracted negotiations is that the Congress leadership is prepared to ask for amendments to the Constitution to allow for a looser association with the Union for areas like Nagaland. At present, all constituent states and territories belong to the Union on the same basis, the only exception being the special status accorded to Kashmir. The right to change this status having been vested in the Union, there has been a progressive whittling down of Kashmir's autonomy, which explains the exacerbation of the separatist urge since 1964. If a change were now to be made in the Constitution to accommodate the Nagas, giving the acceding areas a veto over any alterations in their relationships with the Union, it would open up interesting possibilities for Kashmir. Since the Naga issue does not raise nationalist hackles as Kashmir does, a start toward new policies is most likely to be made there.

Both the problem posed by the peripheral territories and the task of reorienting the center's relationship with the core states of the Union call for a flexibility that the founding fathers simply failed to allow for. They did not lack liberal instincts, but were prevented by the heady nationalist enthusiasm of those years, and perhaps more so by their own background, from taking sectionalist urges into account. The dominant group in the Constituent Assembly—elected, it should be noted, on a restricted pre-independence franchise—was a Westernized élite with a strong community of intellectual interests and ideological proclivities. They little realized the impetus that universal suffrage would give to particularist loyalties, at least in the initial phase. Also, at the time they were writing the Constitution, the problem of separatism at the periphery had not yet appeared.

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What they left undone can still be accomplished by imaginative leaders willing to take on the challenging task of educating public opinion. They will have to come primarily from the Congress Party because of its preëminence in Indian political life. Mrs. Gandhi may have few qualifications for leadership but she does not lack either the empathy or the vision to fill this particular role. She, for one, seems to realize the obligation placed upon the Central Government in India's present situation to create conditions in which power can be shared among parties on reasonably peaceful terms. She also shows a welcome awareness that diversity, including the extreme of separatism, can neither be wished away nor steamrollered into nonexistence. Unfortunately, however, her position in the party, even after two years as Prime Minister, is not strong enough to permit bold initiatives. More important, the preoccupation of all political parties with survival leaves little scope for taking the long view.

It is indeed a matter of regret that most of the non-Congress parties are getting pushed out of power much too soon; they simply have not had the time to learn the lessons of responsibility. Notwithstanding the incongruity of all-embracing coalitions, they were beginning to recognize that governing inevitably involves hard choices and that there are strict limits to the degree of social change that can be imposed from the top by legislation. Yet the loss of power should have a chastening influence, especially in making them realize how much they need to broaden their base to get within striking distance of the Congress.

The electorate, too, has probably learned a lesson: it can be expected to be more discriminating in its future choices. Mere opposition to the Congress is not enough; it is to be hoped that next time the people will demand to know what the alternative policies are before bestowing their favors. Chastened parties and a choosier electorate could combine to steer India to a calmer and more assured future. While it is difficult to make a prediction with any assurance, we should not underestimate the instinct for survival operating through three thousand years of Indian history.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS

By Max F. Millikan

OF the many experiments in the purposeful promotion of economic development which the world has witnessed since the end of World War II, incomparably the most important among underdeveloped countries is India's. The population involved in this experiment constitutes a third of the people of the non-communist underdeveloped world—more human beings than are to be found in all the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Latin America put together. The development planning effort undertaken by the Indians is one of the oldest and probably the most sophisticated to be found in any of these countries. Finally, it has been conducted in the context of a genuinely democratic political system, with repeated free elections, substantial freedom of expression by opposition groups and two orderly changes of top leadership. Three five-year plans have been completed since Independence, and India is in its fourth quinquennium of serious development effort.

Two successive disastrous monsoons in the crop years 1965–66 and 1966–67 focused so much attention on an emergency food situation that the record of the preceding fifteen years and its lessons for the future have been somewhat neglected. There is now some danger that because of the concentration of both Indians and those helping India on the important problems of agricultural production, the problems of overall economic growth are not being adequately recognized. Agricultural prospects now look bright, but there is a real possibility that a severe foreign-exchange shortage will soon develop, forcing continued depression on the modern non-agricultural sectors of the economy, choking off agricultural growth and producing political consequences of unknown dimensions.

Before exploring in more detail the exact shape of this cloud on the horizon, it will be well to review India's performance to date and some of the reasons for it. The record of the first fourteen years of planned development is one of fairly steady and impressive growth, culminating in a year of good weather and record

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agricultural output, followed then by drought and war. But from 1951 to 1965, national income at constant prices increased in every year but one, in which there was a bad harvest, and the average increase was just short of 4 percent per year. This was well below Indian targets. The second and third plans hoped for a rate of real growth of better than 5 percent. The Indian performance was slightly below the average for the non-communist underdeveloped world, which for the decade 1955–1965 was around 4.5 percent, and it was significantly below the performance of such outstanding successes as Mexico, Taiwan, Israel and, more recently, South Korea. But the Indian growth rate of nearly 4 percent in this period represents a notable acceleration over the annual growth rate of British India for the first half of the twentieth century, which has been estimated at no more than 1 percent, and compares very favorably with the growth rates of the presently advanced countries during their earlier development history. The advent of the population explosion has of course meant that more than half of recent Indian growth has had to be devoted to supplying the expanding population, and per capita Indian incomes have grown by less than 2 percent per year. But while 2 percent sounds small, it should be remembered that this rate if sustained will double real incomes in a third of a century and multiply them eightfold in a hundred years.

While this record was good, and better than is frequently realized, it did not come up to the hopes of either the Indians or those who were helping them. In appraising the reasons for this, it is important to remember that maximizing the rate of growth of real national income, either in the aggregate or in per capita terms, was only one of the goals of Indian economic policy and that the strategy employed in the pursuit of this goal was conditioned in important ways by at least three other objectives to which Indian planners gave high priority. The first of these was to bring to an end India's dependence on foreign aid at the earliest possible moment. From the beginning there has been controversy within India as to what levels of foreign aid were required to achieve Indian growth targets and how soon India could free herself from the economic and political constraints which dependence on foreign sources of food, technology, raw materials and capital goods was believed to involve. There was a clear recognition that help from abroad in all of these matters was critical, but equally that the continuation of aid could not

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be counted upon and that since reliance on such help was filled with dangers to Indian independence, dignity and self-respect, it should be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Thus where there was a choice between a strategy which would raise the growth rate but prolong dependence on aid and one which might reduce growth performance but promise earlier self-sufficiency, the latter was likely to be selected. Some of the controversies over the strategies of the second and third plans revolved around whether this kind of a choice did or did not exist.

A second objective of Indian economic policy which has occasionally been in conflict with the maximization of growth has been to achieve an equitable distribution of the fruits of development. The extensive regulatory powers of the Indian Government over prices, the allocation of scarce resources and the structure of taxes have all been designed with this in mind. Finally, in India as in the United States the political requirements of a democratic system have had a major influence on the execution of development policy. The fact that India is a federal system in which administrative decisions are subject to legislative review and ultimately to the test of acceptability to the electorate has influenced the volume of saving which can be extracted from the public, the location of key new industries and the efficiency of decision-making.

Turning to characteristics of the Indian economy which condition the options open to Indian decision-makers, the first is the sheer size and diversity of the country. In population it is equivalent to about six Brazils, nine Nigerias, fifteen Egypts or more than fifty Kenyas, and there is added to the population each year the equivalent of an Australia or a Peru. If it were broken into twenty good-sized normal countries, we would expect a fairly wide range of performance among them. To hope for an average equal to that of one of the small star performers is quite unrealistic.

One corollary of India's size is that foreign trade is, as in the United States, a relatively small fraction of national income, imports amounting in the period under review to about 8 percent and exports to about 5 percent of total production. This means that for effective development the range of goods produced within India must inevitably be very wide. There can be arguments about the adequacy of Indian efforts to promote exports, but there can be no question but that the investment program of a

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country the size of India must be heavily focused on what is commonly referred to as import substitution—that is, on the production of a wide range of goods including capital goods for the domestic market. The notion that India could have relied for her development mainly on the promotion of exports of raw materials and light manufactures and imported all of her requirements of steel, machine tools and heavy industrial equipment was clearly ruled out by even a casual examination of the relevant numbers. The expansion of exports required by such a policy would have been many times as great as the most optimistic estimates of the possibilities.

On similar grounds it is clear that in a country the size of India there must be a rough kind of balance between agricultural and industrial production. This can and should be adjusted through international trade, but very broadly speaking India must feed herself and produce a large part of the industrial output on which modern development depends. The doctrine of balanced growth is ridiculous in Kuwait, is of only limited relevance to a normal-sized country with comparative advantage in particular exports, but sets real limits to specialization in a subcontinent the size of South Asia. Sensible men no longer argue about whether India should give priority to industry or agriculture but only about whether the balance is roughly correct or should be shifted marginally one way or the other.

A final consequence of size has been that India could not expect amounts of aid in per capita terms as large as those available to many smaller countries. Total aid, while larger absolutely than for any other country, has never amounted to more than a little over $3 per Indian per year, with the U.S. share, including food, only a little over $1 per head.

II

With these considerations in mind a look at the profile of Indian growth from 1951 to 1965 suggests that Indian strategy was moderately successful. On the average, agricultural production grew at 3 percent a year. Food-grain production increased some 50 percent (reaching a total of 89 million tons in 1964–65), compared with a virtually static level in greater British India during the first half of the century. Improvements in yield were disappointing and a considerable part of the increase in output was achieved by expanding acreage, the possibilities for which

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are now largely exhausted. But even in this period of less than optimal agricultural policy Indian agriculture reversed the pattern of the first half-century and pushed a little ahead of population growth.

The industrial performance was much more dramatic. The index of industrial production rose 150 percent in the fourteen years. Consumer goods grew much more slowly than capital and intermediate goods. Coal production doubled, steel went from 1.5 million tons to more than 6 million tons, electric power generation multiplied nearly sixfold and a flourishing machine-tool industry was established from practically nothing. In consumer goods the demand for bicycles and sewing machines, which at the beginning of the period was met in considerable part from imports, by 1965 was satisfied entirely by domestic production. All of this was accomplished with what was for an underdeveloped country a quite extraordinary degree of monetary stability. The price level actually fell substantially during the first five-year plan, which coincided with our Korean War inflation, and wholesale prices rose only some 40 percent over the whole fourteen-year period. This was in spite of the outbreak of hostilities with China in 1962 and the more than doubling of defense expenditures consequent upon that conflict. Government deficits were held to very modest levels, the tax revenues from the center, the states and the union territories rose from about 7 percent of national income at the beginning of the period to about 14 percent at the end, and savings and investment as a fraction of national income both went up by 3 or 4 percentage points.

Foreign trade is one of the weak spots in the record. During the first two plans, export earnings fluctuated around a nearly constant level, and the relatively modest increase in the third plan, averaging 5 percent a year over the four years, was due in part to a rapid expansion of exports to Eastern Europe. Under the pressures of development requirements imports increased more rapidly, and during the third plan averaged some 50 percent more than exports in value. Through the whole period export earnings were not quite enough to pay for what Indians call maintenance imports—that is, the raw materials and consumption goods needed to keep the economy operating; virtually all of the imports required for the expansion of plant and equipment were chargeable to the trade deficit. This was true in spite of the fact that India, compared to most underdeveloped countries,

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held luxury and nonessential consumption items to very low levels.

Import requirements were consistently underestimated by the development planners, and there was a severe foreign-exchange crisis early in the second plan which led to the establishment of a very detailed and somewhat cumbersome system of import licensing and foreign-exchange regulations. The large deficits in the balance of trade were financed in the early part of the period by drawing on the foreign-exchange reserves which India had accumulated during World War II. In the latter part of the period, after these reserves were largely exhausted, the deficit was covered by a mounting flow of foreign aid, a little over half of which came from the United States, with the balance being supplied by Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan and the International Bank. Much of the aid was in the form of relatively short-term loans, and by 1965 the burden of interest and amortization was already escalating to the point where the difference between gross and net aid was substantial.

Thus, in summary, India's development performance before the last few troubled years was notable in social overhead and industry, especially in capital goods and heavy industry, to which the planners had given first priority; was substantial but inadequate in agriculture; was praiseworthy in fiscal and monetary management; and was disappointing in the growing deterioration of the Indian balance of payments. The overall growth record was more impressive than is frequently realized but must none the less be characterized as disappointing both in terms of the targets the Indians set for themselves and in terms of progress toward independence from foreign aid.

Among the reasons frequently cited for this inadequacy, the first has to do with measures relating to agriculture. The problem here was not the allocation of financial resources, for agriculture, community development and irrigation were assigned about 20 percent of the public and private development resources in the second and third plans and a significantly larger percentage in the very much smaller first plan. But the first plan, in which a good deal of attention was paid to agriculture, in some ways gave too great an appearance of success. It was preceded by a year of relatively poor weather and finished with a comparatively good year, and the planned targets for agricultural output were exceeded in food grains and largely achieved in most other crops.

With the advent of the second plan the focus of attention

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shifted to building the heavy industrial base. The top decision-makers continued to say all the right things about the importance of agriculture and put satisfactory numbers for agricultural investment in their summary tables, but the administrative time and attention required to fit together all the complex pieces of an effective program were missing. High priority was given to community development and extension but too little attention was paid to insuring that the expanding supplies of physical inputs like fertilizer and improved seed were available at times and in places and at prices which would make it possible for farmers to use them. Relatively modest fertilizer production targets were not met, and inadequate priority was given to fertilizer imports in the face of foreign-exchange shortages which threatened favored heavy industrial projects. Funds were allocated to and substantial progress made on major irrigation works, but the constant care and attention at the local level required to clear water channels, secure effective drainage and insure the proper timing and allocation of local water distribution were not supplied. There was an understandable but unfortunate preoccupation both in the design of irrigation systems and in research into new varieties of seed with trying to provide insurance against the worst consequences of drought rather than to maximize yields in periods of reasonably good weather.

Now that very substantial progress is at last being made in promoting Indian agricultural development it is easy to say that the same things could and should have been done a decade or more ago. In fact the current promise derives partly from the recent appearance on the scene of new varieties of the major crops, and, even more, the stimulus of two bad harvests.

One of the key limitations of the agricultural program prior to the mid-sixties was a consequence of the conflict of objectives between maximum production and equity, to which we have already referred. The prices of marketable farm output and especially of food grains were held down by government procurement, which was designed to keep the prices of food low on behalf of the low-income urban consumer, while the prices of fertilizer in terms of bushels of wheat or rice were in India among the highest in the world and sufficient to deter even a rational farmer from taking the risks involved in adopting the new techniques. This defect was compounded by restrictions, which still exist, on the interstate movement of food grains. The result was to keep prices low in

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surplus states where there is the biggest potential for increasing yields and high in the deficit states where investment is less promising.

The policy of keeping food prices low even at the cost of discouraging farm production was made possible partly by the availability of surplus grain from the United States under PL 480. This supply, made available partly to dispose of embarrassing surpluses and partly out of a laudable impulse to help feed the hungry, may well have had the long-run effect of delaying serious Indian attention to the mounting problems of agricultural productivity.

There is no question but that the relatively sluggish growth of agriculture until 1965 even in good-weather years was one of the main factors limiting the rate of growth of the economy as a whole. This is true partly because agriculture still produces half of Indian national income and partly because slow growth in agriculture inhibits development in other branches of the economy. Fortunately, this situation has now radically altered and India is, I believe, faced with the opposite danger: that agriculture, running ahead of the rest of the economy, will stumble and fall for lack of reinforcement from other sectors.

III

Turning to industry, the allocation of resources in the second and third plans was quite heavily focused on capital goods and heavy industry. This was accomplished partly by setting up government plants in steel, machine tools and other related fields, and partly through the control of private investment through government licensing, foreign exchange allocation, price control and the like. Investment in heavy industry has a very high foreign-exchange component, usually involves long periods of gestation and, because of its technical complexity, may not permit fully efficient operation until some years after projects are completed. Thus the early yield in national income from a dollar's worth of investment may be quite low.

For these reasons some critics have argued that India could have gotten a quicker and bigger payoff from the amounts of savings and foreign exchange available to her if she had reduced somewhat her investment in heavy industry and given more attention to light engineering, agricultural inputs and consumer goods. The argument here among responsible observers is not

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whether India should have any heavy industry. As already mentioned, given her size, her inherent comparative advantage in steel and related industries and her long-run development goals, there can be no question of her need for a capital-goods sector. The only question is whether the timing has been ideal—whether, that is, a somewhat slower expansion of industries making machines to make machines might have increased the rate of growth of national income.

To answer that it would almost certainly have done so in the early years does not fully meet the point of the proponents of the strategy which has in fact been followed. Their case was based quite explicitly on the argument that, since foreign aid was compromising and uncertain, India must give top priority to those elements of the industrial structure which would give her as quickly as possible the capacity to produce everything else she needed without dependence on largesse from abroad. This should be done, so it was argued, even if it meant that India's existing plant was for a time inefficiently used. Thus, when there was a foreign-exchange pinch, major projects requiring imported equipment took precedence over the import of raw materials and spare parts to keep existing equipment utilized at capacity. If this was in fact a wrong policy—and there is room for difference of opinion on that point—the countries supplying foreign aid bear at least some of the burden of responsibility. Until recently we and other aid donors had a preference for project as opposed to program assistance, and this would have made it difficult or impossible for the Indians to implement a policy of giving priority to full use of existing capacity. Wherever one comes out on this argument, the existence of widespread excess capacity in many sectors of Indian industry in 1965 and *a fortiori* today means that there is a potential for a very rapid industrial expansion at least for a short time if the foreign exchange necessary to fuel it can somehow be found.

The final area of controversy is the management of India's foreign exchange. Could export growth have been increased and the allocation of foreign exchange for imports made more rational? Could improvements in the climate of private investment have attracted dramatically larger amounts of foreign capital than the net flow of a little better than $100 million a year which had been achieved by 1965?

There is no question but that India was slow to recognize its export problem. Little was done prior to the foreign-exchange

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crisis of 1957–58 and, while a good many measures to promote exports were subsequently adopted, their results have been limited. Some Indians believe that this was almost inevitable. They contend that world markets for the traditional exports like jute, tea, cotton textiles and the like are saturated, that these markets are not very responsive to price adjustments, and that India's long-term export prospects lie elsewhere, in engineering and industry. These are, however, precisely the sectors in which import substitution has been taking place and is not yet completed, and there is no advantage in diverting essential goods from domestic to foreign markets if equivalent imports are then required. According to this view, a really major expansion of Indian exports must await a slightly later stage of development in which India can supply a larger fraction of its own domestic demand for industrial products.

Supporters of this position were against devaluation of the rupee on the ground that this would reduce the foreign-exchange earnings of the traditional industries and that the newer industries were not yet sufficiently advanced to take advantage of it. Those on the other side pointed out that even in traditional exports India's share of world markets has been declining, that there are some raw materials like iron ore which India has only begun to exploit for their export potential, that other countries have done very well by being competitive in textiles, that some of the new industries are beginning to exhibit a strong export performance, and that proper policies could bring out a good many more. There are many intangibles in the argument and about all that one can conclude with some assurance is that the trade deficit induced by development during the first three plans was of such a magnitude that no reorientation of export policy or alteration in the exchange rate, however desirable, could have eliminated it.

On the import side, controls have had one clearly desirable effect. Scarce foreign exchange has not gone, as it has in large amounts in many underdeveloped countries, into luxury and nonessential consumption. There is little doubt in my mind but that when the demand for and supply of foreign exchange are as far out of balance as they are likely to be when Indian development is prospering, a government dedicated to a priority for investment and committed to a concern for equity cannot permit the allocation of foreign exchange to be determined entirely by

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market forces. As we discovered in wartime in the United States, the more severe the shortage, the more direct controls commend themselves. The question in the Indian case was whether by an appropriate combination of measures, including earlier devaluation, some of the heat could have been taken off the control system so that it could have operated more effectively and with less injustice to the little man, who has the most trouble mastering its complexities. In the early years of the period we are discussing, the effectiveness of the control system in preventing gross misuse was shown by the very limited extent of the black market in foreign exchange. As the period progressed and pressures on the rupee became more intense, evidences of evasion and illicit transactions multiplied. My own judgment is that improvements in the handling of foreign exchange could have resulted in somewhat better export performance and somewhat more efficient use of available imports, but that this would not have made a crucial difference in the overall growth record.

Much the same can, I think, be said of the treatment of private foreign investment. Many American businessmen who have had extended dealings with the Indian bureaucracy have come away profoundly irritated by the delays and frustrations to which they have been subjected. These are unfortunate, but it is hard for me to believe that had they been wholly absent the prospects of profits from investment in India would have been sufficient to increase private foreign investment more than marginally from its very low level.

IV

The troublesome years of 1965–67 brought major structural changes in the Indian economy—changes which have altered rather profoundly the problem of achieving and sustaining a high rate of growth. The key event here was bad weather, the worst two-year period in India in a century. Production of food grain dropped from 89 million tons in 1964–65 to 72 million tons in 1965–66, a decline of nearly 19 percent. The following year was almost as bad, producing only 75 million tons, though the disaster was somewhat differently distributed in the second year. Since agriculture amounts to about half of all Indian production, this drastic decline would have meant a substantial drop in national income even if the non-agricultural sectors of the economy had

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continued to grow at their old rate. This happened for a time, but gradually the agricultural shortage spread its effects through the rest of the economy, contributing to an industrial recession which became quite severe by the middle of 1967.

There were a number of ways in which the agricultural shortage came to affect the industrial sector. The most important was probably its influence on fiscal and monetary policy. The food shortage produced a sharp increase in the prices of agricultural commodities, and since these prices, together with those of agriculture-based industries like textiles, have very heavy weight in the overall price index, the result was a sharp spurt of inflation. The Government, unable to do anything about the real cause of the inflation—the bad weather—took the steps normally prescribed for inflation control, namely the tightening of credit by the central bank and heavy cuts in government spending, especially for industry and development. By a kind of classic Keynesian multiplier process, these reductions in investment, both public and private, expanded urban unemployment, reduced non-agricultural incomes and lowered the demand for a wide range of commodities. In addition, because of the sharp rise in food prices a larger fraction of urban incomes had to go for food purchases, further depressing the markets for other commodities. On the supply side, the agriculture-based industries, which account for more than half of industrial production, found their needed raw materials less available.

This sequence of events, upsetting as it was in interrupting India's record of growth, was not an unmixed disaster. It had consequences for agriculture and foreign exchange which are of very great long-run importance. The drought had a tonic effect on government agricultural programs, from the Central Government in Delhi through most of the states right down to the district and even village level. The Ministry of Agriculture developed a new and very promising plan for stimulating agricultural production, fertilizer targets were revised sharply upward, the introduction of high-yield varieties was greatly accelerated in wheat, rice and coarse grains, and the irrigation program was pushed with new vigor. The increase in the profitability of commercial farming which resulted from the relative rise in the prices of agricultural products gave a boost to the farming community and the demands for fertilizer pushed well ahead of even the

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rapidly expanding supplies. As a result there is now every prospect that agricultural production can be increased at an annual rate of 5 percent a year or more from the base not of the drought years but of the very favorable year 1967–68.

As for foreign exchange in this recent period, the industrial recession reduced the demand, and thus concealed a problem that threatens to become very critical in the future. The outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965 resulted in an extended interruption of U.S. aid commitments. This was slow in showing itself in economic performance since the utilization of aid already committed had lagged for a variety of reasons and there was a good deal in the pipeline. By the time the situation might have been serious the industrial recession had cut the demand for imports to the point where foreign exchange was not for the time being the limiting factor on Indian recovery. The interruption, however, combined with the delays in 1965 and 1966 in American commitments of surplus grain to meet the food shortage, had a political and psychological effect in India of lasting significance. It greatly reinforced the view that India must find a way of freeing herself from dependence on foreign sources of aid capital by a policy of austerity and the reëstablishment of tight central controls. This view has not yet become very powerful because the industrial recession has prevented the emergence of a foreign-exchange crisis, but it is latent in the background and could be revived by a foreign-exchange shortage.

The other important development of the year 1966 was the devaluation of the rupee. This was accompanied by some liberalization of import controls and both measures were undertaken at the strong urging of the International Bank and the U.S. Government. The decision to adopt these measures was supported strongly by one wing of Indian opinion, and it is not clear how much urging from abroad had in fact to do with it. But opponents were convinced that these steps represented a concession to foreign pressures. Whatever the facts, there was a widespread view in India that these measures could be effective only if they were combined with a substantial increase in the availability of foreign exchange through foreign aid. There were at least implicit promises from the United States and other sources that, if these measures were in fact adopted, a higher level of aid would be forthcoming. In fact, the aid flow was first interrupted and then, apart from food, resumed at a significantly lower level.

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V

In the light of these developments and the structural changes of the last two or three years, what can we say about the prospects? With respect to agriculture the answer is already fairly clear. For the year 1967–68 the outlook is for a record in foodgrain production of better than 95 million tons. More important than the figure is what lies behind it. Favorable weather is only partly responsible. The program initiated in 1966 of intensive concentration on 33 million acres of irrigated crop land, about 10 percent of India's total, is already beginning to bear fruit. The introduction of new varieties is proceeding ahead of schedule and, where irrigation and fertilization have been adequate, the yields have been fully up to expectations. Fifteen million acres of new high-yielding varieties of rice, wheat, maize, jowar and bajra were expected to be planted in the current crop year and by 1970–71 supplies of seed should be sufficient to more than double this acreage. This season and last, the supply of nitrogen has been doubled, phosphates raised 150 percent and potash substantially increased; programs for continued expansion of fertilizer production and high priority for fertilizer imports have been established. Measures have been taken in irrigation—especially tube wells—in plant protection, in improvement of transport, in the availability of credit and in agricultural research and education—all of which are beginning to show results and should continue to do so. With decent weather the momentum already apparent in agriculture should be maintained, and in so far as the advance is occurring mainly on irrigated land which is being rapidly extended the dependence on weather is markedly reduced.

What this means is that agriculture as a bottleneck to overall Indian development is in the process of being eliminated. A 5 percent growth in agricultural production should permit a 6 or 7 percent growth in overall national income, and in addition the building up of some stocks and a slowing down or cessation of the rate of inflation of the last two or three years. Agricultural prices have already begun to recede and this should make possible the removal of the fiscal and monetary restraints on the performance of the rest of the economy. The finance minister has already indicated that he proposes to move in a somewhat expansionist direction.

The cloud on the horizon in this otherwise rosy picture is foreign

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exchange. The tentative commitment of the consortium of countries aiding India under World Bank leadership is $900 million in the current year, no higher than it has been in recent years. It is true that this is all for non-project aid, but the prospects for project loans over and above this amount are very slim. Indeed, in light of the fate of the President's aid bill for fiscal 1968, it seems almost certain that America's share of the consortium commitment will not be met. If the U.S. aid appropriation emerges this year in the same range as for fiscal 1968, the contributions of other consortium members are likely to fall off, and the total figure may fall substantially. If the resources of IDA, which are about exhausted, are replenished by additional U.S. and other contributions, this will help, but the prospect is uncertain at best. Some expansion in Indian exports can be hoped for over the coming years, but this is likely to compensate for only a portion of the decline in foreign aid.

Agriculture and the imported resources to sustain it, such as fertilizer and the plant and equipment for fertilizer production, are now given such a high priority by both the Indian Government and the suppliers of aid that a foreign-exchange pinch is unlikely to restrict agricultural inputs seriously. On the other hand, if as seems likely, and is indeed already beginning to happen, soaring agricultural output removes the main source of inflationary pressure and fiscal and monetary policy eases accordingly, there is the prospect of a boom in the nonagricultural sector as presently unutilized capacity is put back to work. That will generate a very large increase in the demand for imports.

The shape of the cloud on the horizon is now becoming clearer. The danger is that continued depression and the persistence of excess industrial capacity will be enforced by a shortage of foreign exchange to procure the imports of raw materials, spare parts and the like which are required to fuel a major industrial expansion. If this occurs, a series of additional disturbing economic and political consequences are likely. There will certainly be a revival of the old dilemma of whether to use scarce foreign exchange to keep existing capacity occupied or to push ahead with the expansion of new capacity in the capital and intermediate-goods industries, and permit current output to suffer. Either way this dilemma is resolved, unemployment in the industrial labor force will continue and urban incomes will fail to resume even their earlier advance.

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This, in turn, will result in sluggish urban demand for the rising surplus of agricultural produce and heavy downward pressure on agricultural prices. While some reversal of the upward trend in agricultural prices would be healthy, there is a danger that if this reversal goes too far the agricultural expansion which now looks so promising may be halted in its tracks by a deterioration of profit incentives for farmers. The Indian Government has now recognized the importance of price incentives and has established floor prices for agricultural commodities, but these floors are still very low and it is doubtful whether the Government would be able to maintain higher ones in the face of low demand for marketable agricultural surpluses.

Beyond this, continued depression in the nonagricultural sectors would have very serious fiscal consequences, for it is here that both state and federal revenues are primarily obtained. Land taxes have been abolished in most of the states, and agricultural income taxes, which are reserved to the states by the Constitution, have not been adopted. State commitments and expenditures have been rising rapidly and can be supported only by a combination of rising state revenues and grants-in-aid from the center; and both depend heavily on the prosperity of the modern sector. Central government revenues have been markedly assisted during the past two years by the sale of U.S. grain and, though some continuation of PL 480 shipments is justified to rebuild stocks, this source of revenue will surely soon decline sharply.

It is not easy to predict what would be the political consequences of this economic state of affairs, if it develops, beyond saying that they would be disruptive. There would certainly be some exacerbation of the conflicts between the states and the center. In addition, tensions between rural and urban communities would inevitably be heightened. The agricultural community is much more likely to generate political trouble when agricultural output is high and prices low because of weak demand than when, as in the recent past, food supplies are inadequate. A rise in the educated unemployed in the large urban centers would certainly strengthen the extremist tendencies already observable in places like West Bengal. The problem of how the costs and benefits of development are to be shared has not been a seriously divisive one in Indian politics up to the present, but in the face of industrial depression and fiscal troubles it could rapidly become explosive. And though the democratic tradition in India is too

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strongly embedded to be abruptly abandoned, pressure for more authoritarian solutions would surely mount.

Perhaps more important, those who have been arguing successfully for liberalization of the control machinery, for a more sympathetic attitude toward foreign private investment, and for economies in the allocation of scarce administrative and managerial resources (which somewhat greater reliance on market forces makes possible) would suffer a serious setback. Those who have been arguing, on the other hand, that the Western countries cannot be trusted, that reliance on foreign aid is both too risky and too prejudicial to Indian independence, would have a more responsive audience. With industrial prosperity, both the economic and political prospects for significant expansion of private foreign investment in India are favorable. With industrial recession and a foreign-exchange pinch, whatever prospects there are now would rapidly disappear for both economic and political reasons.

There is, of course, no guarantee that if the Western countries make a few hundred million dollars more aid available per year, the Indian economy and polity will have clear sailing. If we have learned nothing else in the past decade, we should have learned that the relations between economic and political performance in the developing world are a great deal more complex than some of us at one time assumed. But the possibility at least now exists for a very impressive performance by the Indian economy over the next five or ten years, if that economy is fed by some additional aid. The Indian case is one of the clearest where poor economic performance will have predictably destabilizing consequences. Now that India, largely through her own efforts, has made very promising progress toward cracking what has been the most critical bottleneck—agriculture—it will be too bad if today's high promise of accelerated economic growth cannot be fulfilled because the Western countries permit what is for them a relatively small shortage of foreign exchange to stall the whole process.

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INDIA IN TRANSITION

FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS

By William J. Barnds

INDIA has now been an independent nation for twenty years. While such a period is but a moment in the history of Indian civilization, those who struggled for freedom and worked to consolidate it looked upon the early years of Independence as a crucial period in establishing India's domestic institutions and its position in the world. Nehru's eloquent words on the eve of Independence reflected the widespread awareness that a unique moment was at hand:

> Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.

The years since Independence have witnessed many accomplishments as the remarkable group of men who led the struggle for freedom turned their energies to the tasks of building a nation out of the disparate peoples of India and establishing the nation's position in the world. For many years the momentum was maintained, but recently the setbacks to India's progress have been more striking than her advances. In the international sphere, there has been some decline in India's prestige and influence, and war with her principal neighbors has magnified all her problems. The upsurge of patriotism and national determination that followed her humiliation by the Chinese in 1962 soon gave way to a sharp decline in national confidence as it became clear that even with the greatly increased defense build-up that was planned India would be unable to regain its lost territory and status. A measure of this lost confidence was restored as a result of India's performance in the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965: not only was India successful in repulsing Pakistan's effort to seize Kashmir, but it also dealt with Peking's threats firmly and skillfully and kept the peace at home—preventing the strong popular feeling against Pakistan from leading to violence against Indian Moslems. This performance was viewed with pride by both Hindu and secular

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nationalists. Yet except for a psychological boost, India gained little from the victory; the basic hostility between the two countries continues unabated, and India is having increasing difficulty finding Kashmiri politicians who are able, popular and reliable.

Despite its conflicts with China and Pakistan and the major changes in some of the key relationships involving South Asia—the formation and decline of the United States-Pakistan alliance, the development of close relations between India and the U.S.S.R. and the shift from friendship to animosity in Sino-Indian relations—New Delhi has held to its policy of nonalignment and its support for Asian and African nationalism throughout the past twenty years. This has been a source of considerable pride to Indians. Prime Minister Gandhi's meeting with Presidents Tito and Nasser in 1966 was an effort to assert the continuity of Indian policy as well as to demonstrate that nonalignment still had a practical meaning in a world in which both Western and communist alliance systems were crumbling. Similarly, despite the damage done to India by the closure of the Suez Canal, Mrs. Gandhi firmly backed the Arabs generally and the United Arab Republic specifically in the Middle East crisis in 1967, continuing a long-established policy of Indian support for Arab nationalism (also designed to prevent Pakistan from gaining solid Arab support on Kashmir). For the first time, however, strong opposition to the policy was expressed by many Indians.

The striking element of continuity in Indian policy often masks the great change that has taken place in India's position in the twenty years since the British departure. Nonalignment and support of Asian nationalism remain politically and psychologically important, but the vital concerns of Indian foreign policy are its relations with its two antagonistic neighbors, China and Pakistan, and with the major industrial nations, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, whose support is essential for India. These relationships have gradually altered over the years in a way that has increased India's burdens and reduced its freedom. Thus the India of today is in a much less enviable position than the India of 1947.

II

The Indian Government was the heir to two distinct bodies of thought regarding foreign policy. The first was the legacy of the British who dealt with threats to the security of the sub-

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continent by dominating the countries on India's frontiers and controlling their foreign relations. In its broader international context, however, the foreign policy of the British Indian Government was clearly directed toward advancing British rather than Indian interests. The second theory of foreign policy was that expressed by Nehru and the Congress Party in the years before Independence, which decried imperialism, favored independence for colonial territories and saw no basis for British claims about external threats to India's frontiers. The men who led the independence movement reached maturity at a time of British strength, Chinese weakness and Russian preoccupation at home and in Europe; and their natural inclination was to regard India's security as due to the great Himalayan barrier rather than to the accidents of history. But the rise of Soviet and Chinese power later created potential threats from the northwest and northeast, especially to a subcontinent that was no longer united or directly supported by British industrial and military power.

Obviously Nehru's thinking was more in touch with many of the realities of postwar Asia than was the British Indian tradition, and it was India's efforts to apply these precepts that attracted the attention of the world in the early years of Indian independence. Yet the British Indian tradition was centered on the vital issue of territorial integrity and was the only body of thought realistically concerned with the question of India's frontiers in the Himalayas—the area that was to be the scene of the major conflicts involving India after Independence. However, both streams of thought assumed an undivided subcontinent and thus provided no guidance on the most important issue facing the newly independent Indian Government—its relationship with Pakistan, which both age-old Hindu-Moslem antagonism and conflicts growing out of the partition struggle assured would be a hostile one.

Most Indians—and most outside observers—regarded India's foreign policy as predominantly successful during the early years of its independence. India held the most valuable part of Kashmir and was able to deal with Pakistan from a position of strength; the United Kingdom and India developed a formula that allowed India to become a republic while remaining in the Commonwealth; India's efforts on behalf of nonalignment and anti-colonialism won it great attention and considerable respect in many parts of the world; and because India's foreign policy was

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widely accepted by politically conscious Indians, it enhanced national unity. Communist Chinese control of Tibet was something beyond the impenetrable Himalayas and seemed of little consequence to most Indians, although New Delhi had quietly taken steps to strengthen its position in the inner buffer zone of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and was ruling the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) directly. The burden of defense required to deal with a hostile Pakistan was about $400 million annually, hardly a trifling sum but not a crushing load.

The U. S.-Pakistan alliance was the first major threat to India's predominance in South Asia, which had allowed New Delhi to play a wide-ranging role in world affairs. Indian bitterness and Pakistani pleasure—and anticipation of further U. S. support—permeated the area to an extent that is difficult to recall today. India began a gradual build-up of its military forces, and its defense expenditures increased by over 50 percent—to $610 million by 1958. India and the Soviet Union also found a common interest in closer ties. Stalin's successors were aware that India was no tool of the West, and sought to play a role in India's development in the hope of weakening India's links with the West and moving the country to the left domestically. New Delhi wanted to increase its manœuvrability vis-à-vis the Western powers, to acquire great-power support on such issues as Kashmir, and to develop a promising source of economic assistance. Finally, India signed a treaty with Peking which terminated the special rights in Tibet that India had inherited from Britain, recognized Tibet as a part of China and set forth the famous five principles of peaceful coexistence (*Panch Sheel.*)[1] Uncertain about U. S. intentions, Nehru wanted to avoid simultaneous trouble with both of his large neighbors. These moves, together with the limited nature of U. S. support for Pakistan, enabled India to counter the U. S.-Pakistan alliance.

Soon a crisis of a different type appeared. India began its first five-year plan in 1951 with about $1.8 billion in foreign-exchange reserves, and even with minimal aid maintained them at this level until 1956. However, the ambitious second plan (1956–61) shifted the emphasis of development effort from agriculture to industry, and the concomitant requirement for a sharp increase

[1] India apparently did not try to obtain Chinese recognition of its border claims in return for giving up its rights in Tibet. New Delhi did make its claims known to Peking and, while the Chinese never accepted them, they never contested them.

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in imported industrial goods and industrial raw materials resulted in a decline in India's foreign-exchange reserves to $625 million at the end of 1957. India turned to the West for help and the West responded with steady increases in aid. This enabled India to continue satisfactory economic progress without cutting back its defense build-up, but only at the cost of increasing dependence on the United States, Western Europe and the U.S.S.R.

The third major challenge came from the northeast. Prime Minister Nehru had always placed great importance on good rela-



tions with Peking in view of Chinese strength and Pakistani hostility toward India. His policy seemed to be working during the mid-fifties. India and China were gradually extending their control into the Himalayan frontier area, but the formidable natural obstacles involved made this a slow process, and until the 1959 Tibetan revolt the Chinese military presence in Tibet was a modest one and of limited concern to India. New Delhi was, however, concerned about Chinese maps showing certain Indian-claimed areas along the northern and northeastern frontier as Chinese territory, and Peking's assurances that these were only old Chinese Nationalist maps that would in time be adjusted left India uneasy. Indian apprehension increased with the discovery in 1958 of a Chinese road in the Aksai Chin area of the Ladakh section of Kashmir, and in 1959 Chou En-lai first informed Nehru

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that China did not accept India's border claims. Border clashes also occurred in this period, and by August 1959 Nehru felt compelled to inform Parliament of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Asia's two largest nations were now enemies, and the *Panch Sheel* period was over a scant five years after it had begun.

India increased its military forces along the frontier, and expanded roads and communications links between the plains and the mountainous border areas and within the border areas. India was determined at least to hold all of the territory it then controlled. Defense allocations were raised again, and reached a total of $780 million by 1962. India also sought Soviet support for moderating Chinese policy. The U.S.S.R., already having its troubles with Peking, publicly adopted an essentially neutral position but privately, it is thought, urged restraint on the Chinese. Moscow, as well as Washington, was finding it difficult to maintain ties with both allies and neutrals.

Finally, India attempted through negotiations to persuade Peking to accept Indian border claims. When Nehru and Chou En-lai met in New Delhi in April 1960, Chou suggested that China would yield its claim to the Northeast Frontier Agency in return for acknowledgment of its claim to Aksai Chin. Though this proposal would have enabled each to keep what was strategically important to it, no settlement was reached, nor was any progress made toward one. Nehru's freedom of manœuvre was limited by the strong anti-Chinese feelings that had welled up in India. While his reliance on *Panch Sheel* had been as much an act of hope as of faith, the faith had been public while his doubts were concealed, and this made it appear that he had been naïve in dealing with the Chinese. Moreover, he himself was angered by the devious manner in which China had put forward its claims and taken advantage of Indian friendship; therefore he was not inclined to make any substantial concessions.

India was now openly involved in territorial disputes with both Pakistan and China, each of which was allied to one of the superpowers. Yet rather than seek a compromise settlement with either Pakistan or China in order to concentrate forces against the other, India held firm in both cases. Indeed, it not only refused to compromise with China, but began to move its forces forward in Ladakh in 1961 and 1962 to recover at least some of the territory that was occupied by China. In so doing, Indian leaders gravely miscalculated their own strength, the Chinese

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strength and the likely Chinese response to such an Indian advance. In time the fighting spread to NEFA as well, and in the fall of 1962 India suffered a humiliating defeat.

Despite the early withdrawal, China was now a confirmed enemy in Indian eyes. India's defense budget more than doubled to $1.8 billion within two years, as New Delhi attempted to develop a military machine capable of facing China and Pakistan at the same time. India's policy against acceptance of military aid was dropped as New Delhi attempted to secure a continued flow of Western and Soviet arms. Even though the U.S.S.R. had disappointed India during the crisis, Nehru did not want to rely on the West alone lest this lead to the end of nonalignment and to Soviet support of China. (The Afro-Asian countries also generally took a neutral position—one of the cruelest blows of all to India.) Thus nonalignment was in a sense replaced by an informal double alignment. Now hard-pressed financially, India needed the aid of both superpowers in expanding and modernizing its outdated military forces, and coöperation with both of them might also have the added benefit of straining U. S. ties with Pakistan and further undermining Soviet-Chinese relations.

III

If developments over the last twenty years resulted in growing defense burdens, India was for many years remarkably successful in securing outside assistance to enable it to carry these burdens while adopting ever more ambitious five-year plans. The flow of foreign aid to India on a significant scale began in the mid-fifties, following the cold-war stalemate in Europe and East Asia. The attention of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. turned to the newly independent Asian countries as predictions were made on all sides that the side that "won" the Third World would emerge supreme.

The Soviet Union and the East European communist countries have been major contributors to India's efforts to develop its economy and more recently to expand and modernize its armed forces. Since the Soviet Union undertook to construct the Bhilai steel mill thirteen years ago, the Russians and their allies have committed about $2 billion in aid for a wide variety of industrial projects—machinery factories, pharmaceutical plants, machine-tool plants and (after the United States had refused) the giant Bokaro steel mill. India's trade with the U.S.S.R. and East-

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ern Europe has increased from an insignificant level until it amounts to about 14 percent of its total trade. The Soviet Union has given India political support on Kashmir and Goa, and its adoption of a generally neutral position regarding India's quarrel with China made a continuation of nonalignment possible. Finally, the Soviets have contributed military equipment worth several hundred-million dollars, including transport aircraft, helicopters, fighter aircraft, submarines, tanks and arms factories—and are now virtually the only foreign source of arms for India.

As a result of this extensive Soviet support and Indian recognition of its value, Moscow has enjoyed harmonious relations with India since the mid-fifties. Both governments seem determined to emphasize points of agreement and gloss over differences of views. The Russians in one sense have little choice in this matter, for if the Soviet Union is to be a world power they need a substantial position in so important a country as India, the more so in view of their hostility to China. Even the retreat from a completely pro-Indian policy in the subcontinent in 1965 and its subsequent efforts to establish a position in Pakistan have not basically undermined the Indo-Soviet relationship.

Thus the Soviet presence and influence in India today are much more substantial than ever before in history. When Soviet leaders were fearful that China might enter the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict by attacking India—and thus present Moscow with an impossible dilemma—they were able to arrange a meeting of President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri in the Soviet Union. The comment of *The Times* (London) was most appropriate: "How strange and intolerable it would have seemed to Curzon that the affairs of the subcontinent he ruled should be taken to Tashkent to be discussed under the patronage of a Russian." Equally striking to the West was the spectacle of the leading communist state working successfully to ease rather than exacerbate tensions between two bourgeois nations.

Yet it is important not to exaggerate the extent of Soviet influence in India today. Indian foreign policy was more anti-Western, and Indian domestic policy more enthusiastically socialistic, in the early years of the Soviet effort to establish itself in India than is the case today. This shift reflects the inherent difficulty any country has in acquiring influence in another nation, especially one as large and proud as India.

Moreover, during the past twelve years Indian dependence on

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the West has grown. It would be unduly cynical as well as incorrect to attribute India's better relations with the West entirely to its growing need for assistance, essential though this has been. Just as the United States came to see that India's nonalignment policy was compatible with Western interests, Indian suspicion of the United States gradually declined as a result of our efforts to achieve an accommodation with the U.S.S.R., our opposition to the Suez invasion in 1956 and our restraint in supporting Pakistan's claims to Kashmir. In any case, the rise in U. S. aid to India has stopped, and the immediate prospects are for a decline of some magnitude—at a time when India's debt repayments are very large.

It is ironic and tragic that India, which spoke so eloquently of the futility of seeking security through military preparedness and of the need for peaceful accommodation among quarreling nations, is today at odds with its major neighbors, supports an army of 900,000 men, and spends nearly 5 percent of its GNP on defense—a rate higher than that for most NATO countries. Moreover, India's tense relations with Pakistan and China are a psychological as well as an economic burden. Finally, if India decides it must develop nuclear weapons and ultimately a missile delivery system, defense costs will take another sharp jump.[2]

Thus have India's quarrels with Pakistan and China and its need for great-power support become the central concern of Indian foreign policy and altered its position in the world. Preoccupation with these matters has caused India to play a less prominent role in the affairs of the Third World. Moreover, as more and more colonies became independent, the Afro-Asian group became less cohesive and the younger and more radical leaders were not inclined to look to a moderate India for guidance —particularly after the death of Nehru. While the Afro-Asian countries still at times stand together on issues of common interest, they are preoccupied for the most part with matters of individual concern.

IV

Evaluating the nature and extent of hostility between two antagonistic nations is always a difficult task, particularly for

[2] India could acquire a nominal nuclear weapons capability for $25–$50 million annually. However, the major problem would be the cost of a delivery system capable of reaching important targets in China, which are far from the Indian border. The price for this would be several hundred-million dollars a year.

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those directly involved in the quarrel. A nation tends to see the hostility of its antagonist extending far beyond the particular points in dispute and embracing a generalized malevolence. Once suspicion and fear gain the upper hand, the worst possible interpretation is placed on the opponent's every action. In these circumstances, the need for emotional disengagement and dispassionate analysis is all the greater, lest the escalation of suspicions lead to the very action feared.

These observations are apropos of both the Indo-Pakistan and Sino-Indian quarrels. Pakistanis argue that India's refusal to accept the two-nation theory and its implications (yielding the Moslem state of Kashmir) upon which partition was based, and the many Indian statements over the years expressing a desire for a reunited subcontinent indicate that India has never truly accepted partition; hence the conclusion that India intends to destroy Pakistan when the opportunity arises. India's failure to attack Pakistan in the years just after partition when Pakistan was extremely weak, and Indian willingness to agree to a cease-fire in 1965 when the tide of battle was going against Pakistan, are facts which have little impact on Pakistani thinking. Similarly, Indians are convinced that the anti-Hindu emotions that brought Pakistan into being are the key element holding the nation together, so that even Indian concessions on Kashmir would not lead Pakistan to alter its basic hostility.

Neither Indian nor Pakistani fears are entirely irrational, although they are considerably exaggerated. The legacy of antagonism lies heavily on both peoples and colors their attitudes toward each other. Moslems generally regard Hindus as devious, untrustworthy and hypocritical; Hindus look upon the Moslems with a mixture of contempt and fear, regarding them as intolerant and brutal. There are exceptions and some are in high places, but those with a broader vision are probably in a minority. Leaders of both countries have periodically emphasized both publicly and privately their desire for better relations. Yet far more characteristic than these occasional statements have been the charges and countercharges hurled at each other for twenty years by the politicians, press and radio. Citizens of each country generally base their beliefs upon the worst possible interpretations of the words and actions of the other, and the national heroes of one nation are despised by its neighbor. The recent sharp criticism of Mrs. Gandhi in the Indian Parliament for sending a

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message of congratulations to President Ayub on the completion of the Mangla Dam (built under the Indus River Plan but in a part of Kashmir held by Pakistan) shows how little room the leaders have to manœuvre.

Such attitudes do not mean a new war is likely, for Pakistan is wary after coming so close to disaster in 1965, and India is basically satisfied with the status quo on Kashmir. Yet if the danger of war appears remote, the prospects for a settlement of the key Kashmir dispute are even more remote. India is more determined than ever to retain the disputed territory. Indian nationalists with a basically secular outlook have never been willing to accept the two-nation theory upon which Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is based. Hindu nationalists are equally opposed to yielding anything on Kashmir, partly because they are against concessions of any kind to any Moslem, and partly because they consider Kashmir as sacred Indian soil. Moreover, both groups fear that if they acknowledge that Pakistan has a legitimate claim to Kashmir, they would indirectly be admitting that Pakistan has a legitimate interest in the status and welfare of Indian Moslems.

Strategic considerations are also involved. Yielding Kashmir to Pakistan would not only weaken India's strategic position vis-à-vis Pakistan; more importantly it would make it virtually impossible for India to defend Ladakh against China. There is, too, the simple desire of any country to hold on to what it has, a resolve that has been hardened in the Indian case by Pakistan's attempt to take Kashmir by force in 1965. Indeed, the desire to uphold national prestige and past policy—whatever outsiders may think or say—is probably the most important factor of all.

Yet the Indian Government and many informed Indian citizens are aware that India has yet to win more than the sullen acquiescence of the Kashmiris in their present political condition. Indeed, it would be surprising if the growing strength of the Hindu Jana Sangh in recent years had not increased the apprehensions of the Kashmiri Moslems concerning their ultimate fate. While India has no intention of yielding anything to Pakistan on this issue, it probably would be willing to give Kashmir greater autonomy if it were persuaded that this would satisfy rather than stimulate Kashmiri appetites. The recent release of Sheikh Abdullah is no doubt aimed more at satisfying the Kashmiris than at effecting a rapprochement with Pakistan. Yet Sheikh Abdullah has always been a man of independent but vague ideas, a combination which

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makes it difficult to be optimistic about his ability to contribute to a resolution of the issue.

V

Just as India and Pakistan are each convinced that the hostility of the other encompasses far more than contested territory, so India and China believe that their quarrel is more than a mere border dispute. When the dispute developed in 1959, New Delhi could not believe that Peking would press its demands at the price of India's friendship, but the devious manner in which Chinese leaders dealt with the boundary question in the following years —and especially the expansion of their earlier claims in the Aksai Chin area in 1960—convinced Indian leaders that China's border claims were but one step toward a more ominous if indefinable goal. These beliefs and fears were reinforced by the 1962 war and China's subsequent links to Pakistan, as well as by the general hardening of Peking's foreign policy after 1957. China's willingness in 1960 to reach a compromise border settlement, its restraint in not sending troops beyond its border claims in 1962, and its early withdrawal from NEFA have never been considered by Indians as evidence that China may have more limited goals. Indians have become convinced that China is, in Nehru's words, "a country with profoundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions" or that the border dispute is part of a Chinese effort to pressure India "to follow the Chinese line, both in her domestic and external policies, or risk disintegration in the process of resisting that pressure." Recent Chinese calls for a Maoist revolution in India are seen not as a shift from an earlier policy but as an indication of what Peking's true goals have always been.

Yet there is another possible explanation of China's motives, at least before the madness of the Great Cultural Revolution. The direct routes from western China to Tibet pass through extremely difficult terrain and are sometimes impassable in winter. A less direct but more dependable route is through Sinkiang into Tibet from the northwest. However, such a route has to pass through the disputed Aksai Chin territory to avoid the rugged terrain to its north. Therefore, possession of this area is of great importance to China if its position in Tibet is to be secure. Indian unwillingness in 1960 to accept a compromise border settlement which recognized this area as Chinese was probably interpreted in Pe-

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king as demonstrating that India did not really accept Chinese control of Tibet, but was following the old British policy of seeking to make Tibet a buffer state. The outrage expressed by the Indian press, public and some members of Parliament over Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1959 had already made China suspicious on this matter. India did obviously hope that Tibet would have as much autonomy as possible and that only limited numbers of Chinese troops would be stationed there, but it does not follow that the Indian Government intended to undermine Chinese control of Tibet.

Similarly, India's movement of its troops forward in Ladakh in 1961 and 1962 gave China the choice of losing important territory or responding with military force. (This advance was successful enough so that Nehru could tell Parliament in August 1962 that India had recovered 2,500 square miles of its territory.) Having concluded that a military response was necessary, Peking apparently designed its attack to achieve its territorial objectives, force India to accept Chinese terms for a settlement and humiliate it in the eyes of other nations.

Such an interpretation, while not ruling out a measure of rivalry between the two largest nations in Asia, suggests that the Sino-Indian dispute is not as broad in scope as the two parties believe. If this is correct, is there any basis for a settlement of the border dispute that would meet the asserted needs of the two nations? New Delhi has argued that its boundary claims in both the northeast and Ladakh—as well as the few small disputed areas between Ladakh and Nepal—are based upon custom, geography and past international agreements. These prove conclusively, so it asserts, that these areas are legally part of India and have long been recognized as such.[3] The conviction that it has a good legal case is one reason for India's firm stand, and for its willingness to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

Yet the legal aspects of the Indian and Chinese claims are both complex and unclear. Both sides rely on tenuous arguments on certain points. Western scholars who have examined the matter in detail generally agree that India's claims to NEFA are notably stronger than China's, while there is a division of opinion as to whether either side has a strong claim to the disputed Aksai Chin.

[3] However, Hinton points out that maps issued by the Government of India between 1947 and 1950 show no line for the outer border of Kashmir but simply state "Boundary Undefined." Harold Hinton, "Communist China in World Politics." Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1966, p. 280.

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Turning from the legal aspects of the dispute, it is clear that India's natural defense line at its northeastern frontier runs along the ridge of the Himalayas, which the McMahon Line largely follows. If China were to acquire the southern slopes of the Himalayas, India's ability to defend its northeastern territories would be seriously jeopardized. On the other hand, the portion of the Aksai Chin that New Delhi claims as Indian territory is not strategically important for the defense of India. India's natural defense line in this area is the Karakorum Mountains, which run south of the Aksai Chin from northwest to southeast. Therefore an agreement which recognized Indian claims along the northeastern frontier and those of China to the Aksai Chin would meet the strategic requirements of both countries.

Such an agreement would offer several advantages to India. It would lessen the chances of another war between the two countries. It would reduce the upward pressure on Indian defense spending, and might in time make some cutbacks possible. By lowering tensions, it might also lessen India's sense of need for nuclear weapons. Finally, it would weaken if not undermine the Sino-Pakistan relationship.

Despite these advantages, a settlement along these lines is not likely in the near future. The China of the Great Cultural Revolution shows no desire to work for harmonious relations with India or its other neighbors. Yet the general view among China watchers is that Peking will eventually return to more pragmatic policies. Moreover, Communist Chinese foreign policy has often changed direction, and it may be that after the force of the present upheaval has spent itself China will try to normalize its relations with its neighbors. Even so, India would find it politically and psychologically difficult to settle for less than the whole loaf, despite the fact that it would be giving up nothing it now holds or is likely to acquire—unless Chinese authority so disintegrates that Tibet regains its autonomy. If this ever occurs, the question of who controls the disputed Aksai Chin territory will be of little consequence. In the past the Indian Government has offered to divide Kashmir along the present ceasefire line despite its attitude that Pakistan has no legal right to any part of the state. If India can display similar flexibility in negotiating a settlement with China, it will have taken a major step toward increasing its security, reducing its burdens and regaining a measure of the diplomatic freedom it has lost in recent years.

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ITALY: THE FRAGILE STATE

By Luigi Barzini

NEW general elections will be held in Italy in May. The present government coalition (formed by Christian Democrats and Socialists, with the addition of the very few but earnest Republicans) will defend itself on two fronts. From the radical Right will come the assaults of the not-numerous neo-Fascists and the still scarcer last-stand Monarchists; much more vigorous and dangerous attacks will be launched by the radical Left, the Communists and the revolutionary Socialists. Both radical Right and Left are theoretically sworn to destroy the present state of things and erect diametrically opposite régimes on the smoking ruins and the carnage. Such apocalyptic prospectives are not difficult to defeat, as they provoke more fear than hope in large sectors of the electorate.

The opposition also includes the Partito Liberale Italiano[1], which is not radical, frightens nobody and does not wish to demolish the liberal, democratic parliamentary Republic it helped to set up after the war with other anti-Fascist parties, but would rather see it function more efficiently, honestly and, if possible, equitably. It would also like to see the other opposition parties and the Government less dependent on foreign influences like the Kremlin, the Vatican or the State Department. The Partito Liberale is small, to be sure (7 percent of the electorate), but should be considered the only legitimate opposition existing in Italy, the only one, that is, working strictly within the system, as a legitimate opposition should in a well-ordered democracy.

What will be the results of the elections? Are they predictable? The Government, whose record is generally good, is solidly entrenched in a strategically favorable position, neither Right nor too far to the Left. It has a rich program, which includes all sorts of wonderful plums for all sorts of people, from the most opulent automobile manufacturer of Turin to sulphur miners of Sicily. It controls vast economic pastures which are open to its friends and supporters; directs the expenditure of immense sums for all

[1] It is preferable not to translate the term to avoid confusion. While all liberals spring from the same philosophic sources, fought originally the same revolutions, and still cherish somewhat similar goals, each country has developed its own distinct variety, determined by the conditions of the local struggle against tyranny, and by the nature and obstinacy of the local enemies of liberty.

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kinds of genuinely useful public schemes and huge unseen sums for all kinds of recondite purposes, which include the financing of the parties in power. It can rely on the loyal support of the radio and TV (which is a state monopoly) and the majority of newspapers (some are firmly controlled by the state; the others can be easily persuaded).

While almost everything else is visibly deteriorating, the economy is flourishing as never before in history, more rapidly than in countries which are evidently better governed and administered, and shows at the present moment no serious signs of slackening. The Government, as everybody knows, controls 50 percent of the economy and easily influences the rest, both legitimately (through public contracts, incentives, tax laws, discount rates) and illegitimately (through favors, indirect pressure or threats). The boom, the endemic corruption tolerated in the handling of public money, the many lotteries and football pools spread the hope that anybody can become rich any time. People are optimistic and tend to forget their many unsolved problems. For all these reasons, qualified observers do not expect vast migrations of votes from one side to another.

Political conflicts in Italy today have been compared to trench warfare during the First World War. To be sure, costly offensives will be mounted by all sides during the campaign; billions of lire spent on propaganda, posters and canvassing; lurid scandals uncovered both by the government parties and the motley opposition to defame and disqualify their opponents; but everybody agrees that all these cyclopean efforts will result in the conquest or loss of relatively small percentages of votes. Might one conclude, if things turn out as foreseen, that the coming elections have little importance, that all the *jeux sont faits, rien ne va plus,* and that the Italian Problem has been solved once and for all? Will it be possible to say that Italy has reached the state of the happy country without history? Are things really as stable as they look?

II

If this were true, it would indeed be welcome news. Historians agree that the only constant feature in Italian political life since the Barbarian invasion (and perhaps even before) has been its fragility and precariousness. Libraries are filled with studies of the probable causes of this state of things, diagnoses and pro-

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posed cures being as numerous as the fashionable theories which followed each other down the centuries, from Saint Thomas Aquinas' "Summa," Dante's "De Monarchia," Machiavelli's "Discourses" and "The Prince," to Vico's "New Science," Croce's "History of Italy," Gramsci's "Essays" and this morning's array of editorials. The cause or causes, however, do not interest us here. What deserves our attention is the consequence, the fact that the country was never freed, for one reason or another, from the necessity to lean on props of all kinds, special régimes, powerful outside guardians or protectors, and, at times, foreign occupying armies, to ward off some sort of imminent catastrophe, anarchy, civil war or invasion from abroad.

The most durable (and perhaps the most natural) of these *combinazioni* was the alliance between the great spiritual power of the Holy Roman Church and the great material power of the Holy Roman Empire. It lasted, with ups and downs, through many and notorious vicissitudes, from the sack of Rome by the *Landsknecht* of Charles V in 1527 till the Italian national army entered the same city in September 1870. This alliance preserved a splendid, somnolent, corrupt and humiliating peace. Some historians are of the opinion that such arrangements were the cause of worse inconveniences, in the long run, than the catastrophes they were designed to prevent, for they weakened the people's desire and capacity to determine their own future and to rely on their own forces. It is difficult to know whether this is true; there is no sure way to ascertain what would have happened without outside tutelage and help. What we can say is that, until the nineteenth century and the *Risorgimento,* no Italian tried to solve the National Problem, which was always hidden under a gorgeously multicolored baroque façade of rhetoric, bombast and *trompe l'oeil* deceptions.

The calamity to be warded off by means of all possible subterfuges has now been the same for almost half a century: it is the communist threat to conquer power, which always seemed (and still seems, at times) real, imminent and frightening. In spite of all the ingenious expedients devised, the threat never vanished. Obviously, they were based on a mistaken assessment of what caused the prevailing unrest. In 1922, many believed that the best medicine for it was a strong arbitrary government, a one-party totalitarian régime led by an all-powerful dictator; others accepted the Fascist rule as a temporary necessity, the

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only way out of an emergency; only a few disagreed. In the end the régime had to be imposed mostly by the secret police and the might of the German ally. It ended, as everybody knows, in ruin, defeat and ignominy. Obviously what the country needed (but might not have been ready for, at the time) was something different.

Twenty years later, in 1943, the Communist Party emerged from the underground as the most authoritative, literate, mature, aggressive and experienced outside the Soviet Union, the wealthiest and most numerous in the West. Led by Palmiro Togliatti and by excellent cadres of intellectuals and organizers, it went from electoral success to electoral success after the war. Togliatti was a scholar, philosopher and historian, a shrewd man who did not simply know his Marx and Lenin but also his Machiavelli and Gramsci, and adapted the naïve Soviet instructions he received from Moscow to the complex Italian historical reality. To be sure, the party lost some of its raw enthusiasm and revolutionary zest (all the terrorists and extremists were carefully weeded out) but acquired bureaucratic efficiency, discipline and the knack to rally protest votes not simply from the proletariat but from all kinds of dissatisfied people.

To face the growing menace to their liberty, the Italians were persuaded to confer absolute power in 1948 and almost absolute power ever since on the Christian Democrats. They resemble an American more than a European party. They form a vast conglomeration of men from all walks of life and classes, holding all possible political opinions, from the extreme Right (the Papal nobility, the hierarchy and the landowners) to the subversive extreme Left (the young clergy, the trade unions and the intellectuals). They are nominally held together by their common faith and the fear of a communist take-over. Their strength came (and still comes) from the moral support of the Church and its capillary organizations, which did excellent duty for an electoral machine. With such aid, the party's candidates filled almost one-half of parliament at every turn with incredible ease.

The Christian Democratic deputies and senators led by De Gasperi were animated by a desire to solve national problems and defend national interests. Their record, in the beginning, was good, sometimes excellent. The country was starving, the economy was in ruins and everything needed to be done. The Communist Party was kept at bay. The Christian Democrats

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were resigned to accepting orders from the Church in matters pertaining to a few sensitive but secondary sectors, like censorship, divorce, birth control and the public financing of Catholic schools (matters in which their opinions did not differ from the Church's anyway), but as the years went by they realized that they had limited autonomy in many other matters, even when the Vatican granted them their freedom. Each candidate was (and is) inevitably chosen (or approved) by the local Bishop; he knows he has to be pliant and understanding if he wishes to be elected and reëlected. Most important policies, therefore, had to be harmonized with those of the Church, in all fields, including foreign affairs. Problems which it did not consider vital were ignored or tackled only halfheartedly.

This would not be very important if the Church in Italy were like Catholic Churches elsewhere, if it were, that is, a National Church, led by a Primate, the kind that in the past stood up against overbearing princes and still respectfully defends national views against the Holy See whenever necessary. Such local churches at times supported excellent Catholic parties which governed well and wisely, or bravely assumed the defense of their flock and became a symbol of national unity in grave historical circumstances, as in Ireland under the English and in Poland under Imperial Russian and Soviet domination. There is no Italian Church. What exists in Italy is the Universal Church. The Primate of Italy is the Bishop of Rome, the Holy Pontiff, whose divinely imposed duty is to promote the welfare of all Catholics and Church organizations in all parts of the world. Where there is a conflict with the aspirations and needs of the Italian people, it is obvious that the interests of the Holy See take precedence.

III

The task of governing Italy and encouraging her prosperity and social progress has never been so difficult. The times make people impatient; they are persuaded that man's hopes have already become man's rights. The country can boast of every problem associated with the archaic, the ultra-modern and the overripe industrial world. It is, in spots, Greece, Switzerland and Lancashire. It has to cope with a high rate of illiteracy, an immature electorate, overbearing and avaricious entrepreneurs, the unemployment of too many unqualified workers, poverty and

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widespread corruption; with air and water pollution, inefficient state welfare organizations, chaotic urban growth, lack of modern schools, hospitals, courts; finally, with obsolete industries, some of which are state-owned or want to become state property to protect themselves from aggressive competition and to be able to point to their losses not as examples of bad management but as farsighted contributions to social well-being.

Then, if these headaches were not enough, Italy has a vast number of troubles which are uniquely her own, most of which cannot be cured and cost a great deal of money. Among them are the war on the Mafia, the retarded development of the South, earthquakes, floods, the effects of deforestation, the necessity to preserve priceless art treasures, *palazzi,* churches, ruins, world-famous landscapes and ancient archives from decay. What other country must prevent one of the world's most exquisite cities from slowly sinking in the mud or another from being washed away by the next spring flood? Where else must the government worry whether the inclination from the perpendicular of a glorious and ancient marble tower is approaching the danger point?

There are, in fact, enough problems to keep busy an army of foundation-financed specialists, each happily digging his own little sector. Non-specialists, however, who prefer the panoramic view, suspect that all these afflictions could be considered the many effects of one single pathological condition. This appears superficially as the discrepancy between the energy, vigor, feverish activity, zest for life, adaptability, industry, resourcefulness of the Italian people as a whole, most of whom now refuse the miserable living conditions they had resignedly accepted as their lot for centuries, and the growing paralysis of a decrepit state machinery. The Italians are visibly transforming parts of their country, by hook if possible and by crook if there is no other way, into a passable imitation of Mitteleuropa. They are moving, so to speak, in a northwestern direction, toward the Duchy of Bourgogne, the Rhine Valley and the Low Countries. At the same time, the public administration is sleepily dragging itself in the opposite direction, with Byzantium as its ideal resting place.

The problem, then, is fundamentally only one: that of bringing the public administration on a level with the need of the people, or the *aggiornamento*—the updating—of the state. Should Italy somehow acquire within the next few years a relatively efficient civil service, run by competent men, regulated by simplified

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procedures and governed by cabinet ministers with few but clear ideas, nobody doubts she would advance more speedily and with less impediments. She could cure most of her ills and prevent the deterioration of the few incurable ones. Obviously a start should be made with illiteracy. This should not be impossible to liquidate in a country where the entire school system from kindergarten to university is either run directly or controlled by the Ministry of Public Instruction.

Poverty could be tackled next. The state owns, runs, manages and controls directly some of the economic activities; it can easily influence all of them, as every modern state does. It is, in fact, on paper, the most powerful state in the free world, even if it does not seem to be fully aware of its properties and possibilities. It would theoretically be easy to provide stable and remunerative employment in a well-ordered economy for a properly trained population, fully able to take part in the scientific production processes of industry and agriculture. Finally, a reasonably affluent and literate population, whose rights and needs were automatically and quickly recognized by the state, would no longer fall prey to the communist mirage. The ancient problem of the revolutionary threat to liberty would be solved.

The people have been dreaming of being well governed for centuries. There is a fourteenth-century fresco by Lorenzetti, on a wall of the Palazzo della Ragione at Siena, called *"Il buon governo." "Il buon governo"* is the title of a well-known book by Luigi Einaudi, the distinguished economist who was the first President of the Republic. The fact that the country has had good government only at rare periods in history has convinced many that Italians do not have the qualities necessary to become good civil servants and administrators. This, of course, is not true. Many Italians (too many, perhaps) have a natural inclination for state employment and enjoy the security and authority connected with it. They like nothing better, in fact. And they can be satisfactory, if not always exemplary, bureaucrats whenever the system requires it.

They were impartial, honest and efficient under the first governments of united Italy (1860–1876) and under Giovanni Giolitti before World War I. They were good under the Austrians in Trent and Trieste. They were (and are) expert administrators in the Canton Ticino and the Swiss Federal bureaucracy. There are a few sectors of the Italian State which still function impec-

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cably, the Banca d'Italia and the Carabinieri among them. Finally, they have created and run for about twenty centuries the greatest bureaucratic masterpiece of all, the most subtle and complex organization devised by man, bigger and more far-reaching than the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey—the Roman Curia.

To be sure, old-fashioned government responsibilities were less exacting and specialized, more suited perhaps to the Italians' native qualities. But they have also proved themselves resourceful and skillful in the intricate organizations of the contemporary industrialized and scientific world: they are doing well, for instance, among the "Eurocrats" in Brussels. In other words, they love the jobs, possess the necessary qualities and can be good whenever they are enclosed within well-defined rules and entrusted with precise powers and duties. For these reasons many believe that the Italian state could be made to function in an adequate manner within a short time, with substantially the same men already employed, give and take a few thousands, and at approximately the same cost.

The *aggiornamento* of the state machinery should obviously be the aim of both the Right and the Left. Conservatives in Italy as elsewhere pine for law and order, the protection of life and property, the certainty of well-defined rights and duties; they enjoy seeing crooks and grafters end in jail and public affairs smoothly and economically managed. The Left, however, should want an energetic and refurbished bureaucracy and streamlined legal procedures even more. Their avowed policy is "the intervention of the state in the economy for the advantage of the collectivity." (The formula is not new. Every Italian government since Cavour did just that. Only the idea of what constituted the advantage of the collectivity varied with the times.) In order to intervene effectively one must have the necessary instruments: bureaus manned by trained and reliable experts. As most of the laws passed by the Left encounter obstinate resistance, the need for impartial and energetic enforcement agencies is particularly evident. Nationalized monopolies must be kept working for the common good by state surveillance, and not for their own aggrandizement. Finally, if the country should be divided into autonomous regions, as the Left and the Christian Democrats want, a well-run central administration will be found indispensable to harmonize local initiatives.

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That the problem has become a matter of life and death is recognized by the first victims of the prevailing disorder, the civil servants themselves. For the last twenty years their unions have been placing an anguished request for a total overhaul of the system at the head of their list of demands when negotiating with the Government, even before higher wages and more tolerable living conditions. The minor parties, whose origins go back to the Risorgimento, the Liberali and the Republicans, as well as the newer Social Democrats (when they existed autonomously, before being merged in the new Partito Socialista) considered a reform of the state machinery preliminary to other political action.

The Liberali, in particular, who insist that the "rule of law" is a prerequisite of liberty in a country which has always been tempted by dogmatic paternalism, have made the renovation of the state and the reconstruction of its authority their principal electoral issue since 1946.

Even some left-wing Socialists have now come around to the same idea. Pietro Nenni (vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers) has lately pointed out to journalists that "one cannot entrust more and more intricate, technical and delicate new tasks to offices so disorganized they cannot even undertake their old ones. . . ." At this point many agree that the Italian people cannot survive and flourish for long if they do not solve their fundamental problem.

To be sure, the situation is not the result of a sinister conspiracy. The efficiency of bureaucracy and the authority of the law are declining in other countries, including some of the most famous and long-established nations; why should they improve in Italy, where the unified and independent state is only a few years older than a century and has always been fragile and precarious? The present crisis may be but the contemporary aspect of the durable Italian Problem: some believe that a country which could not be governed as a whole in simpler times cannot easily be well run now that problems have become intricate and complex.

It must also be remembered that the liberation of Italy from foreign rule, the foundation of the new independent and unified kingdom, and the conquest of Rome were brought about by a small minority of the population, the middle class, with the aid of foreign allies, against the strenuous opposition of the Catholics, the legitimist upper classes and the proletariat. The new state

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was supported at best by such a small percentage of the people (the rest put up a resigned and not very convincing show of loyalty) that it was strong and authoritative only when the weather was fair. In fact, it went to pieces after World War I, as soon as an enlarged electorate brought to parliament a vast number of men representing sectors which had opposed the Risorgimento—the Catholics and the extreme Left—and the going became rough.

Then came twenty years of arbitrary rule under the Fascist régime, when the law was regularly set aside by the ruling clique and only those bureaucrats who slavishly served the régime could get ahead. The final blow was the War (which naturally suspended all semblance of rule by law) and the defeat. It is not surprising that the reconstruction of the public administration did not particularly worry the postwar democratic governments, haunted by more urgent problems. Short cuts (some of them illegal) were found to reconstruct everything, to block the Communists and to produce quick results in all fields. The new political élite in charge had no experience of correct administrative procedures and no desire to learn them. All this demoralized what was left of the administration and made its vices worse.

IV

To be sure, there are groups, institutions, sections of the population, political parties, entrenched interests which find the decay and disorganization of the state eminently suited to their needs. They flourish in chaos. But it cannot be said that they are directly responsible for a situation which has deep roots in history. It is true, however, that they not only do nothing to solve the problem but also do everything in their power to prevent others from doing so. They are powerful and cannot be easily defeated. It must be remembered that, as long as they prevail, the country will not be able to conquer illiteracy, poverty and the communist menace. As long as they prevail the country will not know real stability.

Here is a rough list of them:

The managers of state-owned and privately owned big industrial and financial concerns. Both know that a rigorous control will paralyze their initiatives. They are in favor of a semi-socialist state, to be sure, with the powers necessary to interfere in the economy, and therefore back the present leftist coalition. They

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want the state to be strong enough to serve their interests, which, as everybody is being told all the time, coincide with the national interests, but weak enough not to hamper their freedom of action. Their contributions help support the parties in power and inevitably call most of the tunes.

The Trade Unions. The Communist, the Socialist and the Christian Democratic Trade Unions have for twenty years successfully prevented the passage of laws, which the Constitution calls for, to regulate their activities. For obvious reasons, they do not want to see the right to strike limited in any way nor legal procedures established for the settlement of labor disputes, similar to those existing in most progressive countries. The trade unions control vast blocs of votes and are represented in parliament by powerful groups of deputies and senators, both supporting and opposing the Government. They are ready to collaborate in order to discourage or defeat initiatives designed to curb their autonomy. It must be said that so far no serious attempt has been made to limit their power.

The Communist Party. It thrives on unsolved problems. It understandably watches with dry eyes the growing ineffectiveness of the bourgeois liberal state, which its great masters foresaw, and looks forward to its final collapse as impatiently as an heir waiting for the demise of a wealthy relative. The Communists also know that an efficient state would make them lose electoral votes and power. They understandably do nothing to improve matters.

The Socialists. They belong to the governing coalition but do not have the energy and the power necessary to launch any reform against the opposition of the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, they themselves are not of one mind about what reforms to ask for, what reforms would be useful and how to go about getting them. Some, in fact, believe like the Communists that the state should be allowed to reach its ultimate collapse in order to transform it more easily into their ideal model. Others would timidly like to do what is possible to better things now and alleviate the suffering of the lower classes. This dichotomy (which has always been part of Socialist parties in Europe) paralyzes them. Most of them are theoretical rebels at heart and found themselves more comfortable in the opposition; they had no inkling or training as administrators.

The Christian Democrats. For centuries the Church has played

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power politics in Italy. Machiavelli believed it was never strong enough to unify and govern the country effectively, but always strong enough to prevent others from doing so. At all times, it considered that being the sovereign master of its territory, surrounded by friendly principalities, was essential for its welfare, liberty of action and prosperity. After one hundred years of anticlerical or hostile governments, this historic task has become vital today. Furthermore, for deep philosophic reasons, the Church considers all states, even the friendliest, its own adversaries; it sees all merely human organizations and man-made laws with detachment and diffidence. Also, when good Catholics are in charge, it prefers the state to be weak and impotent. Finally, it must be remembered that the Christian Democrats of today are the heirs of the opponents of the liberal and secular Italy formed during the Risorgimento; they have besieged the castle of the state for so long that, now that they have conquered it, they cannot easily shed their old mentality. They cannot remember that the hated walls, ramparts and bastions are their own defenses, essential to keep the Communists out, and should be reinforced and kept in good repair. They enthusiastically keep on dismantling them. Even among the best of those who are trying to run the country, some of whom show great qualities of leadership and competence, there is a vague feeling that the *Rechtstaat* is somehow impious and that there is little that can be done here and now to better man's predicament.

The formation of the Center Left coalition was greatly aided by the combined efforts of the Vatican and the United States. John XXIII and Paul VI thought that breaking the old alliance between the Socialists and Communists would weaken and demoralize the extreme Left, open the way out of a dangerous situation, and help the Church acquire a more progressive and liberal image. President Kennedy dedicated to the operation (which would obviously strengthen American prestige) all the visible and invisible resources of the United States Government. At one point all Catholic organizations, the American foundations, the American press, American military agencies and the State Department were involved in pushing the project.

Was it a success? It did not disappoint all its backers, to be sure. It definitely weakened the Communists, who began to find new cause for hope only later, when the Church timidly opened a dialogue with them to explore the possibility of striking a modus

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vivendi in the West (including Italy) as well as in the East. The coalition solved some short-range problems and made few mistakes. It gave the Government unprecedented stability, a majority docile and large enough to consider launching a vast program of new legislation. It encouraged (or did not hamper) the rapid development of the economy. Nevertheless, it did not tackle the larger problems. It could not, because of the very nature of the allied parties. Since the Catholics cannot take the state seriously and the Socialists do not know whether to cure the state's ills or let it wither, the Government was never able to agree what a reformed, more efficient and modern state should look like.

Economic prosperity is a great advantage, to be sure, but without solid institutions to help it, it cannot assure stability in troubled times. Money alone does not solve fundamental problems, as more powerful, industrialized and affluent countries than Italy have discovered. While the economic weather remains fair, the Center Left coalition will be able to do good work, win elections, possibly pass a few needed laws and put up a good front. Should the weather change, however, the contrast between a hard-working, progressive society and a decrepit state machinery will become dramatically apparent; then the country will face anguishing decisions. There are a few observers who believe the present solution could be compared with the ancient alliance of the Church with the Empire (with Lyndon Johnson taking, *pro tempore,* the place of the Holy Roman Emperor), the alliance which kept Italy at peace for centuries but prevented the formation of an autonomous country. Some think the governing coalition (which has eliminated all other possible combinations) to be nothing more than a clever *combinazione,* which may postpone the day of reckoning for a while. Obviously, the Government will be a success only if it solves the one problem that history has presented to this generation to solve: the creation of a modern and efficient state. Somebody will have to do the job. If the Center Left does not find the men and the ideas, and fails to agree on the plan, somebody else will do it. Who?

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WHY WE SHOULD TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS

By Theodore C. Sorensen

TRADE between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlikely ever to reach mammoth proportions, regardless of political considerations or even economic systems. It is equally unlikely that either nation would ever consider such trade economically indispensable or even significantly beneficial. Nevertheless, the tendency in some quarters in the United States to dismiss both the prospects and the political importance of such trade should be less readily accepted.

It is inconceivable, in fact, that the United States could not, if both parties were willing, gradually achieve a substantial exchange of goods with a massive, modern nation, now largely urbanized and industrialized but needing far more equipment and technology to fulfill its potential; a market of some 250 million people with much the same needs as Western Europe but insufficient productive capacity to meet all of those needs; a nation with eight cities of over a million population, with an increasing level of education and living standards that now finds television and other appliances in millions of homes, and with increasingly restive consumers (whose comparatively low wages are somewhat offset by free or subsidized medical care, housing, education and other services); a potential trading partner which has demonstrated its economic and technological maturity in space, medicine, aviation, biology, electric power and nearly every basic industry.

The Soviet attempt last year to bid on six giant new turbines for the Grand Coulee Dam—a bid prevented largely for political reasons by a startled U.S. Government—is but one demonstration of the folly of our continually asserting that trade between us will always be miniscule because the U.S.S.R. produces nothing worthwhile for us to buy. On other occasions the Soviets have talked of building in this country metallurgical plants with equipment superior to our own, of licensing new medical inventions, of selling us new kinds of industrial tools.

Soviet-American trade today is miniscule. Except for the special sales of American wheat authorized by President Kennedy in 1963 and implemented under President Johnson in 1964, it

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has been miniscule since the early days of the cold war. Indeed, it has never been large; but the barriers have always been—and remain today—more political than economic. No doubt some American businessmen will always refuse to trade with a communist country on grounds it is immoral. No doubt some critics of communism will always be convinced that, without our trade, the Soviet economic system will ultimately and inevitably collapse. No doubt there remain in Moscow disciples of Marx and Lenin who fear that such trade will only postpone the demise of American capitalism and pollute the purity of Soviet communism. But these are minority voices at best. The largest single obstacle to the growth of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade to a level of hundreds of millions of dollars is the obsolete, arbitrary network of discriminatory tariff, credit and export restrictions imposed by the U.S. Government. These restrictions were imposed largely when the cold war was both hotter and more pervasive than it is today, then elaborated in the days when Stalinism and a more unified communist bloc in Europe appeared to make aggression a clear and present danger; they are justified today on the grounds that the Soviet Union is a supplier and supporter of our enemies in Viet Nam.

We refuse most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Soviet goods, thus forcing American importers to pay the excessive Hawley-Smoot tariffs of 1930 and inviting like retaliation on American goods. (This gap between what the Soviets must pay and what their West European competitors must pay to bring goods into the United States will grow even larger as the new Kennedy Round agreement is carried out.)

We ban seven kinds of Soviet fur in favor of U. S. domestic interests which ask protection in the name of anti-communism.

We ban the export to the Soviet Union of not only military and genuinely strategic goods but also goods which are now freely available for purchase in both Eastern and Western Europe.

We prohibit the Export-Import Bank from financing any sales to the Soviets other than agricultural goods.

We prohibit the sale on credit of surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480.

We will not permit, under the Johnson Act, private banks and businessmen to extend long-term credits similar to those granted by our West European competitors.

We impose costly restrictions and delays on Soviet vessels seeking clearance to enter our ports.

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Some of these barriers could not be eliminated entirely and some relate to long-standing questions involving Tsarist World War I debts and Lend-Lease World War II debts. But all would be susceptible to early reduction if the necessary will prevailed on both sides.

Other obstacles to Soviet-American trade must not be underestimated, including those inherent in doing business with a communist state. Trading with a state is not easy for private businessmen in any case, and Soviet bureaucracy can be even slower and more disorganized or over-organized than our own. The problems of delivery, distribution, servicing, procurement of spare parts and foreign exchange are all immense. Differences in currency, in concepts of competition, in measurements, standards, traditions, trademark and patent protection, in the use of arbitration for disputes, and even in language cannot be swiftly swept aside. Until the Soviets earn more dollars by sales to us, they may often require American exporters to take payment either in Soviet goods for resale by professional "switch dealers" or in credit balances which the Soviets have in a third country (or they may simply stipulate American components in goods which they purchase from countries whose currencies they hold). Some American businessmen may be deterred by the inconveniences of Moscow hotel service, by the need for unusual advance planning for each business trip, by the inefficiencies of the Soviet postal and telephone systems, by the lack of easy access to buyers or sellers and to plant managers or technicians, and by the need to be patient and precise on every possible point in negotiations.

Nor are the political objections confined to one side. Communist doctrine makes a virtue of economic self-sufficiency. In the midst of a business negotiation, the Soviet representatives have been known to stiffen their attitudes and their terms very quickly when the cold war suddenly turned for the worse. The war in Viet Nam has at least dampened the Soviet desire to trade. Clearly, the Kremlin has its own share of "hawks," who ask whether the Soviet Union should be trading with the United States while it is bombing their North Vietnamese allies; who regard their current sale to us of strategic metals as "trading with the enemy;" who believe President Johnson's "bridge-building" is a devious method, to quote one Soviet official, of American "ideological penetration;" and who want no Soviet resources or currency reserves diverted to Western imports, and especially to Western consumer goods,

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when they could be used instead for a greater Soviet military build-up.

Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has not been deterred by the Vietnamese war from selling to this country items which we tell our allies have too great a military potential to be exported to the Soviets—items such as the extremely rare, light, durable metal known as titanium, which we use, as the Soviets well know, almost exclusively for our outer space vehicles and for the supersonic aircraft we fly in Viet Nam. In the course of a long talk last year with Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev and other Soviet officials I became convinced that the Soviets today desire, despite Viet Nam, to buy American goods as well as to sell their goods to us. This desire springs not from any pressing economic need—for they can obtain all the goods and markets they really need elsewhere—but from their belief that trade can help keep doors open and normalize relations.

President Johnson and his Administration, recognizing the value of such exchanges from the American point of view, moved some time ago to remove several hundred items from the export control list and to increase Export-Import Bank financing of sales to Eastern Europe; and the President condemned extremist-sponsored consumer boycotts against East European goods. His proposed East-West Trade Bill of 1966 would have authorized a wholesale liberalization along the lines recommended by a blue-ribbon advisory committee of businessmen. That bill, however, was bottled up in the Congress without even serious consideration and was not resubmitted by the President last year.

Also in 1967 the Senate amended the Export-Import Bank Extension Bill to prohibit loans and guarantees by the Bank to any nation furnishing supplies to Hanoi and to prohibit in particular loans to the Italian credit agency financing the new Fiat automobile plant in the Ukraine. Debate on the amendment related primarily to its effect on the war in Viet Nam and showed that the war is in fact the major obstacle to a liberalization of policy. It is easy to talk about expanding trade with Russia after the war or about trading now with the East European countries in order to lessen their dependence on Moscow. But the really tough question is whether the United States Government should encourage increased two-way trade (in nonstrategic goods) with the Soviet Union so long as that nation is shipping weapons and other supplies to our enemies in Viet Nam.

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That is a question fraught with emotion and uncertainties. Former Secretary of Agriculture Benson has compared such trade to financing Hitler, and suggests that by allegedly promoting communism by such trade the President may be open to impeachment. One Democratic Senator calls it trafficking with the enemy and another describes it as giving aid and comfort to those killing our boys overseas. A Republican Senator compares it to Northern speculators purchasing Southern cotton during the Civil War; and a Republican Congressman says such trade places dollars ahead of lives.

Nevertheless, the question must be faced up to, and my answer is that this trade is desirable for three reasons:

First, such trade can actually advance our national interest in Viet Nam as well as in the world at large. The war in Viet Nam is a time-bomb ticking away in a nuclear world. In this period of tension, the United States and the Soviet Union must deal with each other outside the channels of cold-war manœuvring and hot-war threats and deterrents. We should make every effort to increase understanding and minimize misunderstandings and demonstrate that there is hope for peaceful coexistence. We must show that the United States is not out to eradicate communism from the face of the earth and that methods other than aggression can make progress. Any other counsel tends to escalate the risks and prolong the length of the Vietnamese war. No one advocates that we put dollars ahead of lives; and existing Commerce Department controls on the export of strategic goods will prevent any businessman who wished to from doing so. But neither in a nuclear world can we put all our hope in armaments.

This is not "trading with the enemy." The Soviet Union, for all its contrary interests and adverse actions, is not a declared enemy in Viet Nam nor do we want it to become one. Trade can neither solve nor prevent the conflicts of interest and ideology that divide us there and elsewhere; but by increasing contacts and providing experience in working together, it can help create a climate in which peace may perhaps be more readily achieved.

Bilateral trade strengthens the economies of both countries and any Soviet diversion of foreign exchange to the purchase of nonstrategic goods from us can only be to our advantage. On the other hand, restrictions on East-West trade only draw the communists closer together in increased mutual dependence.

Second, restrictions on Soviet-American trade in nonstrategic

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materials cannot affect the flow of Soviet arms to Viet Nam. Obviously our trade is not of sufficient importance to the Soviets to affect their determination to supply North Viet Nam; equally obvious is the fact that they can buy all the goods they want from our friends in Western Europe and from Japan.

Although East-West trade is still small, it has grown in recent years even more rapidly than Western trade as a whole. American participation in this growth has not equalled that of even some of the smallest European countries. In fact, the latest figures available indicate that, despite some increase, we are trading with the Soviet Union less than we did a generation ago; our sales of hides and skins, foods and fibers, and a variety of other items comprise considerably less than 1 percent of our total exports, while we are buying even less—mostly high-grade chromite, platinum-group metals, furs, aluminum scrap, diamonds and window glass. Meanwhile, our friends and allies—especially Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Finland and Japan—compensating for recent sluggishness in their domestic economies, have been expanding their sales to the Soviet Union by means of long-term credits for machinery, equipment, rubber, transportation items and fabrics, purchasing in return even larger amounts of Soviet fuels, tools and raw materials for their industry, as well as some items for their consumers.

In short, our restrictions on nonstrategic trade do not deny anything to the Soviets. They do deny our businessmen an equal chance to sell in that vast market, to make the most of our technological applications and to reap the rewards in jobs, profits and an improvement in our balance of payments. They deny American farmers and producers who are disappointed with the results of the Kennedy Round in terms of West European markets a fair opportunity to develop markets in Eastern Europe. And they deny American consumers an equal chance to buy low-cost Soviet watches or bicycles or other goods now produced in the Soviet Union more efficiently than by other suppliers. It takes time for our businessmen to develop a new market, particularly one where we have no well-established trade pattern. But we have virtually abandoned the Russian and East European market to the West Europeans and the Japanese; and the longer we stay out the more established Soviet acceptance of other patterns and standards will become. In the name of anti-communism we are not hurting the communist nations but ourselves.

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Trade is not aid. If we sell the Soviets more than we buy, our balance of payments benefits. Even if we grant them long-term credits, sooner or later they will have to come up with the gold or the dollars. As stated by the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce: "Trade by definition does not take place unless benefits accrue to both parties. If one nation refuses to participate, in so far as the second party can find another trading partner, the loss is entirely sustained by the country refusing to do business."

An example of this kind of shortsightedness was the Senate's 1967 amendment to the Export-Import Bank Bill prohibiting the Bank's participation in the sale of American equipment to the Italian Fiat Motor Company for use in its new Soviet plant. Credit was to be granted not to the Soviet Union but to the quasi-official Italian credit agency. Some $50 million worth of American machine tools would have gone into that plant and opened the door for still more American exports. The Departments of Defense, Commerce and State, supported by General Wheeler of the Joint Chiefs, all declared that this loan and plant, as well as the resulting increased Soviet appetite for cars, could not help but result in a diversion of Soviet resources into consumer goods instead of military. The U.S.S.R. is to expend several hundred million dollars of its own on this project and between twenty and forty thousand workers will be employed. There is no possibility, in view of our export control checks, that the smaller, lighter cars this plant will produce in the 1970s could be sensibly used in Viet Nam or any other battle; and it is very clear that both Eastern and Western Europe can supply any of this equipment that we fail to supply.

Nevertheless, in what Secretary Trowbridge called "a fruitless exercise in self-denial without corresponding advantages to the United States," the Senate adopted an amendment which could only antagonize the Soviets, irritate the Italians, deny profits and jobs to our own industry and lose what little influence that sale might have brought us in Moscow—all without interfering in the slightest with the building of the plant in question, with the flow of Soviet supplies to Viet Nam, with the progress of the Soviet economy or with the length of the Vietnamese war. The House having already this year adopted an even broader amendment barring all Export-Import Bank transactions relating to any communist country, it is apparent that Western Europe will supply

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these nonstrategic items to the Soviets and its businessmen and labor will reap the gains, while our balance of payments—as well as our reputation for common sense—will suffer. Perhaps the Senators who voted for the amendment intended it as a symbolic slap at the Soviet Union and felt better as a result. Perhaps the torrent of emotions which compared the proposed transaction to our building "a munitions plant in Moscow" or creating an "RFC for communist countries" had too strong a demagogic appeal to be resisted. But every Senator should have known that the amendment was futile and foolish.

A third reason for trade with the Soviet Union in nonstrategic goods has to do with our long-term interest in moderating the conflict with the Russians. It is often charged that the Soviets use trade as an instrument of policy in the struggle between our two systems. They do and we should. World peace, as President Kennedy said, does not require that we love our neighbors; and world trade likewise does not require that we love our trading partners. While both the ideological differences and the national conflicts of interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are too real to be ignored, present U.S. restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union are a handicap in the ideological struggle and run contrary to our foreign policy interests.

The United States should not emerge from the struggle in Viet Nam to find itself wholly out of favor in Europe and wholly out of touch with Moscow. The gradual reconciliation of Eastern and Western Europe seems destined to proceed, whether we like it or not—and most of us do. Eastern and Western Europe are developing a great network of economic relations, trade routes, pipelines, power grids, shared technology and coöperative production agreements. We are already somewhat isolated from this process by the Viet Nam war and an appearance of uncompromising cold-war militancy. We should not add to our isolation by inflexibility on East-West trade.

It is in our interest to see the Soviets invest more of their resources in consumer goods and less in their traditional sectors of heavy industry, space and defense. Already Soviet leaders show an increased if cautious recognition of consumer demand, of the complaints about shortages, the desire for cars and better homes and clothes. The economic reforms launched by the Kremlin more than two years ago do not go as far as those in several other East European states in experimenting, decentralizing and pay-

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ing more attention to market factors. But more responsibility and initiative are now permitted at lower levels; bonuses, profit incentives and other forms of capitalism are beginning to appear; and the balances between production and demand and between prices and costs are becoming more realistic.

Centralized planning is still responsible for unnecessary rigidities and delays. But once their State Planning Committee has decided that the nation's long-range priorities and hard-currency reserves permit the importation of certain goods, their Foreign Trade Ministry and its operating subsidiaries will seek the lowest possible price in the most arduously negotiated contract.

If our businessmen are to make the most of the vast Soviet market, if we are to influence the evolution of Soviet external political attitudes and internal economic reforms and are to resist the ambition common to Kosygin and de Gaulle to exclude our influence from a reunited Europe, then the Congress should remove our outmoded, discriminatory barriers against nonstrategic trade with the Soviet Union; authorize most-favored-nation status for all of Eastern Europe; and remove these latest restrictions imposed upon the Export-Import Bank. The Administration should remove from export controls those commodities which no longer are strategic in the sense that they are unavailable elsewhere; and the Export-Import Bank should grant short-term commercial credits for industrial exports to the Soviet Union without requiring of the Kremlin anything more than is required of other nations to prove their credit-worthiness.

The traffic on bridges to the East, as Senator Dirksen has said, should move both ways. The credits and concessions should be reciprocal and the expansion should be bilateral. Chinese opposition as well as the Vietnamese war may inhibit Russia from accepting our offers for the moment. But our efforts should outlast the Vietnamese war and outgrow the cold war. Trade is a force for friendship, understanding and peace. We should use it, not thwart it.

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MAN AND MYTH IN POLITICAL AFRICA

By Russell Warren Howe

IT is the privilege of the famous and the infamous to be little known: their myths are often so much more convincing than the men themselves. Africa, a fruitful field for detractors and apologists, has produced myths about people and events that fiction would disown. The gilding and blackening of characters have disregarded widely known and widely reported facts. And the great open book of African history, where our ignorance still exceeds our knowledge, has been used with impunity to justify different sentimental attitudes.

Perhaps not surprisingly, it is in history that the professional mythologists appear to have done their most successful work. Faced with Africa's understandable irritation at colonial versions of pre-colonial history, some historians and other writers offered to give Africa in general—and Black Africa in particular—a "brand new past." Academe produced a figure to fit the age—the "history cosmetician," who repairs the ravages of time. Perhaps because few historians deal with Africa at all, others have cashed in on this academic pop market: a Welsh journalist won a measure of fame for having found that the Americas had not been discovered by the Chinese, the Vikings or the Spanish crew of a Genoese navigator, but by an armada of two thousand Mandingo dugout canoes. Africa's Tamerlane-type empires of yesteryear have been given an Athenian gloss.

It is African historians like Professor K. Onwuka Dike, the former head of Ibadan University, and Dr. Amadou Hampâté Bâ of Mali who have finally imposed a view of events which is African without being basely flattering. Men like them and France's eminent Professor Vincent Monteil in effect have stressed the accomplishments of the contemporary African generation by depicting, unemotionally, the secular inertia of pre-colonial Africa, which helped make colonial domination inevitable. They have written dispassionately of the sanguine warlords, some of revolting cruelty, who crushed conquered peoples under the burden of tribute and looted vast quantities of gold and slaves to build their empires.

Some of the myths of Africa's past have clearly been aimed at quickening the guilt of the Western world over slavery. Behind

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the veil of legend, however, everything in the early records makes it clear that Europe and America did not "bring the slave trade" to Africa—it was Africa that created the Atlantic trade in slaves by stimulating a formerly disinterested market. While in East Africa Arab slavers won a dominant position in the "industry," the West Africans controlled their own (much greater) trade completely, from "upcountry" to the "beach."

Blame for slave-trading and slavery must thus be shared equally between black thief and white receiver. The richest and most developed kingdoms in Atlantic Africa were those that made the most from slaving—and this in fact helps explain why West Africa developed further than those areas in eastern and southern Africa which were too far from the Western-hemisphere markets to sustain a successful commerce. It was the abolition of the slave trade outside Africa which produced the preponderance of unexported slaves over members of the freeman caste in the coastal ports, leading to rebellions and in many cases to the pale beginnings of democracy. The African leadership of the day fought fiercely against Abolition.

As we approach modern times, the facts refute more strongly the entrenched emotional myths. The colonial experience was not a "balkanizing" one—nor was pan-Africanism an African initiative. One hundred years ago, there were approximately two thousand nations in Africa. To compare this state of affairs to the Balkans would be unjust to southeastern Europe. It was colonialism that pan-Africanized the continent into a mere fifty territories and half a dozen administrative language zones—in the place of up to six thousand languages and dialects. It is *since* independence that some of the larger colonial units, particularly the Congo and Nigeria, have shown signs of dividing again into some of their molecular component parts.

Black Africa—three times the size of the United States—possessed no maps. With eighteen thousand miles of coast, it produced no oceangoing ships, no navies or navigators. It sent no trade missions or emissaries around the world, of which it knew—and contrived to know—nearly nothing. Indeed, before the pan-Africanizing experience of colonialism, each tribe was ignorant of almost all African lands except its own, and those of its neighbors and present or past enemies. A female continent, Black Africa was to be "discovered," penetrated and dominated by others. There were few exceptions to this image of passivity.

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Curiously, the myths which "face-lift" this past diminish the quality of the present. It is only from an objective study of African history that one appreciates fully the enormous achievements of what is today not a Renaissance but an Enlightenment. If the economic handicaps facing Africa today were no more formidable than the intellectual challenges have proved to be, Africa would presumably overtake the twentieth century in this generation.

II

Some men have carved their own mythology. Probably none has been so adept at this as Kwame Nkrumah. For both his friends and his enemies, Nkrumah built an image of himself as a left-wing leader dedicated to a large African union and opposed to all that regionalized or balkanized the continent.

The reality was rather different. Since Nkrumah seems, in retrospect, to have opposed all movements which he could not hope to lead, he inevitably opposed every union in Africa of any size, and even many small ones. He dueled with the French-African grouping known at the time as the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM)—now OCAM—on the ground that it united only French-speaking states, although he belonged to the Commonwealth, which grouped only English-speaking ones. Moreover, he had himself formed a still more "mini" union with two French-speaking states, Guinea and Mali, thus limiting still further the size of the much more ambitious UAM.

By pressure on Uganda, he helped to prevent the formation of an East African federation, which, as a West African, he could never lead. When the first steps were taken toward forming what became the Organization of African Unity, he headed a three-state Black African splinter-group within a largely Arab bloc which conferred at Casablanca in 1961. His clear intention was to build up the sub-Saharan element in this breakaway group until he became the ringleader of a sort of OAU of his own. When all else had failed, and every African independent state met at Addis Ababa in 1963, he opposed the organization then being formed on the ground that its aims were insufficiently far-reaching. Even his interest in the Commonwealth began to wane when he ceased to be the only black face aboard. He broke all administrative, monetary and even common-service links (air-line, research institutes and so on) with the rest of English West

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Africa once Nigeria's independence threatened to minimize Ghana's, and his own, importance.

Nkrumah had a valid, very individual point of view. To achieve his aim of forming a group of African countries loyal to himself, he had to cut off branches from the African trunk, dominated as this was by Nigeria, Ethiopia and the relative homogeneity of French Africa. He had to prevent the rise of federations which would dwarf Ghana's role. But just as Prime Minister Vorster calls apartheid "racial independence," so Nkrumah preached dissension in the name of African unity. So convincing was the myth he spun that when he fell even Western publications hostile to him said that his eclipse would halt the trend toward pan-Africanism and authorize diversity. In fact, it did just the opposite—as the 1967 Summit at Kinshasa showed. Nkrumah had been the Tshombe of pan-Africanism.

Some even believed Nkrumah's claim to be a good socialist who accepted the Marxian dictate of history. But his only apparent link with socialism, in its accepted sense of a planified state-controlled economy, was his admiration for authoritarianism, for "one man, one vote, once." As early as 1946, in London, he told Joe Appiah of his admiration for Stalin and his dreams of seeing the tanks roll on Black Star Square. In 1957, he wrote in his autobiography that he favored "totalitarian rule." The same year he told two British liberal journalists that he would have to rule "by terror" to establish his authority. Nkrumah's admirers ignored everything he said or did which cast doubts on his pre-independence image: like all mythic figures, he lost the right to change, retract or betray himself. It may well be that most men seek their own subjective image of perfection (or perfidy) in their leaders, and that mythology is essential to political movements.

But the view of most of Nkrumah's critics, who see him as a full-fledged communist, or at least a full-fledged agent of the communists, is equally mythological. Curiously, the best, safest, most influential thing to be in Nkrumah's "socialist" Ghana was a major shareholder in a large foreign company with investments there. Such companies were protected by law from trade-union agitation and guaranteed against failure by government participation. Evidence given to the current commissions of inquiry indicates that pressure for kickbacks was put only on those companies which could pass the cost on to the Ghanaian consumer.

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Little if anything in Nkrumah's post-independence policy suggests that he had any ideology except the desire to retain both his wealth and power; as Sékou Touré has noted, he ruled through ideology's antithesis—a succession of expedients. His seemingly schizophrenic attachment to Stalinism without communism, to the Commonwealth without Westminster, to Mao Tse-tung and Edgar Kaiser and Nasser and General Spears surely reflects how little political theory meant to this mediocre student of administration and economics. For him, intuition was philosophy: as the title of his autobiography eloquently showed, when he spoke of "Ghana" he meant himself. Even his permanent preoccupation with sorcery was personal—not meant to enhance Ghana's future, or Africa's, but his own.

In all this, of course, he was no worse than countless other politicians across the world and the centuries. To some extent, Nkrumah probably believed in the myths which he enjoined on others. The battle against colonialism was the only battle Nkrumah honorably won. After that, it seems fair to say that his dynamic energies were directed against Africans and against those bigger African entities that occupied the center-stage he coveted; but he fought these personal enemies in the name of "anticolonialism" and unity. Hence his myth.

Often the admirers and the critics of a personality share a myth. Even more than in Nkrumah's case, this could be said of the white admirers and black detractors of Houphouët-Boigny. To most Europeans in Abidjan, and to most radical Africans, Houphouët's policy epitomizes African collaboration with the French. Yet Houphouët's Democratic Rally (RDA), launched in 1946, was the first widespread, popular, grass-roots nationalist party in Africa, and its uniquely pan-African organization has an impact to this day. In personality, Houphouët is also seen as the prototype of the westernized French-African. Yet he is in fact a traditional chief, and his interest in the occult is as reputed in West Africa as was Nkrumah's.

Even politically, Houphouët is not as simple as his friends and enemies suggest. His first alliance was with the French Communist Party, with which the RDA sat and voted for five years (until 1950) in the French National Assembly. His pragmatic policies since have made his essentially agricultural country, poorly endowed with minerals, West Africa's most developed—and thereby the one most economically independent of the out-

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side world. Ivorian government policy is a local version of "classical" social democracy. Of the former French colonies, only Guinea and perhaps Mali are less enfeoffed to France. The Ivory Coast is certainly the ex-French state most open to foreign investment in direct competition with what, in other French-African countries, are French business monopolies.

Some men outlive their myths, and none has done this so well as President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. In retrospect, it is hard to see how the image of Kenyatta as a left-wing revolutionary first emerged. Kenyatta's only book, "Facing Mount Kenya," is a hymn of praise to the tribal life, in effect a reactionary rejection of all modern theory. In many ways the African leader most reflective of "average" African opinion, Kenyatta seeks to preserve the intellectual comfort of the past together with some of the physical comforts of the present. His rebellion was in no sense a revolution; like the Picts and the Welsh against the Romans, his Ghikoyo (his own preferred spelling), Embu and Meru warriors constituted an opposition movement to an unwanted foreign occupation—unrelated to events outside or to the great currents of contemporary political thought. A royalist movement of resistance to a Nazi occupation of Britain would have been as unradical, politically, and more bloody; it would certainly have killed more than 29 of the enemy, and at least as many collaborators. The mumbo jumbo of masonry is perhaps more sophisticated than Mau Mau's, but the intention—unquestioning loyalty—remains the same. Mau Mau, like many movements in the Western world, was the weapon of tribal conservatism against the stranger.

Kenyatta's reforms have been those which any progressive colonial government might have made. He has gone out of his way to make social advance a gradual affair, apparently believing, like Robert Pitt, that "reform should be slow, so that it shall be lasting." His support for pan-Africanism has been minimal and his most consistent backing in Kenya lies in his own tribe—and of course, today, in the European community. Yet because he was persecuted for a bitter decade for being the man he never was (an "anti-white," "communist-inspired" revolutionary who would reverse the whole order of Kenyan society and "lead [it] to darkness"), no African nationalist figure has quite so sinister an image with the settlers further south, nor quite such a respected one among Africans generally, from the Mediterranean

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to the Cape. If one had to choose a single face to put on the cover of a book about African nationalism, Kenyatta would be almost every editor's unfailing choice. The choice would be valid enough, but the reasons would often be mistaken.

III

Those who still see Kenyatta as an ogre tend to sympathize with white South Africa and white Rhodesia. Of course, reforms would be desirable, they say, but after all these white societies are our firm political allies, staunch anti-communists, and rule over the African because they are more capable and want to preserve higher standards. Again, it is a case of basing a valid point of view—self-defense—on myth, not fact.

The governing South African Nationalist Party has its origins in the *Broederbond,* originally founded at the onset of World War I to support the Central Powers. The Afrikaner rising which it brought off in 1914 kept the South African army busy for eight months, delaying Botha's invasion and occupation of German South West Africa. Banned, then revived after the war, it finally blossomed in the thirties in emulation of the German Nazi Party, whose successes dictated the structure of the *Broederbond's* overt expression—the Nationalist Party—and its components, which often took names (*Stormjaers,* etc.) modeled on those of Nazi Party units. In the Second World War, official "Nat" Party policy was a German-leaning neutrality; but extreme wings of the Party, particularly the *Ossewa Brandwag,* favored intervention in the war on the German side.

It is the surviving members of this extremist wing of an anti-Allied party who now control South Africa. The late President Swart was a member of the Grand Council of the *Ossewa Brandwag*. Premier Balthazar Vorster spent two years in prison for making pro-Nazi speeches and the rest of the war under house arrest on suspicion of being in contact with the Nazi submarines then preying on Allied convoys. Robey Leibbrandt, now a major figure in the South African security service, was landed in Griqualand from a German submarine after serving with the Nazi paratroops in Crete; he was saved from a death sentence, after capture, by a mass Afrikaner movement in his behalf, orchestrated by the *Broederbond,* which already grouped, in Premier Smuts' estimate, nearly half all Afrikaner adults. The late Premier Verwoerd sued the Johannesburg *Star* for libel in 1942 for saying he had made

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his paper, *Die Transvaler,* a Nazi tool; he lost. The late Prime Minister D. F. Malan was involved in a Nazi spy ring.

The list of Nationalist Party leaders and publications which openly backed Nazism and opposed the Allies is very long.[1] Suffice it to say that South Africa does not share our Western vision or our ideals; its leaders sought to contribute to our defeat. It is not an ally, merely another enemy of an enemy.

What of the argument that its policy is meant to ensure the survival of a higher culture? Clearly, if South Africa's blacks were incapable, a society based on merit would leave the whites in their present jobs. Special white wage scales, job reservation and a fatter share of public money are crutches which only a cripple needs. Can it be that Rhodesia *needs* to spend twelve times as much on a white child's education as on a black one's? The whites of southern Africa make sure that they start near the winning post: superior education, entry to employment at a higher level, salaries subsidized by the low wage scales of Africans, and other factors creating a caste system. With only a little casuistry, a good lawyer could draw on South African legislation to prove that the white man is inferior, and conscious of it. A qualified version of this would not be too farfetched. Whites in southern Africa are mostly redundant Brahmins—and in South Africa itself, often ex-Nazis too.

IV

The past lends itself to mythology best, but in modern times the Congo—where almost everything that happens carries an air of improbability—has proved the most fruitful field of make-believe.

Millions in Africa and elsewhere have an opinion about this tragic country, confident as most people are that their non-acquaintance with it, coupled with their schematic, headline notions of recent Congolese history, are limitations matched by almost everybody else's. Even today, Lumumba, Tshombe and Mobutu are household names, hated or admired by people across the world—sometimes justifiably, but usually for the wrong reasons. Like true characters of myth in all cultures and all ages, their story and their image can be made to fit different needs and biases. The Lumumba and Tshombe whom most people know are

[1] For more detail, see my forthcoming "The African Revolution" and particularly Brian Bunting's excellent "The Rise of the South African Reich."

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as unreal as the Machiavelli or the Schweitzer of the masses. Ironically, Congolese leaders seem to fascinate foreigners (particularly, of course, foreign Africans) more than they do the Congolese, to whom the facts of both plot and cast are better known.

Illusions about Patrice Lumumba are almost as great among his critics as among his devotees. Here are a few: Lumumba was a radical revolutionary (his admirers' view) or a member of a Moscow- and Nkrumah-inspired conspiracy (his critics' image); he had broad national support and an electoral majority (his admirers); he sought to oust Western finance and socialize the economy (his critics); he was more "African," less "European" than his rival Kasa-Vubu (his admirers); he is a living force in Congolese politics, the father of Congolese nationalism (his admirers again).

The myths about Moïse Tshombe are just as persistent, buttressed in Africa (like those about Lumumba) by the fact that few African newspapers could afford to send a staff reporter to the Congo, that few of those who could afford it bothered to, and that those who were sent did not speak French. Here are some Tshombe myths: Katanga's secession was a European plot, of which Tshombe was merely the executant; secession had the support of the West but failed because of Afro-Asian opposition; Tshombe's political aim was to protect the interests of white companies and settlers; he was principally responsible for Lumumba's death; he is unpopular in the Congo.

Such are the myths of Tshombe's critics. His equally self-deceiving admirers have fashioned others: Tshombe is a "capable administrator," whose leadership ensured that Katanga functioned more efficiently than the rest of the Congo; he brought "peace and order," while the rest of the Congo dissolved in chaos.

A brief glance at the Congolese chronicle just before and since independence refutes this hardy mythology. Effective Congolese nationalism begins with Joseph Kasa-Vubu, a monarchical ex-seminarian who sought to restore the historic Manikongo kingdom of his own Mukongo people, whose territory he saw as being the kingpin state (containing both the capital and the country's only port and coast) in an independent Congolese federation. A tribal conservative who exploited Kibanguism, the "heretical" Christian sect of the Bakongo, his charismatic appeal was mostly limited to his own key tribal lands (including Leopoldville).

Through the 1950s, all narratives of Congolese events confirm,

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Kasa-Vubu was almost alone in incurring the continual wrath of the Belgian authorities. While others (such as Lumumba) were allowed to travel to conferences in Ghana and Nigeria, Kasa-Vubu was always stopped. Alone among well-known Congolese politicians, he repudiated Western clothes and Western ways and brazenly criticized Europeans. Almost alone, he believed in the "African personality" and the "African way of doing things." When he became president, he showed understanding of the need to do something about the problems of administration, but no more inclination than his competitors to do something about them himself. His skill for ruling, in the traditional African manner, from "behind a screen," enabled him for nearly six years to keep his crown when all around—playing politics in the Western fashion—were losing their coronets and sometimes their heads as well.

Patrice Lumumba was a westernized, urbanized Mutatela from the remote Eastern Province who built his political career on membership in the Belgian Liberal Party and the *Cercle des Evolués* in Stanleyville (now Kisangani); he came to prominence only two years before independence. His appeal was to his tribesmen and their ethnic cousins, the beni-Lulua, as well as to a small but articulate core of westernized city-dwellers. In the 1960 elections—the peak of his career—his party and its allies together mustered only a quarter of the vote and of the parliamentary seats. In the face-off for power that followed, he lost the presidency to Kasa-Vubu in a bitter struggle, but accepted the consolation prize of the premiership. The two continued to disagree, and Kasa-Vubu dismissed him after eleven weeks.

Both critics and admirers picture Lumumba as an ideological radical. Yet almost his first major act was to sign a $2 billion deal for mineral rights with a dubious consortium headed by the American Edgar Detwiler. Faced with the army mutiny and the Belgian intervention to rescue beleaguered compatriots, he called on the United States to restore order in the country and replace the Belgians. At Washington's suggestion, he next turned to the United Nations. Only on Nkrumah's advice and as a last resort did he turn to the Soviet Union. His choice for foreign minister was the conservative, pro-Western Justin Bomboko.

Gentle, "sophisticated" and (to those of us who knew him then) transparently well-meaning in the years that preceded power, Lumumba became, as the Congo collapsed around him,

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a man intemperately addicted to drink and drugs, struggling wildly for power and survival. In his disarray, he seemed to become the almost helpless catspaw of Nkrumah and the Soviets, rather than their conscious ally. His most sensitive apologist, the French writer Jeanne Rouche (in her book "En cage avec Lumumba") called him a "sorcerer's apprentice." Every unknown expedient he tried helped both to condemn his brash incompetence and his emotional instability and also to ensure his fate.

If one may interject a homily here, one reason public opinion is often so wrong about public figures is that it does not always realize that people change and that politicians perhaps change most of all. Most political careers are something like a farmer's year, a succession of seasons: between the sowing and the harvest there are many metamorphoses, and finally there is a turning over of the sod, with little of the former crop left in the soil but a modicum of nitrate, and much exhaustion. In Lumumba's only book, "Congo, My Country," published posthumously, he emerges equally as conservative in conviction as Jomo Kenyatta does in "Facing Mount Kenya," but more lured by the technological age and by Western ethics. The Lumumba who died was as different from the man we had known a year before—the man of the book—as the wartime commando is unfamiliar to those who knew him only as an insurance salesman.

What interest the Congolese show in Lumumba today is mostly the result of General Joseph Mobutu's decision to deify him: this he has done to help get recognition and support from those foreign African states which created the Lumumba myth as part of the Third World's search for homespun martyrs and external villains. Genuine pro-Lumumbaism in the Congo itself is a regional phenomenon, almost exclusively limited to the former Eastern Province.

Moïse Tshombe equally is surrounded by his legends; and just as there are "white" myths against Lumumba, so there are "white" myths to promote Tshombe. These in their turn tend to reinforce the African myths which picture Tshombe as the agent of forces external to Africa. Yet nothing is more obvious in Tshombe's case than that he is the creation of the setting in which he was born, and his tribal rank within that setting.

Ethnically and geographically, South Katanga, Tshombe's homeland, belongs to the Bantu-language, ki-Swahili, savannah

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country of eastern and southeastern Africa. The frontier with Zambia is as artificial as most of the frontiers around the Rhine. No one who was not a secessionist, or at least a strong decentralist, could hope to win popular support in South Katanga. Tshombe, before seceding, was prepared to accept a loose confederal constitution.

Kasa-Vubu would undoubtedly have agreed to this, as he later demonstrated at the Tananarive conference, but Lumumba was not prepared to present such a project to the parliament. The hectic speed of Belgian withdrawal left little time for compromise, and Lumumba's stand, in the circumstances, was reasonable. But in the context of Katangese politics, Tshombe's reaction was popular in the area—although not in North Katanga, which he unwisely took with him. His reactions were those of a regional politician, and would have been impossible without popular, nationalist support.

The response of Léopoldville (Kasa-Vubu and, for the month of power still left to him, Lumumba), of the United Nations, of Washington and of most of the world—to oppose secession—was based on the cogent assumption that one successful breakaway in this almost coastless and politically divided country would spawn others (Albert Kalonji's South Kasai soon proved the point), dividing a potentially rich, already integrated economy into a plethora of "jungle states."

After the mutiny, the panic departures and the breakdown of the economy and administration, Tshombe's decision to lop off the Congo's richest area was naturally popular with local Europeans and with Katanga's foreign firms, which thus became the rebel leader's natural allies. The pattern of events shows clearly how he used them—and even bankrupted some. Nothing suggests that they used *him*. Indeed, they had no leverage, or none that would not rebound. They could not replace him or even openly oppose him. He, however, could look upon them as expendable. They, after all, could either be replaced or forced to stay. Long before the collapse of the secession, Tshombe had broken all friendly links with the Union Minière and Brussels, where he is still a prohibited immigrant.

From South Africa and other sources he hired mercenaries, who became, of course, as popular in Africa as the Hessians in America. Since then, Nigerians have brought in white mercenaries too, and the mercenary is probably a feature of the African scene

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for some time to come. (Africa's tribal wars are the product of a pre-twentieth century way of life, and most of the world's wars were fought by mercenaries before the present century.) But whereas Negro American volunteers fighting in a future southern African liberation army would be shot at but not morally criticized by their opponents, Tshombe should have seen that the use of white mercenaries would be given a colonialist connotation; indeed, the mercenaries themselves mostly belonged to the misfit core of unreconstructed colonialists and did not regard their ethnic classification as irrelevant. In addition, Tshombe made an alliance of convenience with Sir Roy Welensky, then premier of the Central African Federation.

Refuting another legend, nothing in the Katangese secession experience denotes that Tshombe had any talent for (or interest in) administration. He was luxury-loving and labelled as venal; like all politicians, he was hooked on power. He had luxury enough in exile—but it must surely have been the lust for power which led him in 1967 to risk the dangers of plotting his return.

Again, nothing in Katanga's brief independent history supports the claim that he was a man of peace, or of law and order. In 1960, while scoring the chaos that reigned in the rest of the Congo, he plunged Katanga into warfare so bloody that ninety thousand are thought to have died in the repression of the Baluba of North Katanga—over one hundred times the number killed, on both sides, in the U.N.'s patient, measured police operation, which drew far more global criticism.

Secession collapsed, not because of a torrent of words from the African states, but because of the perseverance of the United Nations, whose main support—against British and French equivocations—was the United States, notably Ambassador Edmund Gullion and the liberal American press, who buttressed an exasperated Kennedy against the doubts and hesitations of Dean Rusk, Averell Harriman and many others.

Although Tshombe was Nigeria's choice for Congolese premier (on the advice of a pragmatic ambassador, Albert Osakwe) and would still be the selection of some French-African presidents, he clearly has more enemies than friends throughout Africa and is assumed by most non-Congolese Africans to be even more hated in the Congo. But when U. N. Special Representative Robert Gardiner brought Tshombe to Léopoldville in 1962 for talks with the then premier, Cyrille Adoula, the most interesting sidelight

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to his sojourn in the capital was the volume of cheers this big, jovial mischief-maker drew in the streets, 800 miles away from his tribal home.

Faced with Tshombe's obduracy on the secession issue, Gardiner recalls asking him one day: "Why don't you bid for the overall leadership? No one could resist you." It is not hard to imagine how reluctantly this accurate prediction was made. Tshombe became the most charismatic, perhaps the least unpopular Premier that the country has had to date. But the myth of his admirers is just as wrong, for it was his personal inattention to administration which in considerable measure led to his dismissal. Just as, when younger, he had lost a paternal trading fortune (despite credit and advice from Belgian businessmen and fresh funds from his paramount chief, of whom he was the son-in-law), so his old "Katangese" policy of delegating authority to competing advisers produced, in Léopoldville, the same sort of chaos, particularly in the budget.

Some say that the irresponsible, charismatic Moïse Tshombe and the hardworking, unpopular Joseph Mobutu would make a good partnership, if the one were not ostensibly anxious to hang the other. But Tshombe stands accused of plotting a military take-over and, for foreign African consumption, of killing Lumumba and paying white mercenaries to kill Congolese.

The nature of the final blow in Lumumba's death remains uncertain; but the way in which he went from being a prisoner in Thysville (near Léopoldville) to a grave in Katanga is now fairly well documented. From his house arrest in the confines of a military camp, Lumumba was still campaigning (in January 1961) to oust President Kasa-Vubu, and was winning support among his guards. It was reportedly after rebellious Katanga had refused Kasa-Vubu's offer to send Lumumba to Elisabethville that the President decided to send him instead to Bakwanga, to Albert Kalonji, leader of secessionist South Kasai, the "diamond state" whose Baluba people had suffered several thousand dead in a war with the Lumumba-backed beni-Lulua (the war in which the Soviet aircraft intervened). Colonel Mobutu (as he then was) put Lumumba and two companions on a plane and sent the trio to their deaths.

Why the Belgian-piloted aircraft went to Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) instead of to the Kasaian airfield of Bakwanga is one of the points that remains unclear. In those days of limited

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airfields, a plane flying from "Léo" to Bakwanga might possibly file "E'ville" as its flight-plan alternate; it would certainly be easy to find reasons en route for not landing at Bakwanga—a field with uncertain fuel supplies and no on-deck facilities. Whether something like this explains the change of destination or whether the change was part of the pilot's secret orders can only be conjecture now. It would have made no difference to Lumumba's fate if he and his two comrades had been delivered to Bakwanga; but it would have made a difference to Tshombe's "case."

Lumumba was photographed that day emerging, apparently half-dead, from Mobutu's aircraft, having been tortured on the way by Kasaian guards anxious to avenge their (reportedly) 70,000 dead in the 1960 conflict. Tshombe's right-hand man, Godefroid Munongo, is reported by some witnesses to have stabbed the helpless ex-premier. Some versions say a Belgian gave the *coup de grâce* out of pity. Only one doubtful version says Tshombe was even present. His guilt, minimal beside Kasa-Vubu's, Mobutu's, the guards' and perhaps Munongo's, was limited to having covered the brutal killing with his own authority, and with issuing his "killed by tribesmen while escaping" version of Lumumba's death.

Tshombe's use of mercenaries, the basis for another image of his critics, must inevitably be related to Adoula's use of Cuban pilots (anti-Castro refugees recruited by the CIA) and above all to Mobutu's taking over from Premier Evariste Kimba the mercenary contracts which Kimba inherited from Tshombe. Lumumba had, for a brief spell, Russian aircrews. Almost every country in Africa, from Algeria to Zambia, has foreign military men—instructors, advisers, staff or combat officers. The Congo today has over one hundred Belgian officers.

In the Congo and in Tshombe, we have the epitome of political mythology: he stands condemned for plotting a military coup by a president who seized power in a military coup himself; for killing Lumumba by the man who sent Lumumba to him to be killed (and released Tshombe from his captivity in Coquilhatville a few months later); and for using mercenaries by the man who took over those mercenaries. His apologists defend him, not on the ground of the hypocrisy of his accusers, but by claiming for him qualities he never had, intentions he never asserted and achievements of which there is no record.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PEACEMAKING: CONTAINMENT AND COUNTERREVOLUTION AT VERSAILLES, 1918–1919. By Arno J. Mayer. New York: Knopf, 1967, 918 p. $15.00.

This book is a carefully researched reassessment of the Versailles peace negotiations. By highlighting domestic pressures and conflicts, the author has prepared a most valuable case study demonstrating the primacy of domestic politics in international relations. An important work for the historian and political scientist alike.

THE INSECURITY OF NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Charles Yost. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 276 p. $6.50.

This is a far-ranging essay on the state of the postwar world. In speculating on the causes of national insecurity, the author draws heavily on the insights of the Austrian naturalist Konrad Lorenz. He then proceeds to an analysis of the three great upheavals of our time: the cold war in Europe, the victory of Chinese Communism and its impact on Asia, and the rise of independent Africa. The concluding reflections are thoughtful and have the ring of truth.

GULLIVER'S TROUBLES, OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Stanley Hoffmann. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 556 p. $11.95.

The nature and sources of the American style in foreign affairs and the state of world politics are analyzed brilliantly and with wit in this tenth volume in the series of Atlantic Policy Studies sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. The U. S. interest in a slowly confederating "European Europe" is detailed. The architecture of the book is embellished with a wealth of illustration and scholarship.

AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD WAR: 1945–1966. By Walter LaFeber. New York: Wiley, 1967, 295 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.95).

An admirably objective essay in interpretation emphasizing the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. One of the best of the "after the cold war" books.

REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE. Introductory material by Leonard C. Lewin. New York: Dial Press, 1967, 109 p. $5.00.

A "Special Study Group" of fifteen members concludes in a report of still dubious

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authenticity that the war system is a prerequisite to the stability of modern society. A challenging document, but its 100 pages are little more than an intellectual tease with only sketchy supporting evidence.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING. By Arthur M. Cox. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 178 p. $3.95.

A useful, if somewhat superficial, interpretive essay on United Nations peacekeeping operations with emphasis on their significance in the context of American foreign policy.

THE YEARS OF OPPORTUNITY: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920–1926. By Byron Dexter. New York: Viking, 1967, 264 p. $8.50.

The interestingly developed thesis of the author, formerly Managing Editor of *Foreign Affairs,* is that Locarno was the 1925 watershed between a successful League based on "a core of organized power" and a League that became the instrument of Hitler.

ENEMIES IN POLITICS. By David J. Finlay and others. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967, 257 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.50).

A group of three case studies making some fine efforts at conceptualization. Ole R. Holsti's essay on John Foster Dulles and Russia is a valuable contribution to empirical theory.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES: STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. Edited by Lewis J. Edinger. New York: Wiley, 1967, 376 p. $8.95 (Paper, $4.95).

Twelve contributors present case studies. Stanley Hoffmann's essay on "heroic leadership" in modern France is worth the price of the entire book.

A THEORY OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION. By Claude Ake. Homewood (Ill.): Dorsey Press, 1967, 164 p. $6.65.

A highly abstract, heavily behavioral, and very generalized excursion into empirical political theory.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF METHODS AND CONCEPTS. By J. P. Nettl. New York: Basic Books, 1967, 442 p. $8.50.

A massive effort, written in neo-Parsonian idiom, reaching fairly commonplace conclusions.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: Praeger, 1967, 384 p. $10.00.

A comprehensive and well-organized symposium.

WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LAW. By Jerome Morenoff. Charlottesville (Va.): Michie Co., 1967, 329 p. $10.00.

The author makes a survey of space law and argues for a "United Nations Reconnaissance Agency."

DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. By Clifton E. Wilson. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967, 300 p. $8.50.

A detailed and useful compendium.

PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: Free Press, 1967, 554 p. $9.95.

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A comparative analysis of voting patterns and social bases of party support in the English-speaking democracies, continental Europe, northern Europe and the emerging nations. The editors have attempted to place the eleven contributions into a common conceptual framework. An ambitious and useful work.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. By Leon D. Epstein. New York: Praeger, 1967, 374 p. $8.50.

A well-known American political scientist presents a comprehensive, scholarly survey of all aspects of contemporary parties, focusing particularly on Britain and America. Informative and quite readable.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF POWER: HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HAJO HOLBORN. Edited by Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 464 p. $6.95.

Twenty-four historical essays on the manifold aspects of political power, drawn largely from the European experience.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD: PARLIAMENTS, PARTIES AND PRESS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1968. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 366 p. $10.00.

This standard annual reference work gives the composition of governments; sums up party programs and lists leaders; lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies. Includes a 32-page supplement of political maps.

THE COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ALMANAC. By Morris L. Ernst with Judith A. Posner, editor. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 239 p. $6.95.

How 214 countries and territories rank in various basic respects, from life expectancy to number of hospital beds, from suicide rates to number of phones and radios.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE KOREAN WAR. By General Matthew B. Ridgway. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 291 p. $6.95.

This is the war memoir of a soldier who is both tough and sensitive. It includes fine descriptions of the Truman-MacArthur controversy and of the restoration of battle élan in the Eighth Army. The book's central conclusion: "Korea taught us that all warfare from this time forth must be limited."

THE BLAST OF WAR, 1939–1945. By Harold Macmillan. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 623 p. $11.95.

These memoirs by the future Prime Minister form a worthy counterpoint to Winston Churchill's great epic of the Second World War.

PARADOXES DE LA PAIX. By Pierre M. Gallois. Paris: Presses du Temps Présent, 1967, 369 p. Fr. 18.

A challenging analysis, by a leading advocate of an independent French nuclear deterrent, of the impact of atomic power on military alliances.

STRATEGY OF ACTION. By Général d'Armée André Beaufre. New York: Praeger, 1967, 136 p. $4.50.

The third—and most impressive—volume in a trilogy on strategic thought by a leading French military thinker. (First published in Paris as "Stratégie de l'Action," Colin, 1966, 144 p.)

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY AND THE COMMON DEFENSE. By Joel Larus. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, 171 p. $6.50.

A discerning analysis of the problems and prospects of reducing the possibility of nuclear weapons accidents.

INCREDIBLE VICTORY. By Walter Lord. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 331 p. $5.95.

A fast-paced, well-researched narrative of the "closest squeak and the greatest victory"—the Battle of Midway.

THE BATTLE FOR ITALY. By W. G. F. Jackson. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 372 p. $8.50.

Pending the official history, this may well stand as the definitive work on the Italian campaign in World War II.

BATTLES OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA. By Charles A. Lockwood and Hans Christian Adamson. New York: Crowell, 1967, 229 p. $6.95.

A good account of the great sea battles of mid-1944.

THE DYNAMIC WAR. By Lieutenant Colonel Alan Kinghorn. New York: Exposition Press, 1967, 121 p. $4.50.

A succinct survey of the British-German campaigns in North Africa in World War II.

THE BASTARD WAR: THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1914–1918. By A. J. Barker. New York: Dial Press, 1967, 449 p. $7.50.

An authoritative study of the battles waged over the Mesopotamian oil fields between Turkey and Great Britain during World War I.

General: Economic and Social

TRADE PREFERENCES FOR LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES POLICY. By Sidney Weintraub. New York: Praeger, 1967, 231 p. $12.50.

The best study yet of a hot subject. The consideration of policy issues is far more thorough than in previous books, reflecting the author's former responsibilities for these matters in the State Department.

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OBSERVED. By Albert O. Hirschman. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 197 p. $6.00.

Studying World Bank projects has not led Professor Hirschman to write eleven case studies or even to design pigeonholes. Instead, he comments, speculates and reasons closely about ideas suggested by what he saw. The result appears to be another major contribution by an author who has already written two seminal books on development.

DIAGNOSTIC DE L'ÉVOLUTION ÉCONOMIQUE DU TIERS-MONDE 1900–1966. By Paul Bairoch. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1967, 228 p. Fr. 22.

The rather daring effort to treat the less developed countries as a whole produces some interesting statistics and suggestive ideas.

FISCAL AND MONETARY PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING STATES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD REHOVOTH CONFERENCE. Edited by David Krivine. New York: Praeger, 1967, 404 p. $12.50.

Some excellent pieces by authorities from all over the world.

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NO EASY HARVEST: THE DILEMMA OF AGRICULTURE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Max F. Millikan and David Hapgood. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, 178 p. $5.75 (Paper, $2.95).

An excellent condensation of expert thought on the whole range of factors that make agricultural development difficult.

STUDIES IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES. By Bela Balassa and associates. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 346 p. $11.50.

Most of these papers assess the effects of tariff reduction on specific industrial countries, but two authors deal separately with non-tariff barriers and fiscal and social charges. Uneven but with some very good material, the studies were made in preparation for Balassa's recent book reviewed here July 1967 ("Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries").

THE COMMON AID EFFORT: THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. By Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, 421 p. $7.50.

An economist and a political scientist combine forces in a thorough analysis of the work of the Development Assistance Committee and related OECD and consortia activities.

THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. By Anthony Harrison. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 189 p. $5.75.

Excellent summary history of international economic relations in the twentieth century and the changing role of governmental policy.

INFLATION ET ORDRE MONÉTAIRE INTERNATIONAL. By Jacques Rueff and others. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1967, 173 p. (Geneva: Droz, Swiss Fr. 18).

More about the second than the first topic, by a number of eminent authorities.

LOCATION OF INDUSTRY AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS. By Seev Hirsch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 133 p. $5.60.

An interesting contribution, combining theory and cases, to the growing understanding of the relation between industrial technology, stages of production and the different advantages enjoyed by developed and less developed countries in world trade.

INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Bertil Ohlin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 324 p. $8.95.

A slightly abridged edition of a 35-year-old classic, with a substantial essay giving the author's present views.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST HUNGER. By E. C. Stakman and others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 328 p. $7.50.

A history of the Rockefeller Foundation's work on increasing food production begun in Mexico in the '40s and now extended to other countries.

The United States

THE NEW AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH. By Louis Heren. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 366 p. $7.95.

This is a highly perceptive and balanced essay on the American political system by the Washington correspondent of the London *Times*. A valuable contribution.

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BACK TO BACK. By Leonard Baker. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 311 p. $6.95.

A workmanlike, thoroughly researched account of the "court-packing" battle between F.D.R. and the Supreme Court. The author, incidentally, suggests that Lyndon Johnson won his seat in Congress in 1937 primarily by supporting Roosevelt's campaign to enlarge the Court.

EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Leo Katcher. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967, 502 p. $8.50.

This biography, written in staccato style, is better on Warren the politician than on Warren the Supreme Court Justice. The analysis of the crucial constitutional decisions is lacking in depth.

WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA. By John D. Weaver. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, 406 p. $7.95.

This book covers more or less the same ground as the Katcher biography. Again, one misses a probing analysis of Earl Warren, Chief Justice. However, the book includes a first-rate assessment of the Warren Commission Report on the assassination of President Kennedy.

ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928–1945. Annotated by Max Freedman. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1968, 772 p. $17.50.

This is a poignant and moving book, in essence the story of a friendship, but illuminated with flashes of insight into the personalities and politics of the President and the Justice.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES. By Louis L. Gerson. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968, 372 p. $7.95.

This sympathetic but on the whole objective political portrait represents Volume XVII in "The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy" series under the advisory editorship of Samuel Flagg Bemis.

THE *PANAY* INCIDENT: PRELUDE TO WAR. By Manny T. Koginos. Lafayette: Purdue University Studies, 1967, 154 p. $4.75.

The author maintains that the sinking of the American gunboat *Panay* in 1937 was provoked by Japanese military extremists, not the Japanese government as a whole. An interesting, closely-reasoned interpretation of this episode on the road to Pearl Harbor.

THE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF AMERICANS: A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION. By Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967, 239 p. $10.00.

A workmanlike study with some useful methodological innovations. One melancholy conclusion: "A surprising number of Americans are abysmally ignorant of the specifics of international affairs, even at the most elementary level."

FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF WAR, 1941–1945. By John Morton Blum. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 526 p. $10.00.

The concluding volume in the editor's trilogy. An overlong, often discursive chronicle of the friendship between the President and his Secretary of the Treasury.

THE TRUMAN PERIOD AS A RESEARCH FIELD. Edited by Richard S. Kirkendall. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1967, 284 p. $6.00.

This volume, the outgrowth of a conference of historians, political scientists and archivists held in the Truman Library in 1966, is the definitive reference source for scholars of the Truman Presidency.

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FARM POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE TRUMAN YEARS. By Allen J. Matusow. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 267 p. $7.50.
An authoritative work.

TO SEEK A NEWER WORLD. By Robert F. Kennedy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 233 p. $4.95.
A judicious selection from the Senator's papers and speeches since January 1965.

IN SEARCH OF LIGHT. By Edward R. Murrow. New York: Knopf, 1967, 364 p. $6.95.
The great broadcast journalist's reports from 1938 to 1961. The broadcasts age well in print.

IN A TIME OF TORMENT. By I. F. Stone. New York: Random House, 1967, 463 p. $7.95.
A well-assorted collection of "Weeklies" from the editor's pen over the past five years.

PRESENT TENSE: AN AMERICAN EDITOR'S ODYSSEY. By Norman Cousins. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967, 679 p. $7.95.
The editorial page from the *Saturday Review* from Pearl Harbor to Viet Nam. The author's major thesis: The world has become one, but has not become whole.

The Western Hemisphere

CANADA AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE. By Paul Martin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 93 p. $3.95.
Three lectures delivered in 1967 by the Canadian Minister of External Affairs on Canada's role in world affairs.

THE TWILIGHT STRUGGLE. By William D. Rogers. New York: Random House, 1967, 301 p. $6.95.
A sober assessment of the Alliance for Progress—its history, accomplishments and prospects. The author notes that the Alliance "represents an attempt, crude and primitive though it may be, to coördinate the forces for change," and calls for its expansion.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: LATIN AMERICA. By Roberto Alemann and others. New York: Praeger, 1967, 341 p. $10.50.
These absorbing studies, prepared for the Committee for Economic Development, survey the economies of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Written by national policy-makers and/or advisers, the overall tone is conservative. Of particular interest is the essay on Brazil by Mário Henrique Simonsen.

REFLECTIONS ON LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT. By Roberto de Oliveira Campos. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1967, 168 p. $5.00.
These informative essays, by Brazil's theoretician and Minister of Planning during the post-Goulart régime of Castello Branco, provide the intellectual justification for his austere economic policies initiated in 1964.

EL TRATADO DE TLATELOLCO. By Alfonso García Robles. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1967, 339 p.
Speeches and documents, compiled by one of Mexico's leading proponents of nuclear disarmament, tracing the successful effort to bar nuclear weapons from Latin America.

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MEXICO'S RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE MEXICAN VIEW. By Enrique Pérez López and others. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1967, 217 p. $5.00.

Six prominent Mexican economists examine varied aspects of the Mexican economy.

THE LAST, BEST HOPE: EDUARDO FREI AND CHILEAN DEMOCRACY. By Leonard Gross. New York: Random House, 1967, 240 p. $5.95.

Journalistic phrasings and factual oversimplifications characterize this optimistic portrayal of Chile's present régime.

COLOMBIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE. By Robert H. Dix. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 452 p. $10.00.

An important, institutional study of contemporary Colombia and the influence which the process of modernization—industrialization and urbanization—has had upon the traditional system. The conclusions are not encouraging.

PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN PERU. By Daniel R. Kilty. New York: Praeger, 1967, 196 p. $12.50.

An intensive but dry study of public agencies involved in Peruvian developmental planning.

CULTURAL PLURALISM AND NATIONALIST POLITICS IN BRITISH GUIANA. By Leo A. Despres. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967, 310 p. $4.50 (Paper).

A scholarly study of the impact which ethnic and cultural factors have had upon the political system of Guyana.

Western Europe

POLITICAL UNION: A MICROCOSM OF EUROPEAN POLITICS, 1960–1966. By Susanne J. Bodenheimer. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1967, 229 p. Gldrs. 29.50.

A useful study of why political union among the six members of the EEC is so hard to establish, with particular emphasis on de Gaulle's initiative in 1962 and the reasons for Dutch resistance.

EUROPE IN A SHRINKING WORLD. By Laurance Reed. London: Oldbourne, 1967, 208 p. 30/.

A rapid survey of the technological gap which, according to the British author, only European union can fill.

THE POLITICS OF THE COMMON MARKET. By W. Hartley Clark. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 180 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A combination of introductory survey and perceptive comment.

MACMILLAN: A STUDY IN AMBIGUITY. By Anthony Sampson. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967, 256 p. $6.50.

A fine interim study of the career of this fascinating and complex figure. By the author of well-known works on contemporary England.

ESSAYS ON REFORM, 1967: A CENTENARY TRIBUTE. Edited by Bernard Crick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 222 p. $4.80.

A collection of informative, even important essays by established writers, dedicated to the belief that Britain needs to embark on new reforms if it is "to continue to be a worthy place in which a good life can be led."

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BRITAIN AND EUROPE—HOW MUCH HAS CHANGED? By William Pickles. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, 119 p. 10/6.

"Not enough," would appear to be the answer of this British political scientist who still opposes his country's entry into the Common Market, as he did in 1962.

A WREATH TO CLIO: STUDIES IN BRITISH, AMERICAN AND GERMAN AFFAIRS. By Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 224 p. $7.50.

Thoughts and vignettes on British politics, German leaders and the American Civil War, by a veteran historian, writing with his customary perspicacity.

THE CRAFT OF DIPLOMACY. By Sir Douglas Busk. New York: Praeger, 1967, 293 p. $6.95.

A former British diplomat has written a witty but serious exposition of what it takes to have a good foreign service. Lessons are chiefly drawn from the British service but could apply to others as well. Recommended light reading for ambassadors-to-be.

DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1944–1946. By A. W. DePorte. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 327 p. $7.95.

A thoughtful and balanced study of de Gaulle's first ventures in foreign policy, with illuminating efforts to place his foreign policy in the tradition of such predecessors as Barthou and Poincaré. The author, at present a State Department official, believes that de Gaulle's policy after the war set the lines for his successors and foreshadowed the aims of his present administration.

BILAN DE LA Ve RÉPUBLIQUE: LES POLITIQUES. By Pierre Viansson-Ponté. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967, 276 p. Fr. 11.40.

Nine years of Gaullist rule thoughtfully and knowledgeably assessed, by a leading writer of *Le Monde*. The balance of the past is coupled with a brief but highly suggestive perspective of the future with its whole new range of domestic problems. A chronology of the Fifth Republic further enhances the value of this unassuming but important book.

LE RÉGIME PRÉSIDENTIEL ET LA FRANCE: ÉTUDE D'HISTOIRE DES IDÉES JURIDIQUES ET POLITIQUES. By Hugues Tay. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1967, 334 p. Fr. 39.90.

An historical analysis of the various proponents of a presidential régime, particularly after 1940. A useful background to the present and future controversy concerning this fundamental question in French politics.

ANTIMÉMOIRES. By André Malraux. Paris: Gallimard, 1967, 604 p. Fr. 28.

In this first of four projected volumes, Malraux uses the episodes of his rich life as illustrations or signposts of the human condition. Of appealing interest to the philosophically- and politically-minded alike.

THE NORDIC COUNCIL: A STUDY OF SCANDINAVIAN REGIONALISM. By Stanley V. Anderson. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967, 194 p. $7.50.

A political scientist analyzes the evolution of this major regional body, composed of deputies from the five Scandinavian Parliaments. It epitomizes the cooperation of the Nordic countries and their discovery of a middle way between anarchy and integration: "Among themselves, they will neither fight nor unite."

KOMMUNISTEN IM NORDEN. Edited by Åke Sparring. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967, 167 p. DM. 16.80.

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Four valuable studies of postwar communist parties in Scandinavia. The recent rise of new left-wing socialist parties has severely reduced the power and appeal of traditional, Moscow-dominated communism.

THE NEW SWEDEN: THE CHALLENGE OF A DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY. By Frederic Fleisher. New York: McKay, 1967, 365 p. $6.50.

The lessons of contemporary Sweden in sixteen informative chapters, ranging from politics to the new morality. By an American student and long-term resident who obtained his doctorate and wife in Sweden.

GERMANY'S AIMS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By Fritz Fischer. New York: Norton, 1967, 652 p. $15.00.

Because of its insistence on Germany's chief responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War and on its extreme annexationist aims during it, this work created an unprecedented furor in Germany. The author, on the basis of a mass of new—and to Germany damaging—archival evidence, suggests that German expansionism, closely related to the industrial interests of the country, was a continuous policy throughout the first half of the twentieth century. A truly important work that has already stimulated new researches in Germany and elsewhere and must be regarded as fundamental to an understanding of German and European history in our time. (German original published in 1961.)

ERINNERUNGEN, 1955–1959. By Konrad Adenauer. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967, 551 p. DM. 24.80.

By far the most interesting and most candid volume of the Adenauer "Memoirs," covering the domestic and foreign scene from the origins of the Common Market to Dulles' death and the Chancellor's refusal to give way to Erhard. Adenauer provides fascinating résumés of his diplomatic conversations, including his first meeting with de Gaulle in 1958 at which the Chancellor warned that "one could not count forever on the United States," and that Europe had to be made independent of the U.S. Was our staunchest ally a premature crypto-Gaullist?

ITALY FROM LIBERALISM TO FASCISM, 1870–1925. By Christopher Seton-Watson. London: Methuen, 1967, 772 p. (New York: Barnes and Noble, $19.00).

A political history of splendid thoroughness and perception, written with critical command of all sources and infused with the author's intimate knowledge of contemporary Italy. The English scholar is more generous in his assessment of the achievements of the liberal half-century than has been customary in recent literature.

THE FALL AND RISE OF MODERN ITALY. By Serge Hughes. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 322 p. $6.95.

An uneven effort to illuminate Italian politics since 1890 against the background of Italian culture. The author argues that "modern Italian history consists basically of two periods" and that the second period began with the left-center collaboration of the early 1960s.

FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ITALY. By Robert M. Stern. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with University of Michigan Graduate Research Seminar in International Economics), 1967, 216 p. $12.50.

Measures the importance of exports in stimulating Italian economic growth.

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ÖSTERREICH UND DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN: EINE BESTANDAUFNAHME VON 10 JAHREN MITGLIEDSCHAFT. By Wolfgang Strasser. Vienna: Braumüller (for the Österreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen), 1967, 439 p.

A thorough study of Austrian policy in the United Nations in its first decade of membership beginning in 1955. Not surprisingly, particular attention is paid to Austrian efforts concerning South Tyrol.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT. By J. P. Nettl. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 288 p. $6.95.

An able and readable interpretation of Soviet history in the half-century since the Revolution. Designed for the interested general reader but containing many views and insights that will be of interest to the specialist.

THE SOVIET UNION: THE FIFTY YEARS. Edited by Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, 484 p. $10.00.

An extensive survey of the Soviet Union today, fifty years after the Revolution, by a group of *The New York Times* reporters, sent to the U.S.S.R. in 1967. Somewhat uneven in the level of performance and coverage, but containing some excellent pieces.

THE U.S.S.R. AFTER 50 YEARS: PROMISE AND REALITY. Edited by Samuel Hendel and Randolph L. Braham. New York: Knopf, 1967, 299 p. $3.95 (Paper).

A collection of stock-taking essays on various aspects of the Soviet achievement.

SOVIET POLITICAL THOUGHT. Selected, translated, and edited by Michael Jaworskyj. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 621 p. $15.00.

An extensive collection of materials translated from the Russian and organized chronologically, covering the period from 1917 to 1961.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1928–1934: DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS. By Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966–67, 2 v. $19.00.

A useful selection of documents, with narrative summary, covering a particularly critical turning point in Soviet foreign policy. A publication of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.

PLANNING REFORMS IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1962–1966. By Eugène Zaleski. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967, 203 p. $6.00.

An analysis of recent reforms in Soviet economic planning and management.

PLANNING AND THE MARKET IN THE U.S.S.R.: THE 1960's. By Alexander Balinky and others. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967, 132 p. $4.00.

An inquiry by four specialists into the Soviet economic reforms of the first half of the 1960s.

THE ORIGIN OF FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET STATE, 1917–1921. By James Bunyan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (in coöperation with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1967, 276 p. $10.00.

A useful collection of documents, with introductions, depicting the development of Bolshevik policy toward labor in the first years of the Soviet régime.

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POST-WAR YEARS: 1945–1954. By Ilya Ehrenburg. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1967, 349 p. $6.50.

This last volume of the memoirs of the late Russian writer leaves many things unsaid about the late Stalin years but is a significant document none the less.

VOICES OF THE RED GIANTS: COMMUNICATIONS IN RUSSIA AND CHINA. By James W. Markham. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967, 513 p. $7.50.

An investigation, by a professor of journalism at the University of Iowa, of communist mass-communication systems in the Soviet Union and China.

RED OCTOBER: THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION OF 1917. By Robert V. Daniels. New York: Scribner, 1967, 269 p. $6.95.

In this important and absorbing study Mr. Daniels traces the confused course of events immediately preceding the Bolshevik seizure of power and finds that this momentous event was far from a well-planned coup. On the contrary, the whole episode was shot full of contingency and cross-purposes.

LA RÉVOLUTION DE 1917: LA CHUTE DU TSARISME ET LES ORIGINES D'OCTOBRE. By Marc Ferro. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1967, 606 p. Fr. 28.50.

An admirable history, broad in scope, well written and using new material, of the first half of the revolutionary year—from the fall of the Tsar to the end of the brief "honeymoon" period in June.

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: THE PETROGRAD BOLSHEVIKS AND THE JULY 1917 UPRISING. By Alexander Rabinowitch. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968, 299 p. $8.50.

An able and scholarly inquiry into the perplexing abortive Petrograd uprisings of June and July 1917. No startling revelations but a very interesting view of revolutionary action on the local level at that critical period.

LENIN: THE MAN, THE THEORIST, THE LEADER. Edited by Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway. New York: Praeger (in association with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1967, 317 p. $7.50.

A superior set of papers, chiefly by British scholars, reappraising various facets of Lenin's abilities, policies and career.

THE BRIDGE AND THE ABYSS: THE TROUBLED FRIENDSHIP OF MAXIM GORKY AND V. I. LENIN. By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1967, 180 p. $5.95.

An illuminating account of the strained, ambivalent but protracted friendship between Lenin and Maxim Gorky.

DIE WISSENSCHAFT IN OSTEUROPA. By Vilmos von Zsolnay. Mainz: V. Hase and Koehler, 1967, 230 p. DM. 38.50.

A survey of the role of organization of the sciences in the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

WISSENSCHAFT IN KOMMUNISTISCHEN LÄNDERN. Edited by Dietrich Geyer. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1967, 309 p. DM. 19.80.

An interesting mélange of essays by German scholars on philosophical, scientific, political and literary thought in the communist countries of Europe.

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DAS BANKWESEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN VOLKSDEMOKRATIEN. By Ursula Fox. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 1967, 209 p. DM. 23.

This useful study of the structure and activity of banking in Eastern Europe includes an examination of international coöperation in these matters.

LA YOUGOSLAVIE. By Jovan Djordjevic. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1967, 482 p. Fr. 42.

A systematic analysis of the political and constitutional systems of contemporary Jugoslavia, in the "Comment ils sont gouvernés" series.

BÉLA KUN AND THE HUNGARIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC: THE ORIGINS AND ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HUNGARY IN THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1918–1919. By Rudolf L. Tőkés. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1967, 292 p. $7.50.

An able investigation of the origins of the Hungarian Communist Party, centering on the figure of Béla Kun and concluding with the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The Middle East

THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE ARAB WORLD. By John S. Badeau. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 209 p. $4.95.

Mature reflections based on the author's long and deep acquaintance with the Arab world as scholar, administrator and U.S. ambassador. Without prescribing detailed policies, he sets forth the elements of an approach attuned both to basic American interests and to the nature of Arab society and politics in a time of constant and often unpredictable change.

FELLACHEN UND FUNKTIONÄRE: ENTWICKLUNGSWEGE IM NAHEN OSTEN. By Arnold Hottinger. Munich: Kösel, 1967, 211 p. DM. 12.80.

A seasoned journalist's essay on modernization and development in the Middle East. Wisely, he eschews far-ranging theories in favor of sober conclusions resting on the specific political and social conditions in each country.

ISRAEL ON THE ROAD TO SINAI: 1949–1956: WITH A SEQUEL ON THE SIX-DAY WAR, 1967. By Ernest Stock. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967, 284 p. $6.50.

Careful attention to the press and parliamentary debates in Israel gives this competent account of Israel's foreign policy the added dimension of linkage to domestic politics.

THE SUN STOOD STILL. By Roderick MacLeish. New York: Atheneum, 1967, 174 p. $4.50.

A reporter's vivid first-hand impressions from Cairo on the eve of war and from Israel during the six days.

A HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL. BOOK TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT. By Harry Viteles. London: Vallentine, 1967, 749 p. 5 Gns.

This second volume in a projected series of seven describes the evolution of Israel's best known type of coöperative, the kibbutz, from its origins to the present. Massive in its detail, it is an invaluable collection of source material.

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BERICHT EINES BEAUFTRAGTEN: DIE DEUTSCH-ISRAELISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN 1951–1966. By Felix E. Shinnar. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1967, 209 p. DM. 19.80.

Relations between Israel and the Federal Republic, recounted by the Israeli negotiator of the agreement of 1952 on reparation who continued to play a role until the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1965.

CYPRUS: CONFLICT AND CONCILIATION, 1954–1958. By Stephen G. Xydis. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, 704 p. $15.00.

Meticulous in attention to detail, this massive monograph is devoted to Greece's diplomatic strategy in putting its case on Cyprus to the United Nations. Based on published documents and on the papers of Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek Foreign Minister.

TURKEY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION. By Firouz Bahrampour. Brooklyn: Gaus, 1967, 100 p. $5.00.

A description of developments since Ataturk's revolution, based on wide reading but too brief to be more than an introduction.

ARMENIA ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, 1918. By Richard G. Hovannisian. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 364 p. $8.50.

This detailed account of the Armenian question during the First World War and the events leading to the brief period of independence of the "Armenian Republic" is a significant contribution to the political and diplomatic history of the period.

AFGHANISTAN, 1900–1923: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. By Ludwig W. Adamec. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 245 p. $7.00.

A scholarly monograph describing the skillful handling of Afghanistan's foreign relations by three rulers who successfully established the independence which this classic buffer state has since maintained.

South and Southeast Asia

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA. By E. Stuart Kirby. New York: Praeger, 1967, 253 p. $10.00.

A competent survey of the economic development from 1945 to 1965 of fifteen countries in the ECAFE Region represented by East, South and Southeast Asia. Figures and statements are mostly from official sources; inferences, comments and evaluations are the author's own.

THE INDUS RIVERS: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PARTITION. By Aloys Arthur Michel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 595 p. $12.50.

Mr. Michel analyzes Indus Basin projects in the context of political and economic developments in West Pakistan and India since partition. Based on field work carried on in 1963 and 1964.

INDIA AND CEYLON: UNITY AND DIVERSITY. Edited by Philip Mason. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1967, 311 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.50).

Part of a larger project to compare relations in various parts of the world between ethnic groups inhabiting the same state. The essayists find diversity in India in the fields of religion, language and region, tribal populations, the ex-untouchables and disunity between the masses and middle-class leaders.

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INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN INDIA: A STUDY OF INDIAN FEDERALISM. By Amal Ray. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967, 184 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $4.75).

An account of the working relationships between the Union and the states in India, with emphasis on forces and processes rather than the legal structure, and of how recent events have made necessary changes in the traditional concept of essentials of federalism.

WE NEHRUS. By Krishna Nehru Hutheesing with Alden Hatch. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, 343 p. $6.95.

Jawaharlal Nehru's youngest sister (and Indira Gandhi's aunt), herself an important Indian revolutionary active in Indian political and civil affairs, describes the lives and personalities of her family and how they reacted to historical events.

THE KASHMIR STORY. By B. L. Sharma. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967, 271 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $4.75).

An attempt to discover, on the basis of a study of official records of the Security Council and reports of its agencies, whether the Kashmir dispute can be solved. The answer is no. The author, closely associated with the question since its inception and a Council adviser from 1948 to 1966, is sometimes highly critical of the U.N.

THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN. By Chaudhri Muhammad Ali. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 418 p. $11.00.

A Pakistani's account of the events of 1946–48 (immediately preceding and following the partition of British India), the social, economic and political factors shaping them, and the problems facing the new state of Pakistan. Based on first-hand observations of a public servant closely associated with these events and on documentary evidence.

INDIA, CHINA AND PAKISTAN. By Latif Ahmed Sherwani. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1967, 140 p. Rs. 9.

An indictment of India's motivations in foreign policy-making, with emphasis on the roles of Pakistan and China in the formulation of policy.

LAST REFLECTIONS ON A WAR. By Bernard B. Fall. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 288 p. $4.95.

Nineteen tape recordings, unpublished works and articles not earlier published in book form selected by the widow of this highly regarded journalist who was killed, on his sixth visit to Viet Nam, on February 21, 1967. Mrs. Fall also contributes a moving preface.

LA GUERRE ET LA RÉVOLUTION. I: GUERRES D'ASIE: VIETNAM ET CORÉE. By Pierre Naville. Paris: Études et Documentation Internationales, 1967, 324 p. Fr. 18.50.

Events of the 1949–56 phase of the Vietnamese and Korean conflicts, chronologically intermingled in one sequence. The author sees them as part of a larger series of situations over the last thirty years of history, including the status of Taiwan and the Indonesian affair which, he says, may well form the first phase of a third world war.

VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. Edited by Robert A. Rupen and Robert Farrell. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.), 1967, 120 p. $5.00.

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Nine essays resulting from a 1966 international symposium sponsored by the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. The contents include military considerations, relations among the countries involved, influence of the war on China's economy, repercussions in Japan and containment in Asia.

THE FIRST VIETNAM CRISIS: CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT, 1953–1954. By Melvin Gurtov. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 228 p. $7.00.

A description and analysis of strategic and political issues as U.S. policy-makers saw them at the time, with details of the struggle between those who advocated direct American military intervention and those who advocated a severely limited commitment. Sources include the Dulles papers.

"BIG VICTORY, GREAT TASK." By General Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Praeger, 1968, 120 p. $4.50.

Translated reprints of a series of articles published in Hanoi in 1966 by North Viet Nam's Minister of Defense, designed to evoke renewed spirit in the military cadres. Giap, loyal disciple of Ho, claims failure of U.S. aims (the "big victory") and writes of the road ahead (the "great task"). David Schoenbrun, who witnessed Giap's success at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and who recently interviewed the defense minister, provides a thoughtful introduction.

THE VILLAGE OF BEN SUC. By Jonathan Schell. New York: Knopf, 1967, 132 p. $3.95.

Mr. Schell, Harvard graduate student in Far Eastern history, participated in the January 8, 1967, operation by American forces which eliminated Ben Suc and transplanted its 3,500 people, mostly farmers, to a soil-barren refugee camp. A disturbingly moving book.

WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM. By Bertrand Russell. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, 178 p. $4.00. (London: Allen and Unwin, 25/.)

The 95-year-old philosopher bitterly denounces U.S. actions in Viet Nam and the climate in which they are determined.

A HISTORY OF BURMA. By Maung Htin Aung. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 363 p. $12.00.

An interpretation by a Burmese of the 2,000-year history of his country, derived mainly from Burmese sources. As the author, the former rector of the University of Rangoon points out, his interpretation differs from the standard British and American works of Hall and Cady. The main section ends with the regaining of independence in 1948.

CAMBODIA: THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY. By Michael Leifer. New York: Praeger, 1967, 209 p. $6.00.

The author focuses on Sihanouk's dilemma in maintaining neutrality while threatened by Thai irredentism and Vietnamese expansionism.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA. By R. S. Milne. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 259 p. $2.75 (Paper).

Including Singapore as well as Malaysia, the author describes, analyzes and interprets the area's parliament, federal-state relations (including Sabah and Sarawak) and local government. Comparisons with other countries are noted.

LAND TENURE IN VILLAGE CEYLON. By Gananath Obeyesekere. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 319 p. $13.00.

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A University of Ceylon sociologist, on the basis of 1961 field work in Southern Province, analyzes in detail the contemporary system of land tenure and traces the evolution of every land-holding and correlated kinship pattern from the inception of the estate in 1790.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

U.S. POLICY AND THE SECURITY OF ASIA. By Fred Greene. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 429 p. $9.95.

After treating the role of security in foreign relations in general, Mr. Greene shows how and to what extent America's traditional involvement in Asia has developed, identifies threats to its interests there and discusses effects of possible changes in commitments and alignments.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE, 1953–1967. By Kenneth T. Young. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 461 p. $10.95.

An account and appraisal of the 130 or more secret Ambassadorial Talks, held first in Geneva, now in Warsaw, at which American and Chinese representatives discuss their governments' position on important, timely issues. A unique and valuable work, by a former American Ambassador with personal experience in negotiating with the Chinese.

WESTERN INTRUDERS: AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE FAR EAST. By James P. Warburg. New York: Atheneum, 1967, 229 p. $5.75.

Mr. Warburg first briefly summarizes major Western developments in world history before contacts with Asia and discusses East-West confrontations, continuing to correlate them with important landmarks in global historical involvements.

ACROSS THE PACIFIC: AN INNER HISTORY OF AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS. By Akira Iriye. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, 361 p. $8.50.

Using Chinese, Japanese and Western sources, the author examines the way Chinese, Japanese and Americans have regarded each other since 1780, their misperceptions, their common problems and how all this is related to their historical experiences and to the overall international system. A solid, important work.

CHOU EN-LAI: CHINA'S GRAY EMINENCE. By Kai-yu Hsu. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 294 p. $5.95.

A highly readable biography of Communist China's Premier who, in pre-Mao days, built the party élite and subsequently the army élite, organized the key party systems and saw to it that they worked. Professor Hsu draws on information from people who knew Chou at different times and from Chinese and non-Chinese source materials.

THE RED GUARD: A REPORT ON MAO'S REVOLUTION. By Hans Granqvist. New York: Praeger, 1967, 159 p. $5.95.

The origins and aims of Mao's Cultural Revolution and details of methods used to make it a success. This Scandinavian correspondent in Hong Kong suggests political and economic reasons for popular dissatisfaction and attributes the establishment of the Red Guard to reactions to the brutality of work teams dispatched to implement official orders.

CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A RESEARCH GUIDE. By Peter Berton and Eugene Wu. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967, 695 p. $22.50.

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The scholarly compilers identify, describe and tell how to use Chinese and Japanese, Russian and Western-language sources for the study of post-1949 Communist China and post-1945 Taiwan. The 2,226 entries, selected from the most important collections examined here and abroad, concern primarily the social sciences and the humanities. A very valuable contribution.

CHINA'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM. By Audrey Donnithorne. New York: Praeger, 1967, 592 p. $13.50.

A painstaking delineation, sector by sector, of Communist China's economic organization with focus on the 1957–66 years. Miss Donnithorne approaches her task mainly from the institutional (*v.* quantitative) side because, as she says, economic policy there is so closely interrelated with the remolding of social life and customs and because lack of reliable statistics prevents other approaches.

DOLLARS, DEPENDENTS AND DOGMA. By Chun-hsi Wu. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967, 231 p. $7.00.

The intricate nature of overseas remittances to Communist China, the institutions and channels for making them, their volume and the Communists' attitude toward the transactions.

THE SPATIAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA: A STUDY ON INDUSTRIAL LOCATION AND TRANSPORTATION. By Yuan-li Wu with others. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1967, 367 p. $10.00.

A highly regarded specialist focuses on aspects of the problem of integrating a vast land area into a viable economy. Concentration is on railways.

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The conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and China's writers in the 1940s and 1950s. The influences of these unorthodox intellectuals, recalcitrant youth and revisionists can be seen in the current Cultural Revolution, which, however, is not treated in this volume.

FORMOSA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Lung-Chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 428 p. $8.95.

A straightforward work whose authors recommend General Assembly and Security Council seats for Communist China and subsequent admission to the U.N. of Formosa which, "freed of the fantasies and abuses of Chiang's dictatorial leadership, . . . can become a viable and responsible member of the world community."

CONTEST OVER JAPAN. By Herbert Feis. New York: Norton, 1967, 187 p. $5.00.

A Pulitzer Prize historian assesses the rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the right to direct policies of Japan during the Occupation, 1945–1952.

LES AMÉRICAINS ET SA MAJESTÉ L'EMPEREUR: ÉTUDE DU CONFLIT CULTUREL D'OÙ NAQUIT LA CONSTITUTION JAPONAISE DE 1946. By Claude Monnier. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1967, 222 p.

A comparison of American and Japanese political systems and of their peoples' attitudes toward constitutional revision. Based almost exclusively on English sources.

THE JAPANESE MIND. Edited by Charles A. Moore with the assistance of Aldyth V. Morris. Honolulu: East-West Center Press; University of Hawaii Press, 1967, 357 p. $9.50.

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An explanation of the fundamentals of the Japanese mind as expressed in its great philosophies, religions, sociology, thought and practices. Part of a trilogy devoted also to China and India and edited by a dean of Asian specialists.

CENTRAL POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH. By Sir Robert Menzies. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967, 198 p. $5.00.

An analysis of the political and legal process of constitutional development in the Australian Federation and of how the central powers of government have tended to grow beyond original conceptions.

AUSTRALIA FACES SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE EMERGENCE OF A FOREIGN POLICY. By Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968, 175 p. $5.75.

An account of the effect of British withdrawal from Asia and of Australia's readjustment in its foreign policies toward its now politically unstable and volatile neighbors.

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An historical perspective followed by an account of the country's physical characteristics and its social and economic structures.

THE DRAMA OF FIJI: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. By John Wesley Coulter. Rutland: Tuttle, 1967, 230 p. $3.50.

The dearth of possibilities for economic growth and of capital for development coupled with economic and political rivalry between the native Melanesians and Indian colonists (with Europeans holding the balance of power) pose problems for this British colony's drive for self-administration. By a geographer and former U.N. Trusteeship official.

Africa

BURDEN OF EMPIRE: AN APPRAISAL OF WESTERN COLONIALISM IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. By L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1967, 435 p. $8.50.

Two members of the Hoover Institution who are specialists on Africa offer a provocative, competent evaluation, with emphasis on colonialism's more creative aspects.

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In an important, comprehensive country-by-country study a development economist at the Stanford Research Institute analyzes and describes economic relations during the period 1955 to 1966. The well-organized statistical data make this volume useful both as a reference work and a general analytical study.

L'AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE. By Assane Seck and Alfred Mondjannagni. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1967, 290 p. Fr. 20.

A general introductory economic geography by two West African scholars.

DAKAR AND WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Richard J. Peterec. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 206 p. $8.75.

A geographer at Bucknell University analyzes the special administrative position of Dakar in the French colonial structure and foresees that the independence of neighboring countries will gradually modify its preëminent position.

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An account of the political developments which confronted the first U. S. Ambassador to Gabon, and a personal memoir about life in Libreville by his wife.

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The policies and contributions of the major European powers as well as those of the Afro-Asian states are examined in this well-researched assessment of the United Nations' activities in the Congo from 1960 to 1964.

POLITICAL PROTEST IN THE CONGO: THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN DURING THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE. By Herbert F. Weiss. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 326 p. $8.50.

Professor Weiss suggests that rural radicalism in the Congo was only temporarily harnessed by the political parties in the struggle against the European élite, but that after independence rural radicals (politicized peasants) have come to resist African élite domination in the same way. A first-rate study.

DESECRATION OF MY KINGDOM. By the Kabaka of Buganda. London: Constable, 1967, 194 p. 35/.

Though the bulk of this book concerns the history and political manœuvrings in Uganda before independence, the short account of the Kabaka's dramatic flight to England and his indictment of the Obote government will be of more immediate interest.

NOT YET UHURU: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OGINGA ODINGA. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967, 323 p. $7.50.

The former Vice President of Kenya, now the leading opponent of the Kenyatta government, devotes most of his attention to the struggle for independence, but gives a cursory account of the events leading up to his resignation from KANU in April 1966.

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An excellent political study of Tanzania's little-understood single-party system, by a Princeton political scientist.

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF UNYAMWEZI. By R. G. Abrahams. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 208 p. $9.50.

A good analytical description of the political life of the inhabitants of the area around Tabora, in pre-independence Tanganyika, by a Cambridge University anthropologist.

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This heretofore unknown account of the Chilembwe revolt in Nyasaland in 1915 by a recently deceased African nationalist was discovered in the Malawi national archives by a Harvard historian, Robert Rotberg. Mwase's essay includes a disturbing account of life in colonial Nyasaland to which Rotberg adds much in an interesting historical introduction. (A publication of the Center for International Affairs).

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The President of Zambia reveals himself to be a perceptive analyst of the problems of the developing countries as well as an arresting public figure in his own right. An excellent little volume.

CRISIS OVER RHODESIA: A SKEPTICAL VIEW. By Charles Burton Marshall. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), 1967, 75 p. $1.45 (Paper).

This is an unequivocal indictment of British and U.N. policies toward Ian Smith's Rhodesia by a Johns Hopkins University professor of international relations. He views the British refusal to grant independence on Smith's terms as juridically and politically ill-conceived and seems strangely reluctant to raise the wider moral issues behind Rhodesia's UDI.

THE BATTLE FOR RHODESIA. By Douglas Reed. New York: Devin-Adair, 1967, 150 p. $3.95.

A South African contends that the whites of southern Africa are struggling alone against a communist-led, international conspiracy against peace, dignity and freedom centered at the United Nations.

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A short introductory survey by a political scientist at the University of Kentucky who sees the elimination of apartheid and South African domination as inevitable despite acknowledged U.N. failures to date.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ITS HUMAN ISSUES. By John H. Wellington. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 461 p. $13.45.

An authoritative, scholarly analysis of South West African history, geography and politics from the pre-European period to the present, by a South African geographer whose balanced study leads him to conclude, "we White South Africans have to face the facts, and the facts are against us. . . . The plain fact emerges that we have put our own interests first and foremost."

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An introductory essay on modernization by the editor is followed by three case studies of individual African societies in transition: the Ukaguru of Tanzania, the Kipsigis of Kenya and the Anaguta of Nigeria. (Two other volumes in the series deal with Latin America and Asia.)

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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